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La thèse part d’un constat : l’absence, somme toute surprenante, d’un concept juridique du gouvernement valable et opérationnel dans l’ensemble des démocraties occidentales ; elle s’appuie sur une conviction: cette absence n’est pas le fait d’un oubli, elle procède d’un abandon nourri par le sentiment que les définitions existantes suffisent aux besoins des tenants du statu quo; elle résulte aussi de l’effet qu’exerce en doctrine et dans la plupart des discours périphériques une idéologie que nous proposons d’appeler idéologie de l’Etat-gouvernement, dont la conséquence la plus claire est de réduire le gouvernement à une projection de l’Etat vu comme Puissance. Comme toute idéologie, celle-ci se nourrit à certaines sources que l’histoire des idées politiques révèle en partie (souveraineté, contrat social), et elle est dotée d’une efficacité relative qui tient à l’absence d’idéologie concurrente. La première partie de la thèse est consacrée à l’étude de ces sources et à celle de l’épuisement de cette idéologie, dont l’une des causes est à rechercher dans les transformations qui affectent le politique en général (« crise » de l’Etat, mondialisation), allant de pair avec l’émergence de techniques de commande inédites, dont la vocation est de donner une réponse à ces transformations, en légitimant de nouveaux processus décisionnels, notamment sous la bannière équivoque de la « gouvernance », sorte d’anti-modèle de gouvernement auquel une étude critique est consacrée. La seconde partie de la thèse entend proposer, après ce constat, les éléments d’une construction juridique d’un concept opérationnel de gouvernement qui commence avec sa désétatisation. Au vu de certains courants de la pensée juridique contemporaine et aussi de certaines pratiques (standards), il nous est apparu qu’une telle définition ne pouvait se servir d’un autre matériau que celui que le droit nous fournit : la norme juridique, elle-même désétatisée et considérée comme un instrument de direction des conduites humaines. A partir de là, nous nous sommes efforcé d’établir que, parallèlement à l’effet d’entraînement des idéologies politiques dominantes, les éléments d’une pré-théorie du gouvernement se font jour, en France depuis le XIXe s., puis en Europe, permettant de dégager quelques lignes de force, avec l’appui d’une partie de la doctrine: primauté du droit comprise d’une certaine manière dans l’Union européenne, autonomisation progressive du pouvoir exécutif et des fonctions y afférentes dans l’ordre interne, critique des éléments constitutifs de l’idéologie de l’Etat - gouvernant. Ces prémices ouvrent la voie à la théorisation proposée : le gouvernement peut être compris alors, analytiquement, comme une technique de résolution des contradictions de normes elle - même normée, c’est à dire répondant à certains besoins et s’inscrivant dans une logique du réseau. D’un point de vue épistémologique et compte tenu de ce qui précède, il est également permis d’affirmer que le gouvernement, sous ses diverses formes historiques, est un instrument de connaissance de l’Etat (dont il révèle une partie de l’ évolution) et du droit qui est à la fois son fondement et l’un de ses moyens d’expression. / It is surprising to realize that there is no ‘legal theory’ of government. Sort of a consensus granting a fuzzy meaning to the concept of government in order to serve discursive necessities somehow persists. Government is locked in a dogmatic straitjacket. This is why defining the concept of government in law requires to proceed first to a critical examination and then to an analytical effort at defining government. This first step will offer a preliminary and interdisciplinary definition of government which will then have to be confronted to Law in order to determine whether there is such a thing as government in French Public Law.The next step is conceptualization. This is my purpose in this dissertation: making sense of government in legal terms. First of all, I demonstrate that scholars of French Law have not been able to think the concept of government in legal terms because this concept has served an ideology which identifies the government with the state. This ideology is built upon a transposition of political theories of government to the field of law; it reduces government to a mere instrument serving the coherence of political speeches. As such, the concept of government has appeared as a tool to make sense of the state historically and analytically. Then, I move beyond this dogma in order to assess the theoretical validity of the definition of government I propose. This endeavour requires building upon the earlier epistemological and interdisciplinary reflexions as well as the conceptual definition of government to create a legal concept of government. The concept of ‘government’ will serve legal knowledge.

This research explores whether, and how, theoretical concepts from agonistic democracy could be operationalised in order to mediate conflict in multicultural, pluralist society. It highlights three central themes of agonistic democracy: political contestation, contingency and necessary interdependency. It subsequently demonstrates the various ways in which these themes are employed, delineating three distinct agonistic approaches: the ‘perfectionist’ (as encapsulated by David Owen), the ‘adversarial’ (as represented by Chantal Mouffe), and the ‘inclusive’ (as symbolised by William Connolly and James Tully). The research then considers possible tensions between agonistic assumptions and further institutional consideration, and draws on new institutionalist literature to identify which kinds of institution could be compatible with agonistic democracy. It explores these through an experiment, which employs three distinct discussion frameworks, each representing a different agonistic approach. The research combines insights from the experiment and agonistic literature to gain a deeper insight into agonistic concepts and the potential for their operationalisation. It suggests that perfectionism is valuable in encouraging unity, adversarialism is effective in reviving passions, and inclusivity is useful in enhancing interactions between conflicting citizens. Finally, the research proposes an ‘agonistic day’ and demonstrates how a synthesis of all three approaches could mediate multicultural, pluralist conflict.

This thesis is an examination of the interplay between democratic norms and principles defining philosophical multiculturalism. Its most general aim is to find an answer to the following question concerning the possibility of democratic multiculturalism; do democracies adopt multicultural policies at the expense of their democratic credentials or are the two compatible with each other? The argument emerges from the interaction of two strong threads that run through the thesis. First, the thesis engages with three prevalent views on how democracies should react to the facts of disagreement – count heads, turn difference into a positive resource, and design procedures to maximize traditional values lying in the triangle of freedom, equality, and fraternity. In response, I offer a fourth view of democracy that combines minimalism with normativity. Normative minimalist democracy (NMD) holds that these three views are unable to appreciate the respective normative weights of dissensus and consensus, both of which have an ineliminable place in the modern democratic practices and their normative underpinnings. The second thread responds to another trichotomy – the three supposedly democratic challenges that philosophers of multiculturalism have brought up over the last two decades (as well as to the corresponding liberal-egalitarian counter-responses), which respectively draw attention to the importance of recognition, self-rule, and inclusion. With respect to these challenges and counter-challenges, the dissertation argues that both supporters and opponents of multiculturalism have democratic aspirations; and democratic response to multiculturalism should not be overshadowed by either unfounded optimism about the prospects of a substantive consensus fair to all previously marginalized minorities, nor by pessimism about the relapse into the preEnlightenment world due to the so-called return of parochialism. In between these two positions lies a more democratic response to multiculturalism – one that neither celebrates the role of culture as a unique vehicle of human fulfilment, nor dismisses it as a remnant of the past. The argument for seeking a middle ground arises in part out of frustration with the two extremes. Supplementing this critical aspect of the argument is a more constructive strand that explores what the individualist core of democracy implies with respect to political diversity in the form of disagreeing groups. Although NMD leaves room for a theory of groups substantially thinner than the one its multiculturalist critiques require because it is more clearly constrained by democracy’s individualist commitments, it is still thicker than the one standard liberal egalitarianism allows.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War there has been a new radicalism across the social sciences espousing the need for global democracy. Taking its inspiration from theorisations of late 20th and early 21st century globalisation, advocates of Global Democratic Theory (GOT) look to transcend the violence, inequality and suffering that have often accompanied modernity. GOT thus offers normative visions and practical steps towards securing global citizenship and democracy, which would secure economic and social justice for all citizens of the world. The thesis proposes that GOT, due to its pursuit of its normative agenda, actually tells us very little about the current state of global politics. In order to move beyond the limitations of GOT, the thesis provides both theoretical and empirical advances. On the theoretical side, the thesis outlines how John Dewey's work in The Public and its Problems (1927) sets out an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy. This Deweyan approach to global democracy and the lessons it provides has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars of globalisation. On the empirical side, Deweyan insights are used to interpret and explain the politics of the 'Financial Crisis' of 2008 and subsequent 'The Great Recession' in order to provide a richer account of the current state of global politics and the possibility of global democracy. In all, the thesis demonstrates how Dewey's work serves not only as a timely rejoinder to the theories of GOT but also offers important insights into the politics of contemporary globalisation.

Deliberative democratic theory has evolved in response to the perceived limits of liberal democratic theory and practice and offers a challenge to, and a critical perspective from which to judge, contemporary liberal representative institutions. The institution of representation establishes a 'division of labour' between an elite of professional politicians and a passive, privatized citizenry. Deliberative democracy offers the possibility of a different form of that division where increased opportunities for citizen participation are taken to be both feasible and desirable, and citizen engagement forms part of an ongoing critical dialogue upon which more legitimate forms of political authority can be grounded. Underpinning deliberative democratic theory is the idea that our needs and interests may be dialogically interpreted and formed. This takes us away from the notion of the citizen as sole proprieter of private, subjectively formed preferences and provides the imperative for a more public, active conception of citizenship. The work of Jurgen Habarmas is central to deliberative demoratic theory. His distinction between strategic and communicative rationality lies at the heart of the deliberative critique of representative government and in itself provides a useful critical foothold. However, Habermas's procedural conception of discursive legitimacy, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a flourishing and vibrant deliberative democracy. This thesis addresses this lacuna in his work, the problem of the mediation of moral pronciples and moral culture, and elaborates a political ethic of philia politike which substantively supplements contemporary deliberative democratic theory. Turning to the question of deliberative democratic institutions, we ask whether deliberative democracy should be seen as an alternative to liberal representative democracy, requiring a complete restructuring lf liberal political institutions, or whether it points to the reform and supplementation of representative structures and practices. We draw learning from the experience of citizens' juries on what may be of value to deliberative democratic theory as well as critically assessing the claim that citizen's juries are viable deliberative institutions.

Bibliography: leaves 334-376 / xi, 376 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1991

The basic contention of this study is that democratization in post-2003 Iraq has faltered due to a multiplicity of reasons that include the role of religion in politics, lack of democratic tradition, weak sponsor commitment, the legacy of the dictatorial regime, exclusionary policies, stateness problem, interference by regional powers, rentier economy and sectarianism among others. Long years after toppling the Ba’athist dictatorial regime, the establishment of stable democratic institutions continues to elude Iraq. I argue that post-2003 Iraq could not completely eradicate the long historical tradition of despotic governance due to both deep-seated religious beliefs and tribal values, along with widening societal ethno-sectarian rifts which precluded the negotiation of firm and stable elite settlements and pacts across communal lines. After exploring the different definitions of democracy, I discuss the adverse effects of these endogenous impediments to democratization; arguing that they were compounded by a hostile regional environment and the rise of sectarian fundamentalism and armed groups and militias which have mushroomed later due to terrorist threats and outside support. I will examine how the fear by neighbouring countries of a region-wide domino effect of the Iraq democratisation process caused them to adopt interventionist policies towards post-2003 Iraq that helped to stunt the growth of democracy. The lack of resolve and commitment by the sponsor and initiator of the post-2003 democratic process, the United States, undermined the prospects of democratic consolidation. This is compounded by serious administrative mistakes such as the Deba’athification policy and disbanding the Iraqi army which caused a security vacuum that the US forces were not able to fill. This is in addition to the absence of strong competent leaders which the Iraqi society failed to produce. The contribution of this study is to identify clearly the main impediments to democratization in Iraq, providing the evidence for each of them. Identification of the problem is crucial for finding solutions which are not impossible if the right leaders, who are ready to make difficult decisions, emerge.

This thesis examines Hannah Arendt’s argument for a council democracy and its relevance for contemporary democratic practices. References to the councils in Arendt’s work are often ignored or dismissed by her interpreters as a utopian commitment. Against the tendency to neglect this aspect of her thought, I argue that the councils play a crucial role in her work as the institutional embodiment of her principle of political freedom. Tracing the development of the council concept in Arendt’s thought, I offer a significant reinterpretation of her political theory as situated within the radical democratic tradition of Rosa Luxemburg. I contend that Arendt’s key contribution to democratic theory is her championing of a federal system of participatory and empowered councils as the central political institutions of a council republic. Arendt’s argument for a council democracy draws from historical examples of councils from the French Revolution to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. However, Arendt mischaracterises the nature of the councils and the intentions of council delegates. She inserts them in the framework of her own political categories and disregards the delegates’ socialist ideology and socio-economic concerns. Arendt’s distortion of the councils gives rise to the need for a historical re-examination of their political practices. I return to the political struggles of the post-First World War council movements in Germany and Russia in order to place the councils in historical perspective and challenge the biases of Arendt’s account. My analysis reveals that the councils were concerned with both political and economic affairs. I revise Arendt’s depiction in arguing that the councils were transformative organs of democratisation that sought to introduce democratic conditions into all spheres of social organisation. Situating the councils in relation to contemporary democratic practices, my principal argument is that they offer a critical perspective on the limits of current liberal democratic regimes. Although the councils do not present a model that could be replicated today, council delegates engaged in significant political practices that are instructive for current attempts at political transformation. In particular, they reveal the insufficiencies of electoral institutions for enabling widespread political participation and holding elites accountable. I argue that the historical significance of the councils is their exemplary role as institutions through which working-class forces organised to restrain elites, dismantle hierarchical systems and equalise power between citizens.

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