No description available.

The issue of universalism in the human right of freedom of speech is one of several that continue to be debated among Muslims and Westerners. As evidence of incompatibility of Islamic law with the international law of freedom of speech, Westerners, on the basis of Muslims' reactions towards the Satanic Verses and Danish cartoons, point to the blasphemy law in Islam (Sab Allah wa Sab al-Rasul). Four other controversial areas are often raised as an indication of differences between these two laws, namely, speech threatening nation security (Fitnah), defamatory speech (Qadhf and Iftira), obscenity (al-Fihsh), and hate speech. This study examines the important question of whether or not the Islamic law of freedom of speech is compatible with the international law of freedom of speech. The study argues that the Islamic law of freedom of speech is not contrary to the international law of freedom of speech, represented in two of the most significant legal sources of the right to freedom of speech, namely, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10 of the ECHR, both based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which this study presumes to be the standard of the human right of freedom of speech. Rather, the study goes further and concludes that Islamic law, as embedded in the Quran and Sunnah, urges the international concept of freedom of speech and calls for it. This compatibility between Islamic law, on the one hand, and international law, on the other, is not restricted to the level of the concept of freedom of speech. Rather, even the interpretation and application of freedom of speech in the light of Islamic law are, to a considerable degree, consistent with the interpretation and application of the international law of freedom of speech by the Human Rights Committee and European Court. Although there are some differences in interpretation and implementation of moral limitations on freedom of speech between Islamic Law and the international law of freedom of speech, this does not create a general state of dissonance between them. The study argues that such differences are even more pronounced among liberal democracies. In order to demonstrate the differences among liberal democracies in this regard, American law of freedom of speech (the First Amendment) is analysed in depth. The discussion of these free speech laws reveals that although there is universality of freedom of speech among liberal democracies (which refers to the universal quality or global acceptance of the idea of freedom of speech), universalism in the right to free speech (referring to a universally applicable interpretation of freedom of speech) has not been achieved.

The legal restriction of hate speech – i.e. speech that expresses contempt for people on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, or sexuality – is now commonplace in liberal legal systems outside the United States. This thesis takes up the question of whether restrictions on hate speech are generally justifiable. I begin by explaining why liberals should not dismiss anti-hate speech law from the outset as an intolerable violation of free speech. My analysis of the case for anti-hate speech law is thereafter framed by two main concerns. Firstly, I stress that if we are to impose legal restrictions on hate speech, we must establish not just that there are harmful outcomes associated with hate speech, but that those who engage in hate speech are responsible for those outcomes. Secondly, I argue that restrictions on hate speech should be assessed in two distinct classes. Inquiries into the justificatory bases of anti-hate speech law are typically conducted as if informative generalisations can be made about how the law should respond to anything that is properly called hate speech. Against this approach, I argue that while the liberal state can and should impose restrictions on directly harmful hate speech (in which hate speech is used to threaten, harass, and incite violence), restrictions on indirectly harmful hate speech – in which hate speech (allegedly) contributes to identity-based social hierarchies and their concomitant harms – are not justifiable. The problem with restrictions on indirectly harmful hate speech is not the structure of the liability-ascription framework under which they operate. Rather, I argue, the problem is epistemic: we cannot confidently judge that hate-speakers are in fact responsible for contributing, more than trivially, to the harmful patterns of identity-based inequality and disadvantage in light of which restrictions on indirectly harmful hate speech may be defended in principle.