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This work builds upon Holsti's model of institutional change to develop an analytical framework for studying normative transformations within the English School tradition. This framework is used to probe how the Global War on Terror (GWoT) impacted the primary institutions of international society. The model uses primary institutions as markers of change and also adopts Holsti's categories of change. However, it further incorporates any increase/decrease in the capacity of norms, rules and values of primary institutions to mediate social reality as a variable to evaluate the direction of change. Additionally, the model uses three analytical-lenses to study primary institutions: the creational environment (i.e. the socio-political context in which norms are created and embedded), the substantive content (i.e. the cognitive content of these norms and values) and operationalisation (i.e. how these norms and values are interpreted and applied). This model is then applied to study how the GWoT impacts six primary institutions: international law; great power management; war; diplomacy; liberal markets and environmental stewardship. This empirical application reveals that while the GWoT significantly affected the first three primary institutions under study, the latter were only marginally impacted by it. It concludes that actions adopted under the GWoT, and most importantly state reactions to the GWoT, both constructed a creational environment favourable to normative institutional changes. Secondly, state actions under the GWoT also added new norms to the substantive content of the institutions studied and generally tended to reinforce statehood, increase pluralism and compound the existing hierarchy in interstate society. Finally, the operationalisation of norms and values under the GWoT also aggravated existing normative tensions and contradictions in interstate society. While this work's specific conclusions may be restricted to this particular case study, this model can also be applied as a broad analytical framework to study institutional change in interstate society.

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I consider who should undertake humanitarian intervention. Should we prefer intervention by the UN, NATO, a regional or sub-regional organisation, a state, a group of states, or someone else? This thesis answers this question by, first, determining which qualities of interveners are morally significant and, second, assessing the relative importance of these qualities. The thesis then considers the more empirical question of whether (and to what extent) the current agents of humanitarian intervention actually possess these qualities, and therefore should intervene. Overall, I develop a particular conception of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention. I use this conception of legitimacy to assess not only the current interveners, but also the desirability of potential reforms to the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention.

Since 11 September 2001, Somalia has become a significant focus in the United States-led 'war on terrorism'. The U.S. government has listed a number of local and foreign actors in Somalia as terrorist groups and terrorist sponsors, including the militant Islamist movement Al Itihad, the Al Barakat group of companies, and the Al Haramain Charitable Foundation. Al Qaeda cells are active in the country and have used Somalia as a rear base for attacks in Kenya, most recently near Mombasa, in November 2002. Other actors, including shari'a courts, the Transitional National Government, the moderate Al Isiah movement, and other Islamic charities, are additional sources of interest and concern. In response, the US continues to mount increasingly invasive military and intelligence operations in the country, including the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti. This dissertation provides the first in-depth analysis of political Islamic movements that exist in Somalia today. It separates out the hyperbole surrounding the 'global war on terrorism' from the historical development, current organization and ideological affiliations of Somalia's political Islamic movements, as well as detailing their evolving relations with other Islamic and secular actors in the country. This is grounded in an analysis of the current political situation in Somalia as a 'failed state', and the historical role of Islam in Somali society and politics. The dissertation concludes with an assessment of the global threat they pose in terms of terrorism, and the wider implications of the rise of political Islamic ideologies in Somalia, as well as the extent to which they are being accounted for and addressed by U. S. counter-terrorism operations. This dissertation is based primarily on field research in Mogadishu, Somalia, where a wide range of interviews were conducted with leaders of Somali Islamist movements, 'warlords' who command Somalia's competing militiafactions, traditional clan elders and religious scholars, as well as 'civil society' activists. Given the limited number of existing academic sources on this subject, additional material is drawn from official United Nations documents, statements by US government officials, policy literature published by Western non-governmental organizations and think tanks, as well as journalistic sources.

International Relations theory tends to assume that the use of violence is both necessary and effective. Supporters of non-violence however propose that violence is not effective to achieve ones aims. This study will question these contrasting perspectives by asking to what degree violence is effective in obtaining security in international politics. The study focuses on International Relations theory, testing its assumption that violence is effective against the case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a conflict that is often seen as a clear case for the success of violence. If the security benefits of this war cannot be proven clearly, then it brings the effectiveness of violence to build security into question. The study questions the effectiveness of violence in this case for three main areas: territory, military power and non-military power. It finds that Iraq's use of violence was mostly counter-productive, leading to further losses rather than gains. The use of violence on the Coalition side brought the Coalition some benefits, but these benefits were not as high as one might expect, and they were not long-lasting. This leads to the conclusion that the benefits of the use of violence are not easy to achieve, even for the victor. It is easier for the victor to destroy the power and ability to act of another actor than it is to build the benefits from that destruction afterwards. The final conclusion of the study is that the use violence needs to be treated more critically in International Relations theory, as it cannot be assumed that the successful use of violence will bring security.