This thesis analyses British and Soviet policy towards negotiations on an Interim Agreement on Berlin, from November 1958 until May 1960. It emphasises the crucial role played by the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan and the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, both of whom viewed the Berlin problem within the wider context of their mutual objectives of achieving detente and disarmament. The opening chapter analyses Soviet motivation for reactivating the Berlin question, and emphasises two factors behind Soviet policy: the maintenance of the status quo in Germany and Eastern Europe, and Soviet fears of the nuclearisation of the Bundeswehr. The next two chapters reassess Britain's response to the Soviet Note of 27 November 1958, the impact of British policy on Berlin on the Western Alliance and the subsequent emergence of a British initiative on Berlin which culminated in Harold Macmillan's visit to Moscow in February 1959. Fresh insights into Soviet policy on Berlin and European Security are offered. The fourth chapter reappraises Macmillan's visits in March 1959 to Paris, Bonn and Washington to persuade his Allies of the benefits of his initiative. This chapter also deals with the British contribution both to the Allied debate on contingency planning for Berlin and to the discussions on Germany, European Security and Berlin, which took place in the Four Power Working Group from January until May 1959. The ensuing chapter analyses British and Soviet attitudes to the East-West negotiations on an Interim Agreement on West Berlin at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, May-August 1959, and considers whether the British Government was correct in its perception that the Soviet Government wished to establish a modus vivendi on Berlin. Chapter six traces the evolution of Soviet and Western policies towards the forthcoming summit conference from August 1959 until May 1960. The final chapter examines Soviet and Western reactions to the U-2 Incident of 1 May 1960 and seeks to demonstrate that Khrushchev left for Paris prepared to negotiate on an Interim Agreement on Berlin, and hopeful that he would achieve the East-West Detente for which he and Macmillan had striven.

This study is concerned with the description and analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations and the onset of the second world war, from t: arch 1938 to August 1939. It is intended to examine the Soviet aspect of appeasement. Did Stalin's foreign policy offer the Chamberlain government an alternative to appeasement; was it viable or not; and why was it rejected? When it was apparently explored in 1939, why did it fail? What was to be the relation of the USSR to a hopefully pacified Germany? Does British policy in eastern Europe support the contention that a free hand - whether by design or implication --was offered to Germany? An introductory background analysis traces the relation of the Soviet Union to the aims of appeasement. This indicates that British foreign policy was always cautious when defining its interests in eastern Europe; and that as long as German pacification remained the intention, the USSR could a priori not participate. An examination of Anglo"-Soviet relations from March to September 1938 shows that the exclusion of Moscow from the Munich conference is the inevitable outcome of Anglo-French efforts at a peaceful solution of the Czech-German crisis. The conference symbolizes the decisive rejection of the Soviet alternative. The strongest evidence on British policy in eastern Europe is embodied in the immediate post-41unich period. On various issues Britain and France pursued the logical sequel to the desired Anglo-German agreement:. d sint6ressement in eastern Europe. The tripartite negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939 are seen to have their origins in the sudden attempts by London in January 1939 to improve relations with Moscow. This was to ensure the latter's benevolent neutrality in case of war. The Anglo-French-Soviet political and military negotiations are then analyzed in terms both of Britain's inability to harmonize short term methods -a deterrent front including the USSR, with long range aims - German appeasement, and of a change in Soviet interests and priorities. This study makes use of the available official government documents on foreign policy, and various collections of private papers. The quite substantial amount of archival material appearing in Russian monographs and articles, despite its selective nature, was found of considerable value.

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