There exists a certain consensus among scholars and French diplomats that the golden era of the exceptionally close and amicable relations between France and its former sub-Saharan colonies is over. Nevertheless, the conclusions that these researchers arrive at regarding the current state of France’s African policy are rather different. The aim of the thesis is to determine which of the three paradigms concerning France’s African policy – the incremental adaptation, normalisation or confusion – best describes the French response to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire under the Gbagbo regime. The contribution of the thesis is the analysis of continuities and changes of this specific Franco-African relationship, also known as Françafrique, within the framework of international relations regime theory. The thesis argues that France’s diplomacy towards the Ivorian crisis and her role in the multilateral conflict resolution strategy, reveal her growing inability to defend the constitutive principle of the Françafrique regime: grandeur. Her pursuit of middle power status through maintaining hegemonic relations to her favourite former colony was considerably challenged by various domestic and systemic factors, among which the Ivorian power struggles and Gbagbo’s duplicitous politics played a considerable part. Moreover, the thesis also points to the persistence of some old rules and decision-making procedures of the Françafrique regime, especially the resilience of informal networks. These old practices collide with France’s growing desire to make her African policy more transparent, coherent and efficient. It is therefore concluded that the coexistence of these opposite tendencies in France’s response to the Ivorian crisis under Gbagbo, as well as the inconsistent resort to the Françafrique principle, rules and decision-making procedures are best explained by the confusion paradigm of France’s African policy.

Cette thèse s’articule en trois parties. La première vise à comprendre les facteurs contribuant à la continuité de la politique française d’intervention extérieure. Elle met l’accent sur la notion de puissance moyenne, la culture française des droits de l’homme et le lien particulier qui unit Paris à l’Afrique. La seconde partie détaille l’évolution des normes internationales et de la pratique onusienne et cherche à apprécier le rôle joué par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies dans la mise en place de la politique étrangère française. Cette partie intègre une dimension comparative puisqu’elle évoque successivement les politiques américaine, européenne, russe et celles des pays émergents en matière d’intervention extérieure. Ceci permet d’appréhender les spécificités françaises, tant en termes institutionnels qu’en termes de capacités de projection des forces. La dernière partie s’intéresse aux différents terrains d’intervention de l’armée française et permet de qualifier l’action de l’Hexagone de politique d’intervention à géographie variable. Sur le continent africain, les opérations sont généralement conduites unilatéralement, les troupes africaines prenant ensuite progressivement le relai. Au Moyen-Orient, les interventions militaires françaises s’inscrivent au sein de coalitions internationales menées par les Etats-Unis. L’opération Harmattan en Libye fait l’objet d’un chapitre à part. Elle a été initiée par la France et le Royaume-Uni mais conduite dans le cadre de l’OTAN. Cette thèse de doctorat analyse donc une décennie d’engagement de l’armée française à l’étranger et permet de décrypter l’actualité en matière de gestion de crise et de conflictualité. / This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first one underlines the different factors which contribute to the continuity of French politics of military intervention, stressing the notion of middle power, French culture of human rights and the very special link which still unites nowadays Paris to the African continent. The second part examines the evolution of international norms and UN practice and tries to appreciate the part of the Security Council in the establishment of the French foreign policy. This section includes a comparative dimension as it deals with American, European, Russian and emerging countries politics in terms of military interventions. That focus enables to grasp French specific features, both institutional and in terms of military capacities. The last part of this work aims at analyzing the different military fields of the French army during the last decade. In Africa, military operations are often led unilaterally, African troops then taking over gradually. In the Middle East, French military interventions are mostly part of international coalitions led by the United States. "Opération Harmattan" in Libya is addressed in a proper section as it is in between the classical military interventions in Africa and the one we use to observe in the Middle East. Initiated by France and the UK but conducted under NATO leadership, this intervention constitutes a paradigm shift in French, European and Transatlantic security. This thesis thus analyzes a decade of French military engagement and enables to interpret the current events regarding crisis management and conflicts.

La France et les Etats-Unis fascinent l' observateur des relations internationales par la complexité et les contradictions de leurs relations, tant est paradoxal et parfois détonant, le mélange d'amour­ haine ou peut être plus justement, d' attraction-répulsion ou d'amitié-tension qu'elles recèlent. Ce qui n'empêche pas les deux pays de se retrouver ensemble lorsqu'il s' agit de défendre la liberté. Contrairement à l'Espagne ou à la Grande-Bretagne, la France demeure le seul grand pays européen à n' avoir jamais été en guerre contre les Etats-Unis. Pourtant, elle est son allié le plus indocile. La France et les Etats-Unis sont donc les pires amis du monde. Aussi cette réflexion se donne-t-elle pour ambition d' analyser leurs relations avec l'Iran et l'Irak de 1972 à 1982, ainsi que les perspectives de coopération ou de compétition qui en ont résulté. Toutefois, on ne peut comprendre ces relations que si l' on admet au préalable qu'elles renvoient à une appréciation différente des situations internationales et des intérêts des deux pays. / France and the United States fascinate the observer of international relations by the complexity and contradictions of their relations, as is paradoxical and sometimes explosive, the love-hate mixing (or perhaps more accurately, attraction-repulsion or friendship-voltage) they contain. This does not prevent the two countries to get together when it cornes to defending freedom. Unlike Spain or Britain, France remains the only major European country to have never been at war against the United States. Yet it is his most unruly ally. France and the US are the worst friends. Also this reflection does the ambition to analyze their relations with Iran and Iraq from 1972 to 1982, as well as prospects of cooperation or competition that resulted. However, one cannot understand these relations only if we admit beforehand that they refer to a different assessment of international situations and interests of both countries.

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