The theme of this thesis concerns post-Soviet Russian foreign policy perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008. In the thesis I argue that Russian perceptions became increasingly revanchist in nature during this period, and that we may distinguish between two different types of revanchism, the consequences of which for Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty are quite different. I argue that all Russian perceptions of international affairs are constituted by perceptions of Russia. Thus, perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty may be divided into three categories, or paradigms, each of which centres on a specific concept that legitimises the existence of Russia, and determines how Belarus and Ukraine are viewed. The three central concepts are the concepts of Law, Power, and Nation, respectively. In the introduction, I outline these paradigms, both in abstract terms and in relation to Russian foreign policy in general, as well as Russian foreign policy towards Belarus and Ukraine. Subsequently, I present my methodology and my literature review, together with a discussion of the theoretical assumptions, which provide the foundation for my argument. Then, I briefly outline Russian foreign policy making during the period relevant for my thesis, before the four main chapters of my thesis outline in roughly chronological fashion how the relative significance of the three paradigms has changed over time. Overall, I find that whereas the paradigm of Power has generally dominated perceptions, the paradigm of Law has gradually lost influence, whereas the influence of the paradigm of Nation has gradually increased. Since I define both the paradigm of Power and the paradigm of Nation as “revanchist,” I conclude that Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008 gradually became more revanchist in nature.

This thesis contributes to an in-depth understanding of the concept of soft power, which according to Joseph Nye indicates the ability to achieve foreign policy goals through cultural attraction. For the purposes of this study of Russian cultural influence in Ukraine, soft power is rearticulated to highlight the ability to engage in mean-making and cultural-ideational leadership on the international stage. A critique of Nye justifies a reframing of soft power, which is supplied by drawing on the analytical power of post-Marxist hegemony and discourse theory. The methodology through which this concept is operationalised empirically emphasises outcomes over inputs, thus appraisals of soft power must account for whether the discourses promoted by mean-making initiatives resonate favourably with target audiences. Desk-based and field research supports an argument that Moscow acknowledges the need for soft power, understood here in terms of ‘sovereignty of spirit’. This civilisational approach is explored further, and the target narratives advanced by significant proponents of the discourse, namely the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Russian Orthodox Church and foreign policy officials, are identified. Insights into the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to promote spiritually-infused discourses are provided, and new developments observed. Finally, the extent of Russian ‘civilisational’ soft power is estimated through surveys and focus groups gauging audience reception to the ideational narratives promoted.

Situated within a global context of political unease over Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, this thesis challenges views of Russian foreign policy as enigmatic and unpredictable. It examines the relationship between identity politics, conceptions of security, and the foreign policy preferences of the Russian political elite. It shows how particular aspects of Russian identity that are dominant in different international contexts work to structure policy preferences. This contributes to the pursuit of apparently contradictory objectives across these settings, and to inconsistencies between the rhetoric and reality of Russian security policy. Previous studies have looked into the impact of Russian identity on its policy preferences, but most have taken a limited, instrumentalist view of identity as a tool that is mobilised by political elites to further their existing policy preferences. By contrast, this thesis argues that conscious elite mobilisation of identity provides only part of the picture. Visions of Russian identity (and consequently of its international role) are constrained by institutional factors. These include the linked historical development of the Russian military, economy and education/research sectors. Following a discursive understanding of institutions, they also include the limited number of ways in which identity has previously been represented. These factors produce subconscious constraints on the imagining of Russian identity. This limited conceptualisation of Russian identity has become even more specific in the Putin era, due to the political elite’s frequent repetition of one, highly restrictive, narrative of a ‘usable’ history, presented as the factual background to policy discussion. This narrative foregrounds favoured events, associating them with preferred identity themes. Resultant ‘truths’ of Russian identity then provide a framework for foreign policy. Particular elements of this framework dominate Russia’s relationships with different multinational bodies, impacting on the type of policy cooperation pursued. In relations with the EU, focus on Russia’s equal contribution to European civilisation brings normative incompatibilities between the parties to the fore and acts as a barrier to compromise. With contrasting visions of their identities in their shared region, of what security there should look like, and of how it should be achieved, Russia-EU cooperation has been most effective when undertaken in a specific, sectoral manner. Anticipating the ‘West’s’ relative decline in global influence, Russia has gradually downgraded EU relations whilst pursuing a ‘multivector’ foreign policy that emphasises alternative partners. Capitalising on its identity as one of the BRICS rising powers, Russia has been able to pursue a joint challenge to the contemporary structure of the international order, facilitated by members’ shared convictions of the inequities of the existing system, and of their subordinate positions within it. Here, Russia’s identity as a cultural bridge has been emphasised, giving it a unique possibility to negotiate between the old and the new global powers. Most recently, Russia has built upon its identity as a continent-straddling regional leader, and a supposedly natural representative of Eurasia. In developing the Eurasian Union, Russia seeks to use its privileged regional role to ensure continued global relevance during an anticipated, and desired, transition to global multipolarity. This is a new reading of Russian ‘great power’, in which Russia’s multiple international roles are combined to give it the greatest possible level of influence in determining new global structures.