This thesis aims to explore the dynamics of exchange operating in special relationships initially formed and largely sustained on an amicable basis between two states of vastly unequal power. The claim is made that the weak state is likely to be adversely affected in the longer term by the persistence of negative patterns of asymmetric exchange, despite the accrual of considerable benefits. To test the validity of this proposition, selected theoretical perspectives on exploitation and manipulation are examined and applied to the analyses of political, military, economic and development issues arising in respect of the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship in the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods. The findings indicate that the dynamics of asymmetric exchange are much more complex than originally envisaged. The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship involved far more than the changing interests of officials whose interests and priorities were sometimes compatible and sometimes conflicting. A special relationship developed between ruling elites in these two sovereign states in the Brezhnev era, largely as a consequence of Cold War competition and ideological bonding. Although evidence indicates that Mengistu's administration had a lot to do with the relationship's progression, the negative patterns of asymmetric exchange that subsequently developed adversely affected Ethiopia more than they did the Soviet Union. These patterns persisted after Gorbachev assumed power, and the adverse impact lingered on after both sovereign states had fragmented. The complex dynamics and adverse impacts of asymmetric exchange are not unique to the Soviet Union and its relationship with non-capitalist states like Ethiopia. In this thesis, Cold War conditions may have largely determined the process of pattern formation, but the findings indicate that similar patterns have been demonstrated in relationships between powerful and weak states in the past and they continue to appear in the present.

Soviet-Third World relations during the Cold War are still not clearly understood. Largely based on previously unused primary material, this study aims to fill this gap in knowledge by emphasising the interplay between domestic, local, regional, and global dimensions in analysing Moscow’s involvement in the Horn of Africa. By offering a detailed examination of Soviet involvement in Somalia and Ethiopia during the Cold War, this thesis aims to shed light on the factors, shaping Moscow’s policies in the area. While it does not lay any claim of representativeness for other Third World regions, this thesis aims to highlight the intricate interplay between ideology and realpolitik in the making of Soviet foreign policy. Additionally, it tries to determine to what extent the ‘local pull,’ exerted by both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, as well as by Soviet and other Bloc diplomats, informed the Kremlin’s policy in the area. This thesis shows that the two main strands of Moscow’s foreign policy, the pragmatic statist line and the ideological Cominternist approach, were not in conflict with one another. Instead, they were amalgamated into a flexible tactical approach, designed to maximise Soviet influence by whatever means available, along the path of least resistance. Another strand in the argument is interwoven with the pericentric framework for the study of the Cold War. While accepting recent interpretations of superpower-Third World relations, this research develops a more nuanced account of the centre-periphery interaction. The act of local engagement was Moscow’s initiative, in accord with its wider geo-political plans. Once engaged, the local actors proved instrumental in informing the Kremlin’s exercise of maintaining a presence. As with its entry, Moscow’s disengagement was predicated on strategic considerations. The period of perestroika, assigned the Third World lower priority in the Kremlin’s global agenda, engendering a withdrawal from the Horn.