This dissertation examines the development of Soviet-American strategic arms diplomacy from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. It argues that bargaining activity during this period produced an evolving set of operative principles, or a "methodology" of strategic arms diplomacy, which has bridged particular agreements and has tended to drive policymakers into recurring patterns of choice throughout the process. It further argues that compliance behavior has played a key role in stimulating adjustments in bargaining methodology, because both sides have pursued successive negotiations against a background of accumulating experience under the terms of older agreements. Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation's central arguments and discusses the links between compliance behavior and bargaining methodology. Chapter 2 identifies factors that may have compliance-enhancing and -inhibiting effects, and argues that treaty-constrained behavior is best viewed as a product of ongoing interactions among these factors. Chapter 3 explains why Soviet and U.S. compliance practices since 1972 are prone to conflicting assessments, and why these conflicts make it difficult to prove or disprove competing hypotheses regarding the motivations behind such behavior on the Soviet side. This chapter also assesses the historical record in light of the several factors discussed in Chapter 2 and identifies the presence of certain "structural" frictions in the Soviet-American context which were not previously considered. The study then explicates the rule-making process. For analytical purposes it defines an agreement as a composite of: framework rules, which represent the internal structure of restraint; scope rules, which are criteria for including or excluding weapons; and verification rules, which govern procedures for monitoring compliance and sorting out problems. After discussing the formative stages of the bargaining process in Chapter 4, patterns of rule-making in each category are analyzed. Chapter 5 demonstrates that a systematic progression in framework rules governing force concentration is juxtaposed against sharp discontinuities in those governing force modernization. Chapter 6 concludes that the inevitable trade-offs between preserving flexibility for oneself versus thwarting treaty circumvention by the other side has led to recurring patterns in scope rule selection. Chapter 7 discusses trends in verification rule-making and the significance of glasnost. Chapter 8 evaluates the impact of bargaining dynamics and compliance behavior upon the rule-making process from the SALT to the START eras.

This study attempts to ascertain the nature of détente by clarifying the term, identifying common elements working for and against détente, and considering whether the history of various periods of détente suggests a cyclical or progressive pattern. First, détente is defined as a process - not a condition, policy or historical period. More specifically, it is the process of easing tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that the possibilities of reconciliation are inherently limited. Second, by examining the post-war Soviet-American relationship and focusing individually on the four periods of détente that occurred during this time ('spirit of Geneva' 1955; 'spirit of Camp David' 1959; Post- Missile Crisis détente 1963-4; Moscow détente 1972-5), those common elements influencing the rise and fall of détente emerge. They include the influence of individual leaders, the fear of nuclear war, the self-perceived strength of the superpowers, the convergence of superpower special interests, the changing perceptions of détente and the national interest, and the difficulties in reaching a common code of détente. Finally, the character of détente is found to be progressive due to the legacy left by each period.