Depuis la crise financière et économique de 2009, la politique étrangère de la Chine est présentée comme assertive et à même de déstabiliser l’Asie-Pacifique. Cependant, s’inscrivant dans un cadre néoréaliste classique, nous considérons que du fait d’un complexe d’insécurité lié à l’absence de parité avec les Etats-Unis, la Chine met en œuvre une stratégie de « maintien de la stabilité » dans la péninsule coréenne afin de garantir la poursuite de son ascension. La Chine est confrontée à un paradoxe de l’ascension, ses capacités matérielles s’accroissent mais son insécurité ne se réduit pas. Les universitaires chinois soulignent l’écart de puissance avec les Etats-Unis, présentent leur pays comme une puissance fragile et partielle, et considèrent la stratégie de rééquilibrage américaine comme une stratégie d’endiguement. Ce complexe d’insécurité conduit la Chine à éviter toute instabilité qui conduirait à un effondrement du régime nord-coréen sources de nombreuses incertitudes stratégiques. La péninsule coréenne est profondément déséquilibrée à partir de 2008 du fait de la transition politique à Pyongyang, et de l’arrivée au pouvoir des conservateurs à Séoul. La Chine met alors en œuvre une stratégie de stabilisation qui se traduit par un soutien inconditionnel à son voisin, au détriment de ses relations avec Séoul et Washington. Avec le retour d’un équilibre partiel entre les deux Corées fin 2012, la Chine maintient sa priorité à la stabilisation mais peut désormais tenter d’affaiblir l’influence américaine et d’isoler le Japon. Pékin met alors en scène un changement tactique suite au troisième essai nucléaire nord-coréen, et adopte une politique coréenne équidistante. / Since the financial and economic crisis of 2009, China's foreign policy has been presented as more assertive and likely to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region. However, using a neoclassic realist framework, we consider that because of an insecurity complex due to the lack of parity with the United States, China’s foreign policy is characterized by the implementation of a strategy of "maintaining stability" in the Korean peninsula in order to guarantee its continued ascent. China is facing a rise paradox, its capabilities are increasing but its insecurity is not reduced. Chinese academics emphasize the power gap with the United States, present their country as a fragile and partial power, and consider the US rebalancing strategy in the Asia–Pacific as a containment strategy. This insecurity complex leads China to avoid instability in the peninsula since it could provoke the collapse of the North Korean regime and open a Pandora's Box. From 2008, the Korean peninsula has become deeply unbalanced due to the political transition in Pyongyang, and the election of a conservative president in Seoul. China implements its stabilization strategy which results in an unconditional support to its neighbor at the expense of its relations with Seoul and Washington. The partial rebalancing between the two Koreas in late 2012 enables China try to weaken the US and Japanese influence in the region while maintaining its priority to stability. Beijing staged a tactical change following the third North Korean nuclear test, and adopts an equidistant Korea policy.

Critics of the liberal peace point out that the imposition of liberal democratic structures of governance through United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has not led to a sustainable peace being built. In reply, supporters of the liberal peace argue that even though the liberal peace is imperfect, there are no better alternatives. The objective of this thesis is to examine the Chinese approach to peacebuilding and explore the possibility that it may be a potential alternative to the liberal peace. The thesis examines the Chinese understanding of the causes of insecurity in Africa, what the Chinese position is with regards to United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in Africa; and what role China see itself playing vis-à-vis United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The Chinese approach to peacebuilding recognises poverty alleviation as the foundation upon which sustainable peace can be built in post-conflict countries. Beijing does not believe the external imposition of a political ruling superstructure can succeed, and sees the liberal peace as neo-colonialism and liberal hubris. However, there is no set Chinese model of peacebuilding which can replace the liberal peace, or which African countries might follow. This is because the Chinese developmental model respects the local context, is based on pragmatism, and relies on trial and error to find the way forward. The Chinese have been keeping a low profile in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and have focused on providing transportation and logistical support to UNMIL. The Chinese focus on infrastructure rehabilitation is appreciated by Liberians and is making a positive contribution to the life of ordinary people. On the deep societal divide that lies at the heart of the Liberian civil war and continues to cause instability, both the Chinese approach to peacebuilding and the liberal peace remain silent.

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Multiplicity is a key challenge and opportunity of world politics, yet scholars continue to struggle to do it justice. One way of reducing the challenge multiple times and spaces present us with has been to organise them allochronically, to align spatial difference in temporal sequence. The effect is a story where others are not different, they are just behind. Scholars have criticised this thinking as it appears in “Western thought”. In recent years, suggestions have emerged that Chinese thought may offer an alternative that escapes allochronic thinking, most notably through the foreign policy-driven concept “harmonious world”. Scholars have studied this term with the aim of finding out its true meaning. This thesis asks instead what “harmony” – and more specifically “harmonious world” – does when it is deployed in contemporary China. It traces the concept across several contexts: the policy documents and speeches that launched it as an official term; the academic literatures that asked what a harmonious world might look like; the propaganda at Expo 2010 Shanghai China that aimed to illustrate it; and the online spoofing culture egao that was used to criticise, resist and avoid “harmonisation”.The key claim of this thesis is that “harmonious world”, as articulated in the contexts examined here, has not taken place, is not taking place and will not take place. Ways of thinking about time, space and multiplicity in China’s relation to the world, and particularly “harmonious world”, repeat the allochronising logic recognisable from “Western” discourses, which disallows the openness of the future and reduces the possibilities of harmony and of the political. As an effect of its excessive proliferation harmony disappears as an imagined metaphysical possibility . The harmonious system is not based on co-operation or non co-operation, but works according to what this thesis calls an onco-operative logic: the quasi-suicidal logic of cancer and the (auto)immune. Ultimately, the aim and most important contribution of this thesis is to bring the onco-operative uncertainty of the political back into the harmonious world concept in order to elucidate the negotiation of danger and necessity of multiplicity.

This thesis analyses China's national identity construction and its foreign policy implications especially towards Japan and the United States during the Hu Jintao period 2002-2012. The vast literature on China's rise takes “rising nationalism” in China as one of the key indicators of increased likelihood for aggressive behaviour in the future. This work problematizes some of the simplified assumptions made in this literature by emphasising the domestic context from which foreign policies rise. I argue that culture specific values deriving from national identities shape attitude structures and affect the whole thinking and conceptualisation related to foreign policy with wide-ranging consequences. Thus, in this research national identity is operationalised through values and attitudes deriving from it. With empirical evidence, I show in my thesis that most things discussed as "nationalism" in China studies literature can be analytically separated into at least two components, each with different foreign policy relevant correlates. Analysing two sets of survey material with statistical methods I show that the type of national attachment in China constrains foreign policy preferences in a different way than often assumed in the literature: "patriots" support an internationalist stance in contrast to "nationalists" who favour more assertive behaviour towards Japan and the US as well as generally protectionist economic policies. In addition to analysing the associations between core values and foreign policy preferences, I also provide other examples of cultural factors shaping Chinese foreign policy context including the role of historical legacies and their political use, and the role of the media in the formation of foreign threat perceptions and foreign policy preferences. The need to better understand these national identity dynamics is emphasised because of the ongoing pluralisation of Chinese foreign policy establishment, which gives more space to domestic input from various levels of society.