Much of Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' (yide baoyuan) postwar Japan policy remains to be examined. This thesis mainly shows how the discourse of 'returning virtue for malice' facilitated Japan's diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan during the Cold War era. More conceptually, this study re- conceptualizes foreign policy as discourse-that of moral reciprocity-as it sheds light on the question of recognition as well as the consensual aspect of hegemony. By adopting a genealogical approach, this discourse analysis thus traces the descent and emergence of the 'returning virtue for malice' trope while it examines its discursive effect on Tokyo's recognition of Taipei under American hegemony. After tracing the emergence of Chiang's postwar Japan policy as discourse, this thesis first delves into the rise of 'returning virtue for malice' as it demonstrates how the discursive formation of Tokyo's recognition of Taipei constituted US hegemony in East Asia at the inception of the Cold War. Second, this study then highlights the heyday of 'returning virtue for malice' as it shows how a powerful coalition formed around the discourse in the domain of Japanese politics, thereby reproducing the recognition of Nationalist China as well as consolidating American hegemony at the height of the Cold War. Third, this research sheds light on the decline of 'returning virtue for malice' as it depicts the erosion of the Japanese discourse coalition and US hegemony due to the lack of consent between Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington as the nature of the Cold War dramatically changed in East Asia. In short, the discourse of Chiang Kai-shek's 'returning virtue for malice' postwar Japan policy represented Chiang as the benefactor to whom the Japanese should repay their 'debt of gratitude', thereby making Japan's recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan possible. In effect, this thesis presents a way of reading bilateral relations as it mainly shows how recognition can be constructed by the political actors who draw on hegemonic practices from the past-such as moral reciprocity-under hegemony.

Under the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the deterioration of the Japan-China relationship and growing tension between Japan and North Korea were often interpreted as being caused by the rise of nationalism. This thesis aims to explore this question by looking at Japan’s foreign policy in the region and uncovering how political actors manipulated the concept of nationalism in foreign policy discourse. The methodology employs discourse analysis on five case studies. It will be explored how the two administrations both used nationalism but in the pursuit of contrasting policies: an uncompromising stance to China and a conciliatory approach toward North Korea under the Koizumi administration, a hard-line attitude against North Korea and the rapprochement with China by Abe, accompanied by a friendship-policy toward India. These case studies show how the nationalism is used in the competition between political leaders by articulating national identity in foreign policy. Whereas this often appears as a kind of assertiveness from outside China, in the domestic context leaders use nationalism to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ through foreign policy by highlighting differences from ‘other’s or by achieving historic reconciliation. Such identity constructions are used to legitimize policy choices that are in themselves used to marginalize other policy options and political actors. In this way, nationalism is utilized as a kind of political capital in a domestic power relationship, as can be seen by Abe’s use of foreign policy to set an agenda of ‘departure from the postwar regime’. In a similar way, Koizumi’s unyielding stance against China was used to calm discontents among right-wing traditionalists who were opposed to his reconciliatory approach to Pyongyang. On the other hand, Abe also utilized a hard-line policy to the DPRK to offset his rapprochement with China whilst he sought to prevent the improved relationship from becoming a source of political capital for his rivals. The major insights of this thesis is thus to explain how Japan’s foreign policy is shaped by the attempts of its political leaders to manipulate nationalism so as articulating particular forms of national identity that enable them to achieve legitimacy for their policy agendas, boost domestic credentials and marginalize their political rivals.