The academic discipline of International Relations (IR) remains largely distinguished by its paradigmatic self-definition contra sociological studies. Historical sociological approaches within IR have challenged this disciplinary insularity through highlighting the social determination of the historical modalities of international relations. Yet they generally remain uncritical of social theory's own tendency to de-conceptualise 'the international' as contingent. The present thesis is largely addressed to this theoretical omission. It argues that 'the international' is heavily constitutive of 'the social'. It empirically substantiatest his claim through a reinterpretation of the Iranian Revolution critically drawing on Leon Trotsky's theory of 'uneven and combined development' (U&CD). The thesis proceeds via a series of critical engagements with the sociological categories through which Iran's political history has traditionally been analysed. These include 'Asiatic mode of production', 'bourgeois revolution', 'Bonapartism', nationalism', 'rentier state' and 'political Islam'. In each case it is shown that the 'internalist' constitution of the category in question a priori omits an 'external' co/over-determination of the specific aspect or conjuncture concerned. The causality of this under-theorised international dimension is concretely manifest in the various hybrid patterns of development whose contradictions ultimately fuelled the socio-historical dynamics culminating in the 1979 revolution. The thesis therefore demonstrates that international relations have reached more deeply into the historical production of the revolution than the explicit record of Iran's foreign relations, the main focus of the conventional accounts, would suggest.

The foreign policy ideology that is communicated by the rulers and foreign policy makers of the Islamic Republic of Iran between 2005 and 2010 builds on the identification of Iran as a changed nation through the 1979 Revolution, and presents Iran as an example for other nations in a changing world. This dissertation shows how Iran's foreign policy behaviour can be made sense of in the context of this ideology. For this purpose, Iran's foreign policy behaviour, regionally and internationally, is discussed against the background of the ideology as communicated by Iran's president and supreme leader as to show this behaviour was made possible in the context of the discourse. Also, the dissertation provided two case-studies, one on the nuclear issue and one on the 2009 events, to show how the discourse on these specific issues stands in relation to foreign policy behaviour, and how this fits with Iran's broader discourse. It show's how the Islamic Republic's foreign policy behaviour is not only made possible in the context of ideology, but ideology is also reinforced through foreign policy. Particularly, as Iranian leaders are engaged in an active shaping of the international order to the advantage of the Iranian regime and the goals they see for the Iranian nation.

This is a multidisciplinary research project that aims to explore the geopolitical dynamics, in parallel with recent developments in the Middle East, in the period 2003-2013 and beyond, to some extent. The most effective developments can be found in the shifting power relations, alongside regional and international rivalries, that led to instability, security threats and patterns of violence. With these dynamics in mind and power shifts post-2003, interactions between soft power (ideological proxies) vs military power played a crucial role in shaping the political and security landscape of the region. The thesis explores three sides of the security triangle. The first corresponds to Iran's foreign policy, as case study, which is one of the focal actors that used ideology as basis for action. The second is the presence of the US and its allies, particularly its regional allies. The third is the Middle East region as a reference point for examining power structures in light of rivalry relationships, which in turn interconnects some regional key players in the security paradigm. The objective of this thesis is to broaden the concept of security studies in the field of international relations. The thesis endeavours to incorporate non-state actor violence, sponsored by some nation-states, in this case Iran, as part of a regional strategic agenda. From this vantage point, defensive and offensive approaches will be discussed, in line with Iran's foreign policy, in order to demonstrate how Iran resists regional threats to ensure its survival, and reinforces its influence to maximise its power.

This thesis adopts a Wendtian constructivist perspective in order to explore how Iran defined its interests in the context of the nuclear issue during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Against realist-type approaches which often attributed a nuclear weapons rationale to Iran and framed its programme as a threat to international security, it argues that Iran’s nuclear policy must be interpreted within the context of its identity and the latter’s causal and constitutive effects on its interests and behaviours. The Wendtian perspective, together with a mixed methods approach combining document analysis and interviews, sheds light on how Iran understood its interests and why the regime perceived opportunities/threats and permissible/unacceptable options in the way it did. This thesis demonstrates that Iran’s nuclear programme was interpreted within a structure of meaning that emphasised its legality and legitimacy. Additionally, it shows that the Ahmadinejad administration’s resistance strategies cannot be understood outside the context of the perceived humiliating failure of the Khatami administration’s confidence-building approach. Not only had Iran’s reputation and independence been jeopardised, but its failure to secure recognition of its nuclear rights also confirmed that the issue was a Western-led manufactured crisis that aimed to undermine the IRI, prevent the development of the Iranian nation and transform the IAEA’s mandate. Iran thus engaged in strategies of self-assertion to challenge the perceived illegal and illegitimate policies of its negotiation partners, the UNSC and the IAEA. Furthermore, this thesis contends that the Ahmadinejad administration sought to transform the diplomatic focus on its nuclear programme into multifaceted geopolitical opportunities. On the one hand, Iran attempted to situate the issue within the wider context of global debates around access to peaceful nuclear energy and the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. Its denunciations of the Western NWSs’ discriminatory practices echoed with other states’ concerns. On the other hand, Iran’s proposals to the EU-3/P5+1 included repeated offers of cooperation on a range of dilemmas of common interests and aversion. As such, Iran pursued dual-track strategies towards its main nuclear opponents, combining enforcement costs with inducements. Finally, the belief that the US lay at the core of the nuclear issue prompted important debates and developments within Iran about the question of their bilateral relations. While these challenged conventional wisdoms about the principlists’ preferences, Iran’s discursive and ever-increasing strategic dependence on the US continued to explain its Janus-faced strategies towards the superpower.