This study aims at exploring the relation between economic liberalisation and Egyptian foreign policy orientation. It argues that the roots of the restructuring of Egyptian foreign policy since 1970 could be traced in the process of transforming the populist statist model of managing the Egyptian political economy. The study of Egyptian foreign policy has been hitherto dominated by the psychological- perceptual analysis of the Egyptian presidents' belief systems. Implicit in such analyses is the assumption of a docile socio-economic set up and an omnipotent leader capable of making abrupt changes in the basic thrust and orientation of Egyptian foreign policy according to his preferences and perceptions. This study seeks to challenge this assumption. As opposed to the asocial conception of a transcendent leader deciding freely on foreign policy matters, major shifts in Egyptian attitudes and behaviour towards its regional and international environments, it will be argued, were deeply linked to, and largely dependent on, the transformation of the Egyptian political economy, as well as its pace. To this end, the thesis is divided into four chapters apart from the introduction and the conclusion. The first examines the foreign policy implications of the populist statist model that prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s as well as the origins of the restructuring process. The second, third and fourth discuss the first wave of restructuring during the 1970s, the hesitant decade of slow transformation (the 1980s), and the second wave of restructuring in the aftermath of the Gulf war respectively. The focus of analysis will remain throughout the study on the exploring patterns of interaction between transforming the political economy and reorienting foreign policy.

This thesis aims to examine both continuity and change in Egyptian foreign policy between 1970 and 1981. The overarching question of this work is: Why and how did President Sadat affect changes in foreign policy? More specifically, the thesis examines the evolution of Egyptian foreign policy in three concentric circles: the Superpowers, the Arab world, and Israel. The broader aim of the thesis is to provide a detailed study of Egyptian foreign policy in this period, which witnessed a multitude of watershed events. The topic is important because Egypt is a leading state in the Arab world, a core actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a strategic ally of the superpowers during the Cold War. The thesis offers a detailed chronological account of Egyptian foreign policy during the 1970s. It advances a revisionist interpretation of the early Sadat years, arguing that there was much greater continuity with the foreign policy of Gamal Abdel-Nasser than is commonly believed. The account ends in 1981, with the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the succession of Hosni Mubarak. It is argued that Sadat not only managed to reverse Nasser’s radical path in foreign policy, but that he also succeeded in institutionalising his most significant policy changes: peace with Israel and the removal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The methodology of the thesis is principally empirical and qualitative in nature. The thesis is based on extensive archival research, recently declassified official documents, memoirs of policymakers in English and Arabic, and oral histories in the form of interviews and transcripts of discussions with former Egyptian policymakers.