This thesis is a normative analysis of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 (codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom). It examines whether Operation Iraqi Freedom could be described as a responsible action by the United States, acting as a great power. The normative perspective and its attendant framework are based on the theoretical approach propounded by the English School of International Relations. The basis of this non-native framework is rooted in the pluralist conception of the English School. The pluralist wing of the English School emphasises the importance of international order and declares that the great powers have a responsibility to protect this order. The threat posed to international order by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was cited by the Administration of US President George W Bush as the main reason for invading Iraq. The action makes the pluralist conception a logical starting point from which to analyse this act. Therefore, the normative framework of this thesis states that, although a great power has a responsibility to act in order to counter a threat to international order, it has an obligation to act according to certain norms. The normative framework established in this thesis points to three obligations of great powers, relating to the norms of legality, legitimacy and prudence. Addressing the issue of legality is the first step this thesis takes towards assessing Operation Iraqi Freedom as a responsible action. From this perspective, the thesis argues that it is not possible to define the American-led invasion of Iraq as a legal act. However, in a situation in which a great power may not be able to act according to legal norms, given a consensus regarding an overwhelming threat to international order, this power would have a moral responsibility to act. Such an action may not fall within the commonly accepted norms of law but the presence of consensus would give legitimacy to this great power's actions. Hence, examining Operation Iraqi Freedom from the viewpoint of legitimacy emerges as the second step by which this thesis evaluates it as a responsible action. The analysis from this perspective reveals that, through the perspective of legitimacy, it is not possible to declare the American invasion of Iraq as a responsible action by a great power. Though a great power has a responsibility to act legally and legitimately, in the case of a clear threat to international order, this power may not think it in the common interest to wait for legal and diplomatic processes to take their course. In such a situation, a great power may choose to act - but under the obligation to act prudently. The third step employed by this thesis is thus to analyse and discuss whether Operation Iraqi Freedom could be described as a prudent action. The examination of the invasion from this perspective determines that it is not possible to class the American invasion of Iraq as a responsible action according to the principles of prudence. Hence this thesis affirms that Operation Iraqi Freedom could not be described as a responsible action according to the normative criteria outlined above. In the run-up to the invasion and in its initiation, the United States did not fulfil the three obligations (relating to legality, legitimacy and prudence) necessary for a great power to fulfil while combating a threat to international order. Thus, seen from the pluralist perspective of the English School, this thesis argues that Operation Iraqi Freedom was an irresponsible action by the US acting as a great power.

This thesis responds to the longstanding call from constructivist and poststructuralist scholars for a turn to discourse. It focuses on the paradox of the ability of language to act as a constituting and constraining device within an agent-structure discussion. The Copenhagen School (CS), its attention to language and its concept of securitization is examined in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, including bringing discourse onto the security agenda to an unprecedented extent. This thesis seeks to speak security at a deeper level and move securitization beyond the moment of utterance and the notion of agents breaking free of rules that would otherwise bind, as well as beyond a singular definition of security. It is proposed that the CS framework can be theoretically complemented by Wittgenstein’s notion of language games on board. The analytical shift made by juxtaposing a speech act and a language game also foregrounds the link between language and rules. Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘acts of interpretation’ is also considered, and substantive questions are raised about what the language of security legitimates in principle and in practice. The Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 Iraq war are taken as a point of departure, and covers how the Bush administration deployed the language of security to justify highly controversial moves. Their narrative about the use of the pre-emptive use of force without an imminent threat existing and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as those seen in the Abu Ghraib photographs in the name of security exemplify that words matter. The arguments conclude that adjustments are needed in the way security is currently spoken in IR theory.