The dissertation explores mechanisms by which a lender can use timings of loans to engender peer monitoring and increase lending efficiency, when lending to a group of jointly liable impoverished individuals. We show that by disbursing the loans in a sequence (restricting the number of loans per period), the lender can finance a greater range of projects and allow poorer individuals to join the groups. Sequential lending entails lending to one borrower per period with the proviso that the second borrower's loan is contingent on first borrower's repayment. Simultaneous lending lets the borrowers make the decisions on their respective tasks simultaneously, requiring the lender to incentivise tasks collectively. Sequential lending separates the decisions on the task temporally and tasks are incentivised individually. Conversely, the lender's capital is less productive in sequential as compared to simultaneous lending. We show that if monitoring technology is sufficiently efficient, a greater range of projects are feasible under sequential lending. In a case-study of a Microfinance Institution in India, we found evidence of sequential lending. The lender restricted the number of group members that could borrow simultaneously, giving non-borrowers incentives to monitor the borrowers. We found significant income heterogeneity within the groups with wealthier members obtaining a higher proportion of loans. We build a stylised model based on the case-study. We show that the lender can engender negative assortative matching (wealthy pairing-up with poorer individuals) by restricting credit to the group. By requiring that the borrower and the non-borrower acquire a stake in the borrower's project, the lender determines the wealth-threshold for joining the group. Restricting credit creates intra-group competition for loans. The wealthy pair-up with poorer individuals to curtail the competition for loans within the group. By forbidding the group members to borrow simultaneously, the lender is able to lower the wealth-threshold for joining the group.

This thesis develops a public interest methodology for assessing the impact of regulatory reforms in microfinance, applies this methodology to the case study of Uganda and explains the results by analysing the political economy of policy change. It thus combines public and private interest approaches in assessing microfinance regulation. Firstly, the study develops a methodology for regulatory impact assessment based on the public interest theory of regulation. The first step is an analysis of market failures as the main rationale for regulation. Regulatory objectives are then defined with reference to these market failures. Finally, a variety of quantitative and qualitative impact indicators are identified to measure the benefits of regulation with reference to the achievement of the regulatory objectives while also considering the costs. Secondly, the thesis applies this rationale-objectives-indicators approach to the new legal framework for microfinance deposit-taking institutions (MDIs) in Uganda using similar, but unregulated microfinance institutions as a control group. The results show that the MDI regime‘s generally positive impact was only achieved at substantial cost to the regulator and regulated institutions and is skewed towards safety and soundness and systemic stability without adequate consideration of other objectives such as consumer protection and access. Thirdly, the thesis explains the degree to which public interest objectives were achieved by analysing the political economy of regulatory change. It shows that the three stakeholder groups with the best knowledge of microfinance regulation and whose interests were most closely aligned with the public interest objectives - the Central Bank (Bank of Uganda), the MDI candidates, and donor agencies - were also those who had the strongest influence on the policy change process. The thesis concludes that its unique contribution is to develop a thorough methodology for assessing regulatory impact in microfinance. The methodology is used to measure the strengths and weaknesses of the MDI regime in Uganda, while the political economy analysis explains why these strengths and weaknesses arose.

Ueda Yoko. Local economy and entrepreneurship in Thailand : a case study of Nakhon Ratchasima. Kyoto University Press. 1995, 158p. / 京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(経済学) / 乙第9679号 / 論経博第214号 / 新制||経||126(附属図書館) / UT51-97-W238 / (主査)教授 渡邉 尚, 教授 今久保 幸生, 教授 上原 一慶 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DFAM