The thesis attempts to account for an apparently wide array of class-like entities in present-day capitalist formation, while remaining true to the spirit of Marxian theory, in which the relationship of exploitation implies a polarised, two-class society. It is argued that the efforts to solve this puzzle usually involve notions of class based on the division of labour. The fundamental concepts of the original theory, such as reproduction, subsistence, exploitation and class are then re-examined and reconstructed. The idea of profit as based on surplus labour is defended, securing the basis for the Marxian understanding of class. The Transformation Problem of moving from labour values to prices of production is discussed and while the force of the Sraffian critique is admitted, a new interpretation of the problem is suggested, making it possible to see the Sraffian schema as a generalisation of the Marxian one. Labour Theory of Value is analysed as a 'dual theory of exploitation and price' and it is argued that only the latter part is vulnerable to the criticisms advanced. The Sraffian schema is interpreted as a clear explication of the concept of exploitation, throwing into sharp relief the disjunction between exploitation-based and division-of-labour-based views of class. An integration of the two concepts is attempted by proposing a new, generalised notion termed 'complexploitation' (complex exploitation) flowing from what is claimed to be the essential idea behind the concept of exploitation: that one group of agents is more oppressed by the constraints of the so-called 'Sphere of Necessity', just so that another group may enjoy more of the fruits of the 'Sphere of Freedom'. Finally it is suggested that the concept of complexploitation makes possible a more fine-grained class map of society than the original two-class model.

In my thesis I attempt to compare Marxism with critical realism. My conclusion is that critical realism is incapable of supporting Marxism. My understanding of Marxism is based on Capital. In Capital, the method of social exploration employed by Marx is historically contextual. Capitalism provides Marx with the condition to construct his method, so that the explanation of capitalistic production is realised. In Marx‘s explanation, the calculation of surplus value is important. This presupposes the equation of the amounts of value possessed produced commodities. Conversely, the critical realist method is trans-historical, because it relies on a questionable ontology. Further, critical realist ontology founding these methodological principles is problematic. The transcendental arguments on this ontology relies, as exemplified by Roy Bhaskar and Tony Lawson, are weak. On the basis of their social ontology, critical realists propose a methodology of social sciences is proposed. Thanks to it, critical realism criticises mainstream economics and supports heterodox economics, including Marxism. This argument, however, is problematic. For one thing, mainstream economics is condemned for mathematic formalism. This critique presupposes a distinction between open systems and closed systems. Because critical realism is ambiguous about the definition of open systems and closed systems, its critique of mainstream economics is questionable. In addition, a critical realist methodology is compatible with utilising mathematics to study open systems. Therefore, it is also compatible with mainstream economics. Finally, in terms of critical realism, Marx‘s account of capitalism is read as an application of a trans-historical method strategy. This contradicts my idea that the method adopted by Marx presupposes a social-historical context: capitalism. Second, being interpreted in terms of critical realism, the explanatory power of Marx‘s theory is reduced, in that the calculation of surplus value in his theory is excluded.

The recent revival of interest in Marxism has addressed the question of subjectivity in new ways. This thesis undertakes a critical investigation of the theme of subjectivity in key texts from the classical Marxist tradition in preparation for assessing its contribution to contemporary debates. My aim in this project has been to explore how one might construct a defensible version of the solution to the problem of subjectivity advanced by Marx and his successors. Examining Marx’s effort to develop the dialectical unity of subject and object in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, I propose the coexistence of two conceptions of subjectivity in these Manuscripts. A tension is created within the text that I argue pre-figures the development of his theory of commodity fetishism. This theory addresses the problem of the authentic or quasi-subjectivity of capital. This theme is developed through an exploration of the obstacles confronting proletarian subjectivity in Marx’s Capital. Within this framework, I show how Marx elaborates concrete forms of working class self-activity, such as in his chapter on The Working Day. The relationship between human actors and social structures is studied, in particular the role of the knowing subject in the process of class struggle, such as with the case of the factory inspectors. I also critically examine the interpretation of Capital advanced by Moishe Postone in his work: Time, Labour and Social Domination. In the third chapter, Lukács’s theory of reification is examined, extending commodity fetishism to locate the commodity-form as the structuring principle fragmenting subjectivity in all spheres of social life. Following Marx’s discovery of the proletariat as the ‘universal’ class, Lukács poses the proletariat as the philosophical basis for overcoming these obstacles. I attempt to locate the questions that Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness allows us to ask and those it excludes. Whilst Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks do not directly address the theme of alienation and fetishism, in the final chapter, I argue that his distinctively concrete account of class subjectivity has a de-fetishising function related to the central role played by intellectuals in political leadership. I discuss the apparent autonomy of the State in Gramsci’s framework and examine whether this poses a problem for his conception of class subjectivity. In order to assess this challenge, I propose a new categorisation of two modes – holistic and constitutive – by which Gramsci analyses the State. Finally, I consider the possibility that Lukács and Gramsci’s heterogeneous frameworks might yield complementary contributions towards contemporary discussions of the problem of subjectivity.

No description available.

No evangelistic erroneous network of ideas can guarantee the satisfaction of these two demands : (1) propagate the network without revision and (2) completely insulate itself against losses in credibility and adherents through criticism. If a network of ideas is false, or inconsistent or fails to solve its intended problem, or unfeasible, or is too costly in terms of necessarily forsaken goals, its acceptability may be undermined given only true assumptions and valid arguments. People prefer to adopt ideologies that (i) are logically consistent, (ii) are more truth-like and of higher information content than their rivals, (iii) are systematically organised, (iv) solve their problems better than their rivals, (v) do not contain unfeasible demands, and (vi) do not contain uneconomic demands. Truth and validity therefore act as Darwinian-like filters on ideologies. Using Popper's notion of situational analysis and with reference to Darwinian evolution, considered as a special case of the former, and Bartley's theory of comprehensively critical rationalism I argue that a propagandist cannot guarantee his message or his movement from sound criticism. All positions are in a methodological sense open to argument. Moreover, the logic of a propagandist's situation constrains him into making his message and himself open to criticism in order to maximize its chances of being propagated through the population. But he then loses control of the message in two respects. Firstly, his audience are disposed to select from the competing ideas they encounter those that satisfy (i) to (vi) because of man's evolutionary history. Secondly, he cannot guarantee protection from criticism even a privileged section of his message because he cannot predict in a systematic way what logical repercussions each protective reformulation of the ideology will have on other sections of the ideology and what criticism the ideology will encounter. He cannot do the latter because of certain logical properties of theories that endow them with unfathomable depths. Marxism and Freudianism serve as case studies, especially for the analysis of Popper's notion of the immunizing stratagem, a methodological/logical device that is supposed to save theories from criticism. "Immunizing stratagems" either abandon the ideology they are meant to protect or seriously lower its chances of being reproduced.

No description available.

This thesis explores the claims of autonomist Marxist theory that contemporary struggles against capitalism are about rejecting capitalism through producing commons. The autonomist approach to commons is significant for social movement theory because, unlike existing Marxist approaches such as neo-Gramscian social movement theory, it places political action in a relation with capital. As a result, autonomist theory establishes a framework for understanding social movements as ?commons movements?, rooted in claims about the nature of commons; the structure of capitalism; and the significance of political action. The thesis explores this framework by applying it to two contemporary social movements: the Bene Comune movement in Rome, Italy, and the Occupy movement in Oakland, U.S.A. These movements are significant because commons, and practices of ?commoning? are both explicit and implicit within the movement practice. It establishes the successes of the autonomist method in offering a thick description of the social movements, their participants, and the local issues that animate them, but less successful at theorising the relationship between social movement practice and capitalism. The final chapters explore the reasons for this, and explore alternative ways of understanding these movements in the context of capital. In the first instance, it looks to other resources that can be found within the intellectual milieu of post-2008 social movements, particularly so-called ?communisation? theory, which proposes a structural explanation of commons, rooted in a theory of secular crisis. Finally, the thesis concludes by suggesting that the primary problem facing autonomist theory as a basis for understanding social movements is its conflation of the logic of the political with the logic of the structural conditions of capital, a conflation which is sclerotic of its attempt to explain the dynamics that underlie the turn towards commons, and limiting of its capacity to explore political strategies at the level of totality.

In this thesis the component parts of Marx's method are identified and clarified, his use of dialectics and materialism examined, and the scientific standing of his method assessed. It is argued that Marx's method is coherent, valid and scientific, and is based on a dialectical and materialist philosophy. The key themes of Marx's method identified include critique, abstraction, essence and appearance, inversion, and practice. Six theses of Marx's materialism are put forward: the realism thesis, the primacy of matter thesis, the naturalism thesis, the historical materialism thesis, the praxis thesis and the materialist methodology thesis. The core elements of dialectics are identified as change, connection and contradiction, and the outline of a non-Hegelian dialectic is sketched out. It is contended that the interpretations of dialectics and materialism presented constitute the underpinnings of Marx's method. The relations between the component parts of his method, and between them and the dialectical and materialist philosophical foundation are indicated, and the overall coherence of Marx's method asserted. Four conceptions of science - scientific positivism, critical rationalism, conventionalism and scientific realism - are identified and analysed, and Marx's method is compared and contrasted with them. Arguments for Marxism's scientificity are examined and assessed, and it is contended that Marx's method is compatible with the scientific realist conception of science.

No description available.

No description available.