The thesis is concerned with the relationship between economic growth, defined by GNP per capita, and inequality. The latter is discussed with reference to income distribution and poverty. Firstly, the theoretical background to the debate is outlined. While considering a wide array of positions, it focuses particularly on the influential thesis of Simon Kuznets (1955), which posits a relationship between a country's economic growth and its income distribution profile. Kuznets' thesis is discussed at length and compared to other interpretations of the relationship. The Colombian experience is then brought in, as a case study with which to test Kuznets' proposition. Published research and other available data, covering the period up to 1978, is then reviewed, before the latest available data - official statistics and other sources, supplemented by interviews carried out by the author - covering the 1978-1990 period, is presented and discussed in detail. A comparison of the inequality profile in the period up to 1978 with that between 1978-1990 is then presented. Following this, some possible determinants - both economic and sociological - of the income distribution and poverty trends between 1978 and 1990 are discussed. These include those related to the economy, the government, education, the drug-trade, and the 'culture of violence'. Conclusions are arrived at as to the influence of each. An overall conclusion is then drawn, which attempts to highlight the links between the Kuznets thesis and the Colombian experience. The problems of a thesis such as Kuznets', arrived at with cross-sectional data, are discussed, as are those associated with using a case study approach to 'test' an hypothesis. Finally, the thesis includes two appendices, the first discussing the data used to assess the income distribution and poverty profiles in the period 1978-1990, the second outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the various measures of inequality employed in the study.

No description available.

Accounts of economic development during mid-twentieth century have been dominated by import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) and/or state-led industrialisation frameworks. is literature attaches considerable importance to such policy areas critical to manufacturing as: trade and tariffs, foreign exchange and the promotion of credit. According to this view, industrialisation became an official goal and in many developing economies governments committed to it seriously. Focusing on Colombia, this dissertation challenges conventional wisdom. It demonstrates that the Colombian state did not provide financial aid, or implement deliberate trade-protectionist support, for industrialists to the degree hitherto argued. A distinct political-economy configuration, in which small-scale agriculturalists, particularly coffee exporters, wielded significant power within the state, meant that the type of distortive pro-ISI macro policies pursued in other Latin American economies were eschewed. Industrialisation proceeded apace in Colombia, but this was chiefly a market- or private-led phenomenon. e methodology employed to substantiate this claim is not comparative, yet frequent references are made to other Latin American nations to serve as benchmarks and counterpoints. New archival material, both quantitative and qualitative, is combined in novel ways to substantiate the original, revisionist interpretations advanced in the thesis. Policy-makers, targeting the twin challenges of managing external-account pressures and sustaining fiscal revenue, rather than promoting inward-looking development, best explain moderate levels of tariffs and slight overvaluation of the currency observed in Colombian trade policy. e heretofore untold history of the Institute for Industrial Development, a direct supplier of venture capital, shows a government agency with major organisational weaknesses, incapable of fulfilling its legal mandate, least of conforming to the major role attached by the literature as key agent for industrialisation. Findings regarding credit demonstrate that neither ordinary nor subsidised credit flowed to manufacturing to the extent previously thought. Patterns of legislated credit, sector-targeted banking and privileged access to the Central Bank, all show that agrarian ventures, not industrialists, were the recipients of subsidised official financing. A growing incompatibility between the financial requirements of advanced industrialisation and the clientelistic nature of the domestic polity that had to cater for the needs of agrarian groups, prevented policy elites from adopting a pro-manufacturing stance in financial and credit policies, even had they so wished.