The speculative currency transaction markets are the largest capital markets in the world with an estimated US$2 trillion being traded every day. By comparison the daily global transactions related to international trade, goods and services represent only a small proportion of capital trades. Speculative flight in times of capital crises has triggered major social and economic disruptions such as those in Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997-98) Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), Turkey (2000) and Argentina (2001). Smaller crises occur regularly including currency speculation losses by the Reserve Bank of Australia in 2002 and corporate disruptions from trading losses incurred by the National Bank of Australia in 2004. Recently (May 2006) hedge funds withdrew vast quantities of capital from Iceland and New Zealand causing major disruptions to financial systems in both countries. Each disruption causes trauma to small and institutional investors and to civil society. The proliferation of transactions and the rise in accommodating and secretive offshore tax havens has created a global shadow economy, which has essentially reconfigured capitalism in modern times. This paper examines the political economy of financial market reform and the financial architecture required to implement a currency transaction tax. The thesis defends an argument in support of global currency transaction taxes based on proposals originally made by Keynes, Tobin, Spahn and Schmidt. There is an urgent need to account for the effects created by the speculative and volatile global shadow economy. Recent developments in hedge fund regulation measures demonstrate that the lobbying power of new financial players create major problems for policymakers and global financial security.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

In the face of escalating health care expenditure, OECD countries are turning to a variety of cost-containment strategies. This thesis analyses three such mechanisms. In Part I, I consider the use of coinsurance to limit the demand for health care. Because coinsurance reduces the elasticity of demand with respect to the price of health care, consumers facing low coinsurance rates may be charged a higher price by doctors. Such discriminatory pricing enables the doctor to extract surplus created in the insurance market, and therefore reduces the effectiveness of coinsurance. I show that in equilibrium, some consumers remain uninsured. I also show how this problem is solved if the doctor and insurer enter into managed care style arrangements. Such arrangements improve insurer and doctor profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. In Part II, I consider the design of fundholding schemes which encourage doctors to restrict expensive treatment to severely ill patients. I show that such schemes may be undermined by a patient-doctor side contract. In the face of such patient-doctor collusion, the fundholding scheme may be made collusion-proof by increasing its "power". I show that the optimal collusion-proof scheme may pay the doctor more than his reservation wage. An alternative solution to patient-doctor collusion is to use a partial fundholding scheme that requires some additional co-payment from the patient. Part III analyses New Zealand's internal market reforms. Introduced in 1993, the reforms involved the separation of funding and provision of health care, and were intended to simulate a competitive market environment, thereby improving the incentives of government owned health care providers to be efficient. On the supply side, I look at the internal restructuring of hospitals into private-sector clones. I argue that this commercialisation failed to take account of informational issues within the hospital. On the demand-side, I examine the suitability of internal markets for eliciting optimal innovation from the hospital sector. Again, I find that a standard argument, namely that increased competition leads to innovation, is questionable in the context of the internal market. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

The community and leasehold forestry regimes (CF and LF regimes) are high priority programmes that are designed by the Nepalese government to conserve forests and reduce poverty through the introduction of formal institutions in terms of legal property rights and governance structures and processes. However, little is known about the mechanisms through which informal and formal institutions influence resource access of the poor under these regimes. By employing a collective case study approach, this research provides some understanding of the mechanisms through which formal and informal institutional factors influence access of the poor to forest resources governed under the CF and LF regimes in Nepal. This study found that informal institutional factors significantly influence the impact of formal institutions irrespective of the regime that was imposed on the Nepalese hill communities. It was revealed that where more than one social group co-exist in a community, discriminatory sociocultural norms (for example patriarchal and caste-based norms), and customary property rights favour one social group over others. As a result, certain social groups have greater access to resources and benefits from the resources than do other social groups. Of particular significance, and not previously reported, the lack of prior experience in collective action of the low castes along with their weak social networks and poor leadership ability is highlighted as being directly linked to their relatively limited access to forest resources. When the Bista system, a specific type of a traditional bridging social network is eroded, the low castes end up with less access due to removal of support from the high castes. This study shows that a more inclusive regime (for example CF regime) is likely to lead to more effective outcomes for the livelihood of the poor as compared to a more exclusive regime (e.g. LF regime). When the powerful are included in the forest user group (FUG), along with the poor, there is less resistance to the shift in property rights and the improved access of the poor to forest benefits that the regimes are intended to achieve. However, it was found that active participation is more determinant of resource access than is a specified set of property rights granted by right of membership in a FUG. Although some FUG governance structures provide a forum where the disadvantaged members of the FUGs have the right to participate in decision making, their participation is constrained by discriminatory sociocultural norms. Further, this study revealed that the decision-making processes dominated by the elites tend to address the needs of the disadvantaged members to only a very limited extent. However, improving capacities has the potential to enhance participation of disadvantaged members in the processes. The research findings suggest that informal institutions must explicitly be considered in the design and implementation of CBNRM regimes in order for them to be successful in improving livelihoods of the poor. The implementing staff need support mechanisms for changing their own attitudes and behaviours to those that are more favourable to the social shift that the regimes are intended to bring about. CBNRM regimes have the potential to improve the livelihoods of the poor, but research must continue on how this can be achieved.

It is a conventional wisdom that since the start of the Chinese economic reform in 1978, the domestic saving structure in China has changed significantly. Previous studies of household saving in China (for example: Qian, 1988, Feltenstein et al, 1990, and Wakabayashi and Mackellar, 1999) have usually relied upon the Keynesian absolute-income hypothesis, Duesenberry's relative-income hypothesis, and Friedman's permanent-income hypothesis. This thesis uses the Modigliani-Brumberg life-cycle hypothesis to examine the determinants of household saving behavior in the Peoples' Republic of China during the period 1978 to 2003. The research uses modern cointegration techniques to examine the impact on saving rates of economic growth, age dependency, wealth, the real interest rate, social security payments and unemployment (as a proxy for income uncertainty). Autoregressive distributed lag models are constructed and tested. The results find that economic growth, the real interest rate and social security payments have the expected effect with significant parameters; age dependency has the expected sign but in one model is not statistically significant; and that unemployment is not significant. The most surprising result is that increases in household wealth are associated with increased saving rates, which may help explain very high economic growth rates in China post 1978.

Developing timely and reliable house price indices is of interest worldwide, because these measures influence consumer behaviour, inflation targeting, and spot and futures markets. Several techniques for constructing a constant quality price index are available in the literature, but these methods are difficult to apply in localities where market transaction data is limited. Since house price movements are a local phenomena, improving the timeliness of a quality controlled price index at local housing market levels in small countries like New Zealand is a challenge. This thesis comprises three essays that focused on improving the timeliness of reported house price indices at the local market levels. The timeliness issue examined in this thesis has not previously been rigorously investigated and this makes the results of this thesis both important and unique for the benefit of both academic research and practical application. Essay One reviews the sale price appraisal ratio (SPAR) method, which has been applied since the 1960s for producing local house price indices at a semi-annual and quarterly basis in New Zealand. Utilizing a variety of statistical tests and comparing this index with the repeat sales and median price index result in the study highlighting the potential of, as well as the problems associated with, a price index produced by the SPAR method at a monthly level. In the following two essays, monthly price indices are tested using empirical real estate research methods in order to examine their usefulness in exploring the research questions as well as revealing the statistical differences between them. Essay Two studies the relationship between sale price and trading volume, and the ripple effect of local house price comovements. The results show that the trading volume generally leads the sale price in the long-run and the ripple effect is most likely constrained within regions. In Essay Two, the monthly SPAR index produces similar statistical results to those estimated by the repeat sales index for large cities. Essay Three is a study on the market efficiency of housing markets. It is found the local housing market is neither weak-form nor semi-strong form efficient. Local house price movements are strongly correlated and are mean reverting towards their long-run equilibrium. It is further concluded that monthly price indices for small cities are problematic due to the problem of small sample size. Overall, the findings in this thesis show monthly house price indices can be generated by using the SPAR method at local market levels. However, this potential is limited to large cities. Further research can focus on improving the quality of monthly price indices for large cities.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / Approaching retirement, individuals are confronted by a range of future risks and uncertainties. The primary worry is insufficient income and the associated danger of outliving one's capital. New Zealand has a unique approach for reducing this risk, comprising a universal state pension supplemented by voluntary unsubsidised saving. This simple model meets poverty prevention objectives, but middle-income baby-boom cohorts may struggle to achieve their income-replacement aspirations. The modest capital they have saved to supplement the state pension is exposed to the risks of inflation, poor investment outcomes, growth in living standards, and increasing longevity. They will enter retirement with significantly less private pension provision than previous generations and while they may hold a high proportion of their assets in owner-occupied homes, this equity is not readily accessed. They and their families also face the risk that they might require costly long-term residential care in old age. Women are likely to be particularly affected, not only as the spouses of men needing care, but, because of greater average longevity, they have a higher propensity to need long-term care themselves. Pension design and annuity markets are neglected areas of inquiry in New Zealand. In part this is because international pressures to privatise the state pension by setting up compulsory savings schemes in the private sector have been resisted. This thesis outlines the historical, practical, political and theoretical factors that explain the demise of private pensions and annuities. This provides a record of international interest as New Zealand is the first developed country to institute a tar neutral environment for retirement saving. While the New Zealand model is largely a credible one, there are significant shortcomings. This thesis examines whether economic theories can cast new light on what should be done and finds the experimentation of a pragmatic kind that has gone on historically precludes highly theoretical or ideological policy solutions. Normative judgements about well-being and distribution cannot be avoided. An integrated approach to reforming the New Zealand system is explored, based on the advantages of linking certain kinds of insurance. A substantial role for the state is inescapable; especially in the annuities market, which, it is argued, should be developed to play a significant role in retirement policy options. A state-guaranteed life annuity linked to long-term care insurance financed by a combination of cash and home equity is proposed, subsidised by intragenerational transfers from the retired population. This reform proposal builds on the existing pre-retirement saving policy and keeps the state pension as the cornerstone. The pay-off is improved welfare for middle-income retirees, greater economic efficiency, lower fiscal cost and improved equity both across and within generations. A greater credibility for the New Zealand model in international forums is also likely to follow.