This thesis argues that the doctrine of absolute Parliamentary Sovereignty does not have a proper legal basis and is a political doctrine. The most superior form of law is Fundamental Law which, contrary to the existing legal view, does have a legal basis for its existence. Fundamental Law is that body of law which expressly or by implication states in its rules the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. These fundamental rights and freedoms are intrinsically linked to a concept which can be properly called Fundamental Justice. A principle inherent within a rule of Fundamental Law is natural equity. When a rule of Fundamental Law is properly operative then a specific form of Justice is created or the same form of injustice is prevented. Research has been undertaken dating back to the 17th. century with particular emphasis upon the period around the English Civil War and the charges brought against King Charles I. This research continued through to the Second World War and onwards to modern times. There is particular analysis relating to the Nuremburg War Crimes trials and the judgments of the Tribunal; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights and the recognized concept of Compelling Law or Jus Cogens. The methodology used during this thesis is the same as that which is applied throughout the courts in the UK legal system. It applies a combination of ‘black letter’ law; documentary analysis; identification at various stages of the distinction between political and legal issues; establishing facts from the evidence and most importantly drawing proper and reasonable inferences from those established facts and factual situations. This being in accordance with the accepted practice of all the courts in the UK. Evidence is provided of a number of specific rules which can properly be called rules of Fundamental Law. These rules are identified by analysing existing recognized rules of Compelling Law and certain specific rules found in Human Rights Law and demonstrating the common factors between them. This thesis accepts that the doctrine of Fundamental Law is not recognized as a legal concept in the UK legal system but provides compelling evidence that such a failure has little to do with the fact of its existence, as a question of law, but is simply a refusal to recognize it, apparently based on political expediency. This thesis further demonstrates the benefits to individuals by the proper recognition of Fundamental Law.

This thesis conducts a systematic, empirical examination of each of the judgments that arose in the UK final court of appeal in the sessions 2007-2011, covering the transitional period between the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The aim of the thesis was to establish whether the institutional independence of the court, following the enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, resulted in a more powerful court within the UK constitution. The relative power of the court was gauged by empirically reviewing each of the court's legal and political institutional relationships, together with the administrative efficiency of the court, across the transitional period. The study concludes that the Supreme Court appeared to be a more powerful and assertive institution than its predecessor. The conclusion also highlights the significant effect that the influence of the European Convention of Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights appeared to have on the court's institutional relationships and its administrative efficiency in the time period.

This dissertation studies the theoretical turn in contemporary British public law scholarship with a view to understanding what is it that public lawyers do when they theorise their subject. The diversification and expansion of theoretical writings that has animated the theoretical turn was inspired by the belief that the atheoretical character of public law scholarship made it unsuited to address the contemporary problems of the field. From the critique of the ‘dismal’ performance of public lawyers came a call to scholars to embark on a search for the foundations of their subject. Most of those who answered this call understood the task to be undertaken as an inquiry into the principles or values that ground and give normative force to public law. In this sense, most approaches within contemporary British public law theory constitute a species of constructivism whose variations differ according to the theoretical resources that are employed (critical social theory, moral philosophy or political theory) and what is taken to be the normative centre of the field (the administrative process, judicial review or political accountability). Although constructivism has been dominant, it would be wrong to assume that all conceptions could be subsumed under that category. There are, I argue, two principal alternative approaches. One, called deconstructivism, contends that theory has a tendency to become estranged from practice because it fails to acknowledge constitutional change and overestimates the role of principles, creating the conditions for the unreflective reproduction of a number of ‘myths’ which have to be dispelled by uncovering the empirical foundations of the subject. The other, labelled reconstructivism, argues instead that the theorist cannot make sense of the field and its present predicaments without understanding the particular historical evolution of the subject which has been informed by competing traditions of thought. Against a widespread assumption, my contention is that these theoretical approaches are not only competitive but also complementary. Without denying that these conceptions are semantically and methodologically incommensurable, I show that this pluralised theoretical landscape represents a decisive enlargement of the understanding of the subject.

Since 1997, the UK constitution has undergone a transformation. This has since become a rolling process which shows little sign of abating. However, some of this constitutional change has been criticised for being rushed, piecemeal and with little consideration of the broader constitution. Yet, despite these criticisms, the underlying methodology of constitutional change has not been discussed in any great detail. This thesis, focusing on formal constitutional change, argues that the methodology to deliver that change should be enhanced to address these concerns. After establishing the limits of formal constitutional change, this thesis then considers how constitutional issues are approached within government and suggests that a Department of Legal Affairs would improve the preparation of proposed changes before being presented to Parliament. The politics of constitutional change are then analysed, with a particular focus on the process of coalition negotiations, which has become a new part of the methodology. The parliamentary process is considered by analysing the parliamentary passage of what became the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. Recent changes to parliamentary procedure have allowed Parliament to scrutinise constitutional legislation more effectively, although there are still areas for significant improvement, particularly during the Committee Stage in the House of Commons. The thesis then considers the role of referendums and establishes when a referendum is required either as a matter of law or convention. The thesis then shows how procedural innovations such as the constitutional conventions in Australia and Ireland or the citizens’ assemblies in British Columbia and Ontario could be used in the UK. Also, as any recommendations of a constitutional convention or a citizens’ assembly are usually put to the rest of the electorate at a referendum, the links between a convention or assembly and the referendum process are discussed. Taken together, these enhancements to discrete aspects of the methodology of constitutional change should ensure that changes are more considered and allow for a more a stable constitutional settlement.