For “Concurrent Delay” dispute in construction projects, within what is called the Malmaison approach, English court allow the contractor to gain time but no monetary compensation. Following the issue of the judgment of the City Inn case in 2007 in Scotland which departed from the English approach to the apportionment approach for the monetary consequences, an argument on “Concurrent Delay” in construction projects has started. Few writers have commented giving their opinion based on common law grounds. The question can be: should we have different remedies for the same situation in a cross jurisdiction industry like construction industry which has nearly the same characteristics anywhere. When we take the matter to a larger comparative study, the civilian law logic should be brought to the argument on how to deal with “Concurrent Delay”. There is a notion of differentiation between private contracts and public contracts in most of the civil law countries. Egypt is a developed example of this. When we examine this notion of differentiation with the possible approaches of the “Concurrent Delay” we may add other philosophical and practical perspective to the matter of “Concurrent Delay”. In view of that issue, the author identifies the notion of the differentiation between the private contracts and the public contracts within the context of public works construction disputes. The author also aims to explore the matter of concurrent delay from its two angles which are the legal perspective and the construction management perspective to identify the concurrent delay issue. The research aims to identify the related matters to the issue of concurrent delay and to test an appropriate regulatory framework for concurrent delay within the civilian law context and in common law context. The main findings of the research can be summarized that, within modern construction industry, a unified fair and reasonable advocated resolution or remedy can be developed to be applicable in different jurisdictions as long as the characteristics and the nature of the dispute are nearly the same. These findings will help to support the process of developing a theoretical regulatory framework that will be used as a guide to develop the way we theoretically and practically deal with concurrent delay dispute. One of the aims of this research is to develop the research area of construction law in Egypt.

Renegotiation is an integral feature of upstream petroleum contracts, given their vulnerability to unforeseen supervening events. The underlying assumptions or expectations upon which the parties enter into contracts change over time due to the special character of these agreements. In petroleum contracts, the conflicting interests of the parties are a major source of instability. While the investor is understandably concerned about the stability of its investment in order to recover its costs and attain a minimum rate of return, the State, as a sovereign entity with the public interest on top of its agenda, prefers contractual flexibility and seeks economic development through the investment. The need for renegotiation of petroleum contracts derives from the necessity of introducing flexibility into petroleum agreements, while maintaining contractual stability. The principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus are at the heart of any discussion of contractual adjustment. While the importance of the sanctity of the contract always has to be underlined, yet the rigid insistence on the contractual stability in the field of upstream petroleum agreements may lead to explosive reactions by the host State. Therefore, renegotiation of such contracts subsequent to change of circumstances resulting in a breach of the parties’ legitimate expectations is essential if the contract is to survive the turbulent times of the future. Many, if not the majority of petroleum contracts, do not seem to contain contractual adjustment provisions, mostly because the investor is fearful that those clauses will be used as a lever by the State party to impose unilateral changes in the investment’s underlying circumstances. However, even in the absence of adjustment mechanisms in the agreement, the petroleum industry practice has shown that renegotiation is still happening outside the parties’ express will. Renegotiation outside the contract, however, may impose the contract to high risk of instability, and therefore, must be qualified. While the necessity of renegotiation of petroleum contracts has been highlighted in this dissertation, it is argued that renegotiation practices outside the contract will be effectively qualified through establishing or finding a duty to renegotiate by recourse to the general principles of law. Finding an implicit or inherent obligation to renegotiate petroleum contracts based on the general principles of law will keep the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, as set out in the contract, consistent with the economic interests of the parties throughout the duration of the contract. Although the principle of protection of legitimate expectations may well be perceived as a source for an inherent or implied renegotiation duty in the field of petroleum contracts, but major municipal laws in the world seem to still adhere to the principle of the sanctity of contracts and narrowly interpret and apply the principle of rebus sic stantibus. That is because the approaches of the prominent national legal systems in the world have been influenced by the rules originally designed to govern contractual relationships between parties with equal bargaining powers in purely private and commercial contracts. This will lead to the conclusion that inserting contractual adjustment clauses in petroleum contracts may be the best way for the parties to ensure contractual adjustment(s) during the performance of the contract in the event that change of circumstances will lead to disturbance of economic equilibrium of the contract.

Scholars have considered various constitutional conflicts in relation to independence of utility regulators (such as telecoms, energy, water and postal services). It ha:s been argued that these entities represent a disintegration of the administrative system, causing a serious failure for ensuring accountability and ministerial responsibility. Besides, some scholars have pointed out that, as these entities perform their powers outside the central political institutions (i.e. Parliament and government ministers), independent regulation means a tension with the traditional forms of political legitimacy . This work attempts to contribute to this debate, proposing a more optimistic understanding of independent regulators, defending their compliance with core constitutional values of legitimacy, accountability and responsibility. Using comparative study of independent utility regulators in Spain and the UK, the work intends to demonstrate that regulators' can be regarded as legitimate and accountable. To do so, it will adopt a socio-legal approach, 'showing the interactions of law and other social sciences, such as politics and sociology. In the first part, it argues that administrative disintegration is part of a larger transformation of the state, and it should not be attached to the creation of independent agencies. Controversial issues of legitimacy which can be approached in various and complex ways, including through the use of systems theory. Principal-agent theory seems to provide good reasons for delegation to independent agencies. Then, it aims to argue that ministerial direction is clearly inadequate as a means of accountability on its own, and needs to be balanced against other constitutional requirements. What is more appropriate is to use. accountability a,s a 'hub concept' and to point to the complex networks this involved, as illustrated from utility regulation in the UK, and telecoms regulation in Spain, UK and the EU. Overall, is intended that the contribution of the thesis will introduce a further debate on the current interpretation of constitutional principles to a transformed state structure, and new forms to ensure accountability and legitimacy mechanisms in relation to peripheral institutions.

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For over more than 50 years the EU Commission has used a deterrence approach in the imposition of fines to enforce EU competition law and pursue the EU competition policy. Although, it has adopted many other instruments to enhance its detection rate and provide more efficient and forward-looking outcomes in pro of competition; the aim to deter in order to achieve prevention has not changed. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has shown that the optimal deterrence framework based on the legal-economic theory is far from even deterring let alone prevent. Criminology and behavioural economics have provided new insights that call for the adoption of a more realistic approach that seeks to elevate the perception of certainty of punishment by increasing the informal costs for individuals and undertakings’ subunits who can prevent competition law violations in the first place. In this regard, a compliance approach that seeks to elevate the immediate costs perception and create a monitoring network that can effectively influence social norms that constraint behaviour, is able to result in a culture of compliance that makes non-compliance a less likely option. By embracing instruments such as compliance programmes, designation of external monitors and availability of whistleblowing rewards among others, the social internalization of compliance norms is feasible and thus, prevention possible.

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Every Ph.D. thesis (thesis) revolves around and aims to address a central research question. This thesis poses the following question: 'Is the European Union Competition Law Regime Suitable for the Republic of Turkey: Does One-Size Fit All?' Essentially, the research question seeks to examine whether and to what extent the European Union (EU) competition law regime is suitable as a model law to be followed by Turkey. In this connection, the problem it seeks to address is the suitability of the EU competition law regime for Turkey against the backdrop of two equally important and challenging issues: first, Turkey's legal obligation to adopt a national competition law regime based on the EU model; and second; divergence between historical backgrounds and political, socio-economic, and broader legal settings of the two jurisdictions.

Foreign direct investment in the mining and oil industries is invariably fostered through the signing of concession agreements between the host State and the investor. Such concessions may contain fiscal incentives, to encourage the flow of FDI. However, such concessions are also susceptible to alteration by the host State, once the investment has been sunk. This may include increasing taxes or outright nationalization. To avert this, investors will often insist on the insertion of stabilization clauses. These clauses constitute an undertaking on the part of the host State, that they will not take any administrative or legislative action that would adversely affect the rights of the investor. Such clauses are well recognized by arbitral tribunals and the unilateral abrogation of these clauses, will have pecuniary consequences. Not only will the host State have to pay damnum emergens but also lucrum cessans as part of the compensation package to the investor. Such a position promotes efficiency as per the efficient breach theory, by discouraging the State from terminating concession agreements unless they will make some money, even after compensating the investor for lost future profits. However, this ultimately renders stabilization clauses inflexible because they preclude the host State from pursuing legitimate public functions. Such a position, necessitates some form of contractual flexibility. However, the legitimate expectations of the investor also ought to the protected. The means of achieving this balance is by the inserting renegotiation clauses in the concession agreements.

The World Trade Organisation's (WTO) agriculture regime set out to abolish protectionist measures and institute free trade. The regime consists of the WTO Agreement of Agriculture, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The new rules were designed to overcome three fundamental deficiencies of the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): firstly, GATT's inadequate rules which failed to address agricultural trade in detail; secondly, a regulatory structure which facilitated loopholes in the coverage of the agreements and consequently affected the rules' cogency and finally, adverse effects on developing countries from GATT's failure to adequately address the difficulties posed by protectionism in international agricultural trade. Despite the WTO regime's shift to an economic solution focusing on these three elements international agricultural trade is still problematic. This thesis suggests that these difficulties care caused by failure on two levels. Firstly, the WTO's rules are ineffective because they have not fully addressed the three problem areas evident during the GATT era. Secondly, the amended agriculture regime's fundamental deficiency lies in the fact that it fails to address both economic and non-economic goals. This is because the WTO's rules are exclusively based on the economic objective of free trade, which means that even if all three problem areas are addressed, substantial issues will be left unregulated. The thesis advocates the gradual removal of the free trade goal and its replacement with the goal of sustainable agriculture. This solution acknowledges the inherent tension in international agricultural trade regulation between preventing a return to protectionism and the recognition that the pursuit of non-economic goals may require the use of restrictive trade barriers in certain circumstances.