Unlike other financial services (e. g., services provided by a bank or a primary insurance company), reinsurers seldom deal with the consumers directly. This indirect relationship with the consumer results in the view that it is not necessary to regulate pure reinsurers to the same degree as primary insurers, because they deal only with other companies or individuals in the insurance business who are already subject to regulatory control. It is true that a reinsurer bears its own risk; however, if a reinsurer becomes insolvent or has not provided sufficient reserves to cover liability of payments, the stability of the primary insurer might be threatened and hence the interests of the insured parties. In the last decade or so, reinsurance markets have been dominated by a number of trends, which include an increase of the potential risk of liability of "longtail" catastrophe (e. g., earthquake, hurricane and flood) and significant uncollectible reinsurance recoverables due to legal disputes relating to contract liability. These factors have affected solvency margins of primary insurers. At the same time, there has been a rapidly growing concern respecting "finite risk" reinsurance and securitisation of insurance risk, which can be tailored more specifically to the needs of the insurers. With regard to emerging markets, reinsurance regulation currently tends to be based on local protectionism. This has impeded the diversification of insurance risk and has resulted in a shortage of capital capacity to cover further risks. In addition, trade barriers as to reinsurance have been gradually dismantled by the efforts undertaken by many international negotiations and organisations (e. g., WTO and OECD) in recent years. On the other hand, with insurance regulation being gradually built, internationally on a set of pro-competitive principles designed to ensure a competitive, solvent and fair market, the reinsurance market is becoming more competitive. In order to establish a sound and viable regulatory regime, emerging countries are seeking to implement regulatory reform based on several leading regulatory models which have been proved effective in developed countries (e. g., the UK and USA models). It is evident, however, that the attempts merely to copy the "readymade" law of industrialised countries will fail unless awareness of particular social, economic and legal differences are taken into account. The primary theme of this volume is that the traditional point of view that private reinsurers and reinsurance markets are not in need of governmental regulation is flawed. To the contrary, the reinsurers, reinsurance intermediaries and related reinsurance arrangements should be appropriately regulated to protect the solvency of primary insurers. Through comparative analysis of different sets of international regulatory principles and of experienced developed country models, this volume will develop and address these general regulatory issues. In order to provide and to enact a sound and viable regulatory system in emerging markets, however, such regulations should be adopted to suit the particular country circumstances and should not be imposed or copied en masse from existing models. In support of this proposition, the example of the Taiwanese reinsurance market will be used as a case study. Unless otherwise indicated, this volume speaks as of September 2001

Developments in the investment securities markets have played an important role in the growth and globalization of the world’s financial markets. Securities market participants, investment banks and hedges funds in particular, were also in the epicentre of the global financial crisis 2007~2010 (GFC). The globalization-to-crisis process has highlighted the problems of regulating the globalizing transnational securities markets on the basis of national laws alone. More precisely, the three global-level problems in securities regulation are: regulatory divergence and conflicts, gaps in cross-border supervision, and, spill-over of systemic risks. This thesis contributes to the post-GFC regulatory reforms debate by establishing the concept of a Global Regulatory Framework (GRF). The GRF consists of a flexible governance structure within which national regulators and policy makers may interact with counterparts, either directly or through regional and global bodies, in seeking to address cross-border or substantive issues of securities regulation. The GRF also comprises a framework of tools for regulatory and supervisory cooperation, using which solutions could be reached for the global-level problems. The GRF is essentially soft law by nature. As a result, while the structure and mechanisms provided by the GRF contribute to securities market efficiency and stability, national sovereignty is also duly upheld. The problems of implementation and legitimacy pertaining to soft law processes are addressed, with recommendations for an implementation structure and principles of ex ante participation and transparency developed. The thesis comprises three Parts, with two Chapters in each, followed by a seventh Chapter of overall Conclusions. Starting from the analysis of the three global-level regulatory problems in the fast globalizing securities markets, the thesis builds on the experience from the EU and US, and other global actors, including the IMF, FSB and IOSCO, to produce a multi-layered structure for the governance of the securities markets. The GRF is designed to accommodate and engender different functions and forms of collective actions, because flexibility is crucial for addressing new cross-border issues arising from the often turbulent transnational securities markets.

The thesis explores the manner in which the R&D-based pharmaceutical industry in Europe organised and operated between 1995 and 1999 in order to secure its interests with regard to the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The TRIPs agreement represents a major increase in the global protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). In fact, the agreement contradicts the general direction of the WTO, i.e. trade liberalisation, since it increases the monopolistic features of international trade in knowledge products. The research was motivated by one basic and fundamental question: why and how is such a strong international intellectual-property agenda in place. A pure economic approach does not provide a sufficient and satisfactory explanation for the creation of IPRs. For example, economists cannot conclude whether patents confer a net benefit or entail a net loss to society. This is due mainly to the structural trade-off built into the patent system: that by aiming to increase the amount of available knowledge in the future, the system represses the free and widespread use of available knowledge in the present. The international IP system, as exemplified by TRIPs, is even more difficult to explain in purely economic terms, particularly with respect to the uneven distribution of IPRs between "northern" and "southern" countries. The importance of IPRs to future economic growth, foreign direct investment and technology transfer is also in dispute. As an alternative to an explanation based on global welfare, the thesis suggests that a dynamic approach, based on the international political economy of interest groups and systemic outcomes, provides a better starting point for explaining how the international intellectual property agenda (TRIPs) was determined. This approach is tested here by focusing on the strategies, organisation, and actions of the R&D-based pharmaceutical industry in Europe and its IP allies, which aimed at preserving and exploiting the TRIPs agreement. Using their highly sophisticated and well-coordinated organisational build-up, the advanced pharmaceutical industry in Europe and its IP allies were able to mobilise regional authorities, such as the European Commission, in order to protect their current international IP achievements. This was despite opposition to the TRIPs agreement from developing and least-developed countries, which became particularly fierce in 1999.

No description available.

Computer programs can now be protected by patents in the EPO, the US, and Japan. Patents can also be obtained for software implemented business methods in the US. This study highlights the problems of the patent system in protecting computer programs in general, and business methods in particular. One of the main problems is in relation to the economics of software innovation. There have been many disputes on the proper level of protection for software-related inventions to optimize innovation. Another problem relates to the criteria of software patentability. Patentability criteria are different in national patent offices around the world. This can lead to disputes between nations and cause complicated legal problems. Recognizing these issues, this study examines the fundamental question of whether or not protecting software by existing legal regimes is optimum and desirable in the light of an economic perspective. This discussion reveals a number of disadvantages of the existing legal regimes and leads us to investigate possible altematives to protect computer programs appropriately. Thus, this study examines the basic structures and features of the alternative V systems, which include a 'Market-Oriented Legal Regime, a 'Compensatory Liability Regime', 'Utility Models', 'Direct Protection of Innovation, and 'Self-Help'. Evaluation of the alternative systems through economic perspectives on the basis of the characteristics of modem software development vindicates that the Direct Protection of Innovation proposed by Kingston and Kronz is the most appropriate form of protection for computer programs. To evaluate this more exactly, the development of software is discussed. This study also investigates the main issues that should be considered in introducing the direct protection system to protect software at the international level.

No description available.

This thesis evaluates the contribution that the co-existential nation and Community trademark systems are likely to make toward the stated aims and objectives of the internal market programme. The inauguration of the Community Trademark (CTM) creates an unprecedented facility for acquiring and enforcing unitary trademark rights. The territorial character of nationally based trademarks has inhibited the potential for economic integration. By removing barriers to inter-State trade, in principle the CTM system enables all undertakings to adapt their trading activities to the Community scale. This thesis argues that trademark decisions must be wary of granting broadening rights based on classifying trademarks as 'property'. The resultant deduction that trademarks proprietors should be endowed with wide powers may encourage monopoly rights in the marked goods. Protection must only reflect the inherent economic value of trademarks: the informative and identificatory function. The practical exploitation of other protected attributes, which merely reflect that the trademark has value may jeopardise inter-brand competition and the fulfilment of internal market objectives. Developing national and community case law is tested against the economic arguments established to judge how trademark decisions are dealing with the enduring tension between trademarks and competition. To achieve a level-playing field, there must be convergence of substantive national and Community laws. This must try to avoid the problems of over- and under-protection by establishing balance between protection of and access to trademark rights. To do so, decision makers must resolve the fundamental challenges of 'What do we want to protect in a trademark?' and from this, 'What is the content and scope of an efficient system of trademark protection?'. Of particular importance is how the small- to medium-sized enterprises, the cornerstone of Europe's economic future, respond the the new system.

Executive remuneration is a prominent issue of corporate governance in the UK. Executive pay packages are regarded as excessive with no apparent link to company performance. This study examines the regulation of the determination of executive remuneration, especially in quoted companies. The study considers the regulation of the determination of executive remuneration as an important foundation that can potentially link executive pay to company performance. The study considers the principles of UK Corporate Governance Code on the determination of executive pay, and the Companies Act 2006’s provisions on executive remuneration. The study adopts a mixed method approach which includes quantitative and qualitative studies. The UK Corporate Governance Code does not make recommendations on specific performance measures that companies should use to determine company performance. To investigate the link between pay and performance and the effect different performance measures have on the pay for performance link, the study examined 25 companies from five different sectors from 2010 FTSE 100 companies. Data was collected mainly from the company’s annual reports and accounts to determine the link between executive pay and company performance. The results indicated in general a weak link between pay and performance. It also demonstrated that different performance measures have different effects on the pay for performance link. The Code does not make recommendations on the factors that the remuneration consultants should consider in benchmarking. To this effect, interviews were conducted to establish the method of executive remuneration benchmarking as there exist no guidelines on benchmarking. Six prominent remuneration consultants where interviewed for which the data was obtained to analyse executive remuneration benchmarking. The findings demonstrated a lack of uniformity in benchmarking practices particularly in the factors considered in selecting comparator companies. The Companies Act 2006 makes no provision on the determination of executive pay but rather adopts a corrective approach towards the determination of executive remuneration. This position of the law has been analysed in this study and suggest that the role of the law is inadequate and ineffective. The study demonstrates a need for a reform on the provisions of executive remuneration.

No description available.

Over the last thirty years there has been a remarkable functional convergence in the way companies are run. Behind directors, asset managers and banks usually participate the most in setting the ultimate direction of corporations, as they have assumed the role of stewardship over shareholder voting rights. At the same time, an increasing number of people’s livelihoods and old age now depend on the stock market, but these ultimate contributors to equity have barely any voice. Why has there been such a separation of contribution and participation? Two positive theses explain this convergence in corporate governance, one political, one economic. The first positive thesis is that laws which guarantee participation rights in investment chains (either for shareholders against directors, or for the ultimate contributors against institutional shareholders) were driven by a progressive democratic movement, but very incompletely compared to its social ideals. The second positive thesis is that when there have been no specific rights in law, the relative bargaining power of different groups determined the patterns of participation, whether the outcomes were reasonable or entirely arbitrary. In practice, the separation has grown between those who contribute to equity capital and those who participate in governance. These theses are preferable to existing narratives in political literature, and law and economics, which entail predictions of different forms of rational interest-driven institutional evolution. On the contrary, participation in corporate governance is largely unprincipled. The evidence is found in the historical development of participation rights in the UK, Germany and the US. Does the separation of contribution and participation matter? One normative thesis is derived from the historical evidence. It proposes that the separation of contribution and participation is a pressing concern, precisely because participation in corporate governance, as it stands, manifests no coherent principles. Asset managers and banks have gathered shareholder voting rights through no better reason than their peculiar market position as investment intermediaries. They have significant conflicts of interest when they exercise voting rights with other people’s money. They are able to use votes like any other selfperpetuating interest group would, because they are not effectively accountable to their natural beneficiaries: the ultimate investors. To ensure that the successes of modern corporate law are not unravelled, corporate governance should protect the principle of a symmetry between contribution and participation. This will mean that in the future, corporate governance becomes more economically efficient, sustainable, and just.