This thesis puts forward two principal arguments. First, it argues that commercial letters of credit and standby letters of credit should not be treated on an equal footing. They are, and should be, treated as two separate undertakings with respect to the application of the fraud exception. Secondly, the thesis argues that there should be a 'wider' fraud exception for standby letters of credit; however, the need is to explore how wide that fraud exception should be. To support the arguments of this thesis, the study examines the application of the fraud exception in four major jurisdictions: the US, England, Canada and Australia. Out of these four jurisdictions, two - the US and Canada - have been expressly applying the wider fraud test to standby letters of credit and the other two have traditionally applied the more stringent fraud test to standby credits. The research will compare and critically examine these four jurisdictions' approaches to their different tests of the fraud rule to standby letters of credit, and argue that the fraud rule for standby letters of credit should neither be too narrow ('fraud in documents') nor should it be too wide (fraud in the inducement or unconscionable conduct or bad faith). It is argued that standby letters of credit are more abstract than commercial letters of credit; therefore, protecting the principle of the autonomy of these independent undertakings is of paramount importance. The study argues that even the wider fraud exception (the 'fraud in the transaction' defence) should be given a narrow meaning: in order to protect the independence of standby credits, it should be confined to cases in which the beneficiary had 'no bona fide belief in the validity of its claim. The thesis clearly shows that the wider 'fraud as no bona fide claim' is an appropriate fraud defence for standby letters of credit whereas for commercial letters of credit the fraud exception should be narrowly confined to 'fraud in documents', which is arguably an appropriate test for these undertakings.

Est-il envisageable de reconnaître l’existence d’un droit au crédit ? Dans la première partie de la thèse, il est montré que ce droit est effectivement admissible, parce que la décision du banquier d’octroyer ou non un crédit n’est pas discrétionnaire. Elle fait d’ailleurs d’ores et déjà l’objet d’un contrôle en droit positif, lequel pourrait fort bien être étendu, sans pour autant que la notion de contrat ne soit dénaturée. La seconde partie envisage l’admission du droit du crédit. Sa reconnaissance pourrait s’effectuer indirectement, par l’application des règles de la responsabilité civile. Mais il pourrait aussi bien s’agir d’une reconnaissance directe, sous la forme d’un droit subjectif ou fondamental. La réalisation du droit au crédit pourrait alors être assurée par un service public ou par le canal éventuel d’une obligation de contracter mise à la charge du banquier. En toute hypothèse, le droit au crédit serait limité aux entreprises, sans pouvoir bénéficier aux particuliers. / Is a rigth to credit possible? In the first part of the thesis, we demonstrate that this right is effectively admissible, because the banker’s décision to credit or not is not discretionary. Its decision is already susceptible of control according to our laws and jurisprudence. This control might be extended without any denaturation of the concept of contract. The second part envisages the admission of the right to credit. This admission could be indirectly implemented by our laws of torts. But the right to credit could also be directly recognized as a fundamental right. Its fulfillment might be put into effect by a public service or by an obligation to contract. In any case, the right to credit would be reserved to enterprises. The consummers would be excluded.