This research project explores the normative content of justice within the courts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England. The project involves analysis of the discourse and practice of national and local courts of England to explore ways in which justice was used to reach decisions. By doing so, it has been possible to illustrate that the invocation of justice in legal discourse was a means of advancing an array of other values that were themselves in tension and that ‘justice’ was therefore a flexible and, ultimately, fluid concept, that obscured as well as enabled decisions based on those other values. The project suggests that an understanding of justice as consisting of such a package of frequently conflicting values can deepen both understanding and critique of judicial practice.

This thesis gives a critical study of the fairness and efficiency of the jury trial in the contemporary English justice system. It analyses the various pressures on the English criminal jury system, and attempts to justify attempts to justify the possible possible abolition of the criminal jury trials in England and Wales, hereafter referred to as ‘England’ for the sake of convenience. Firstly, it considers the origin, functions and theoretical basis of the existing English jury system, including the widespread perception of it being a constitutional mechanism designed to involve citizens in the delivery of justice and the implementation of criminal law. It considers the steady reduction in the number of jury trials in recent decades and the introduction of judge-only trials. Comparisons between jury trials in the Crown Courts and summary trials in magistrates' courts are drawn, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of each, referring to empirical and sociological data. Secondly, it underlines weakness in the jury process stems from stems from obstacles to fair trials, particularly: jury tampering, confusion in complex fraud cases and incidences of contempt of court committed by jurors resulting from their use of the Internet and social media; and draws on selected legal cases, the perceived quality of jury decision-making, the avoidance of institutional prejudice, and issues surrounding public confidence. Finally, it will present a number of recommendations for English jury reform, including the new Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and explores the possibility of the abolition of the English criminal jury system and proposes the use of alternative models of criminal trial.

This thesis investigates legal and political authority in mid-Tudor England, using the operation of the legal system in Oxfordshire and Berkshire in the period from 1540 to 1570 as a case study through which to give context and content to more abstract forms of contemporary political thought. It seeks to address the broad question: how did people experience the civil—as opposed to the criminal—legal system, and what does this tell us about their understanding of authority? In so doing, it aims to shed light on mid-Tudor attitudes towards legality, limited government and the rule of law. The argument of the thesis is built up piece by piece. First, people in the Thames Valley engaged in a remarkable, and increasing, amount of litigation over the period in question, much of which was based on antecedent commercial transactions. Encountering the law, whether in its litigious or transactional forms, was thus a very common social experience. Second, despite their frequent interaction with the legal system, ordinary people perhaps knew less about the technical law than some historians have suggested. Third, even if technical legal knowledge was not widespread among the population, the complicated map of overlapping jurisdictions and rival legal institutions meant that ordinary people nonetheless cultivated a detailed mental map of their legal world. Boundaries mattered because jurisdiction and legal authority mattered. Fourth, partly because of their own lack of detailed technical knowledge, and partly because of the complicated legal landscape which they had to navigate, people sought out legal advice from professional advisers. Fifth, even if people frequently sought out professional legal advice, many people’s experience of the law (and of lawyers) was far more negative than their desire to seek out such advice might suggest. Seen in this light, the social utility of legal institutions was quite separate from their ability to provide an idealised standard of abstract justice.