Throughout twentieth century, it has become increasingly common for executives to be remunerated with stock options, contracts which allow the recipient to buy company stock at a predetermined price, thus giving the incentive to maximize the stock price in order to increase the value of the stock option contract. Not only has stock option compensation become increasingly prevalent to executives at most major listed companies, but also to employees at all levels of the firm, both big and small. However, along with the growth in popularity, stock option compensation also became a topic of contention, not only among the general public, but among lobbyists, legislators and academics. This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of stock option compensation practice, with a particular emphasis on the United States, where stock option compensation is most prevalent. The thesis is divided into three chapters: the first chapter deals with establishing a foundational understanding of stock option practice and possible drivers through investigating the literature on the history of stock option compensation practice in the US. The second chapter develops a holistic theoretical model of an optimal stock option compensation package to possibly explain some practice currently considered as excessive. Then lastly, the third chapter empirically tests the validity of possible drivers of executive stock option policy in recent times in an attempt to identify whether current practice is optimal or not. The first chapter is primarily a literature review, covering a series of events over the history of stock option compensation in the US, ranging from its early beginnings in the early twentieth century until the present day. Included in the coverage of significant events are: legislation impacting tax benefits for corporate and for recipients; “landmark” events such as the first case of “broad-based” option compensation resulting in companies following a standard business practice; trends in the stock market; academic theory of the development of agency theory which supports the use of tools such as equity based compensation, and the development of major option valuation models; the possible impact of accounting standards; and the possibly impact of major bankruptcies or unethical behavior directly or indirectly tied to executive stock option compensation. The second chapter follows with a theoretical approach to understanding stock option compensation trends by analyzing the major benefits and costs associated with stock options. The model developed differs to most other existing optimization models as it does not focus on one set of benefits or factors, rather a more holistic approach is taken. Using a holistic approach, this model also helps explain how levels of compensation that are considered excessive under an optimisation model based only incentive benefits, can actually be optimal for the firm once other costs and benefits are incorporated. The model also aims to provide an alternative explanation to the managerial power hypothesis to explain why the buoyancy of the market may be positively correlated with compensation levels. This is explained by the impact of the buoyancy of the market on the likelihood of stock option exercise, and the costs and benefits either unconditional, partially conditional or conditional on options being exercised. In addition, smaller companies are also found to benefit from stock options more than larger firms due to some of the unconditional benefits, in particular, the ability to attract higher quality talent which can also help small firms fulfil untapped potential. Lastly, the model also provides useful insight into the appropriateness of using of foregone option premiums as the economic opportunity cost of granting stock options. The third chapter aims to empirically test the impact of several factors brought up in Chapter One that may help explain changes in compensation that occurred at the turn of the century. These major factors analyzed are: 1) the bull market prior to and the bear market following the market crash of 2000, 2) changes in accounting standards for equity based compensation, and 3) possible public perception of corruption following several major bankruptcies associated with poor ethics in 2002. Mixed evidence is found regarding the impact of market cycles. These findings include cycles to be linked to granting options out-of-the-money, a general inverse relationship with the levels of stock option compensation with the buoyancy of the market, expected for companies managing incentives, and finally there are indications companies ceased granting options based on poor company stock price performance prior to 2001. Other findings indicate the possible influence of accounting standards on economic decisions as well as the broad impact of events surrounding 2001-2, even though they have no economic impact. On the one hand, decreases in stock option compensation levels is shown to be linked to accounting decisions, however, there is insufficient evidence to support the argument that firm-wide decision making to cease granting stock options completely was based on accounting decisions.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

This thesis extends the 52-week high momentum literature, which was first published by George and Hwang in 2004, by stressing the parameters of the trading strategy to investigate its robustness. George and Hwang, in their seminal paper, find that the ratio of a stock’s close price to its 52-week high price is a good predictor of future returns. The thesis stresses various parameters of the strategy - such as the percent of total stocks bought and sold each period – and applies the strategy over different time periods – such as bull and bear markets. The study finds that the strategy is more profitable over the later half of the data set due to underperformance in bear markets such as the 1929 market crash and subsequent Great Depression. The results also show a significant difference in profitability between bull and bear market periods. The second half of the thesis looks at a new area in momentum, the absolute 52-week high. The strategy buys stocks whose price has increased over the previous six months, and who also close to their 52-week high price. Stocks are only bought (sold) if their price has increased (decreased) over the past six months and is close to (far from) the 52-week high price. The aim is to cut out stocks that are considered to be underperforming in the 52-week high momentum strategy, leaving only true winner and loser stocks. This strategy was found to increase the strength of the 52-week high momentum strategy, and the results show that there is no longer a significant difference between bull and bear market returns.

This study will validate several key results from previous studies of bank loan announcement effects by using the data from Hong Kong market following the 1997 Asian crisis. Banks are believed to play a unique role in financial market which could effectively reduce the problem of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Banks could access borrowers’ inside information which is not available to other participants. Thus bank loan announcements convey valuable information to the market, and market response of the stock price should be positive. However, because of the significant reform in both financial market and information market, the valuation of bank loan announcement conveyed need to be reconsidered. This study investigates whether banks are still “unique” in the financial market or whether they are like middlemen between borrowers and investors. Data used in this study is collected from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Index, and a standard event study with the market model is applied in the research to conduct the empirical analysis. The results suggest bank loan announcements are associated with significantly higher positive abnormal returns than non-bank loan announcements. Based on the market model of event study, market response is found to be significantly positive for loan syndication, short maturity loan and borrower’s debt ratio, and negatively related to firm size and loan size. Bank loans with refinancing and capital expenditure and no specific purpose have significantly higher positive abnormal returns, and borrowers with property and industrial industry type have more significant positive abnormal returns compared to other industry type. The findings also suggest the Hong Kong stock market is efficient in both strong and semi-strong form for bank loan announcements. A strong evidence of information leakage problem is found for non-bank loan announcements. The results are generally consistent with the existing literature.