Prior to 1755, British-American colonial forces and American Indians (hereinafter Indians) predominantly conducted the military campaigns in the North American theatre of European conflicts. From 1755 to 1815, however, the British Army itself became heavily engaged and had to consider its use of Indians as allies or auxiliaries. Indian War customs, such as torture, mutilation and killing of prisoners and civilians, were at odds with an emerging, although uneven, consensus against these practices in Europe. Therefore, British officials often had to decide if the use of Indians was compatible with their concept of military honour. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the British concept of military honour hindered the effective use of Indians in the era of the Sixty Years' War (l755-1815). The author will attempt to persuade the reader that it did and it ultimately cost the British Empire its direct control of, then even its influence in, the American midwest.

This thesis analyses the impact that tactical nuclear weapons had across the full spectrum of British defence policy-making between the years 1945-1957. It assesses the interactions between British defence policy and strategic planning; the roles of the British Army in national and alliance strategy; and Army preparations for nuclear combat. By making connections between these distinct, yet interrelated, elements of British defence planning the thesis provides new perspectives on British thinking about tactical nuclear weapons. The overarching thesis of this study is that the reluctance of British civilian defence policy-makers to engage in meaningful debate about the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons affected negatively the ability of the British Army to adapt to meet the new challenges of nuclear land combat. It is argued that for political and economic reasons the British government invested its resources into developing the strategic nuclear deterrent over all other military capabilities and that consequently the British Army was denied the political and financial support it needed to innovate in the tactical nuclear field. In the alliance context it is posited that civilian leaders acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues and accepted a policy of first use of tactical nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe in order to enhance political cohesion within NATO, despite evidence that this was a flawed operational concept and without understanding the true ramifications of such a posture. It is maintained that a corollary of this was that the Army was forced to confront the challenges of preparing for nuclear land combat with little guidance or support from its political masters.

This thesis examines how Baathist decision-makers expanded the Iraqi armed forces through security cooperation between 1968 and 1990. Current literature on military assistance looks primarily at supplier perspectives. When recipients are discussed, they are often portrayed as "satellites" of their military suppliers, who manipulate them into following policies which are detrimental to their national security and economic interests. This thesis questions this theoretical approach by looking at the growth of Iraqi military power between 1968 and 1990. Despite having a diminutive military force at the start of this period, during the 1980s Iraq emerged as the second largest military importer in the world and was able to defeat an adversary three times its size, Iran. By 1990 Iraq possessed the fourth largest military in the world. Earlier studies of Iraq's unprecedented military expansion were conducted before access to Baathist decision-making was available. Consequently, previous accounts focused on supplier policies (Smolansky, 1991; Timmerman, 1992; Jentleson, 1994). Contrary to such accounts, this thesis argues that the expansion of the Iraqi armed forces was the direct result of Baathist policies. Analysing newly available primary sources, including hundreds of high-level Iraqi government files obtained after the 2003 Gulf War, this thesis reveals the Baathist strategy for acquiring military power through security cooperation. It shows why Iraqi leaders were motivated to expand the armed forces in the first place; how they minimised supplier influence, mitigated defence dependence through diversification and indigenous production, and sustained high-levels of economic growth; and how they used foreign assistance to improve Iraqi military effectiveness. By bringing new details to light on Baathist-era Iraqi military imports policies, this thesis challenges conventional thinking regarding supplier-recipient dynamics and calls for further research into the study of recipient-supplier relationships.

The controversial Iranian nuclear dossier, the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, and the challenge posed to nuclear security by non-state terrorist organisations, such as Al-Qaeda, acquiring nuclear weapons, all raise concerns for international peace and security. The use of Islamic legal, ethical and strategic discourses about nuclear weaponry to justify their respective leaderships’ positions is a common factor. While Iran presents shari’a law as a limiting factor, prohibiting nuclear weapons, Al-Qaeda has long justified its pursuit of a nuclear capability through the Islamic faith. Pakistan has given less attention to discussion of law, but became the first, and to date only, Muslim state to develop a nuclear arsenal, seeking to legitimise and secure funding for the development of its nuclear capability by characterising it as a Muslim endeavour. The strategic, political, and policy implications of the Islamic nuclear discourses of these three actors, including their impact on the non-proliferation regime, regional stability, and national and international security are vital issues. Islam has served as a vehicle to promote national and regime interests but can also have other implications and costs. Once an actor defines its nuclear programme or ambitions in Islamic terms, it can only reverse its position at great political cost.

An argument has arisen that a ‘security-industrial complex’ (SIC) exists in, and is damaging to, the United Kingdom. The oft-repeated assessment is that, like the ‘military-industrial complex’ (MIC) which existed before (and continues to operate alongside) it, a damaging system of public-private sector interaction has emerged in the non-military aspects of national security strategy. Critics portray the purported system - the SIC - as an organised alliance of self-interested government and profit-making entities that exploits the security environment for its own gain. The suitability of using ‘SIC’ terminology is untested within security studies, however. This thesis reassesses how to conceptualise the public-private sector cooperation that has arisen in the contemporary security environment by analysing the origins, characteristics and consequences of the private sector’s involvement in the domestic counter-terrorism (CT) aspects of contemporary UK national security strategy following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. It demonstrates through reference to existing theory on the MIC, original interviews, and analysis of certain contracts and other case studies concerning companies’ involvement in the UK Government’s CT strategy that, instead of replicating the MIC in the new security context exactly, a more nuanced system of public-private interaction has arisen. Whilst some of the dynamics associated with the MIC exist in the CT sector, this thesis questions whether the aggregation of these dynamics in the CT field should be understood and presented in the same way. A lack of systemic scholarly research on ‘the SIC’ in the UK has hindered the development of policy-making and debate in respect of the private sector’s involvement in the non-military aspects of national security. The thesis seeks to address this gap, making an original, policy-orientated contribution, which aims to stimulate informed discussion and policy improvements in the field.

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) balances defence policy aspirations and available resources through the capability planning process. Arguably, the cornerstone of this process is the cross-functional integration of skills and capabilities across defence. This is realised through a construct of Virtual Teams (VTs) called Capability Planning Groups (CPGs). Literature on the topic of interpersonal trust in VTs highlights the development of trust as a key element, if not the most significant, in pursuing desired outcomes. Furthermore, literature on this topic, in a defence context, is scarce. This thesis undertakes a specific research approach, in accordance with its aim: To develop a critical analysis of interpersonal trust determinants in VTs, working in capability planning for the identification of capability gaps or needs, to provide required future military capability. Consequently, three research questions are investigated: What are the pertinent determinants of interpersonal trust in the CPG?; What, if any, are the issues surrounding those determinants within the CPG?; and, What risks are there, beyond the interpersonal relationships, which could influence the trust behaviour of CPG members? A critical review of pertinent literature is followed by the development of a research methodology under a phenomenological paradigm. Building from this, fieldwork was undertaken in two phases. As a result of semi-structured interviews to the members of a number of CPGs, the way in which interpersonal trust is generically perceived was conceptualised, and confirmation of the interpersonal trust determinants considered in an adapted model of interpersonal trust in CPGs was provided. In addition, a cross-case analysis allowed the integration of the data gathered, in order to identify target areas to be covered in the second wave of data collection. Subsequently, in Phase II, information was gathered through a survey questionnaire addressed to the whole population under consideration, in order to increase the robustness of the study, by confirming and providing further insights about key issues identified, as well as underpinning more powerful conclusions. From this, interpersonal trust determinants pertaining to the CPGs, as well as the issues and risks regarding interpersonal trust, were asserted. A major finding was the conceptualisation of these issues and risks, because they are critical in determining if a specific behaviour will be taken. Moreover, as highlighted in the Defence Reform Report (2011), some of these are already identified as very real concerns, and appear as structural or enduring problems at MOD level. These elements are deemed a central focus for future research, because of their significance as contextual variables that have to be addressed in order to stimulate interpersonal trust and, consequently, improve performance in the CPGs. As the use of VTs is considered most likely to increase over time in MOD organisations, the findings from this research will be useful to all personnel involved in capability planning, and other cross-functional activities. In particular, it could inform the design of organisational processes and systems as capability management is taken forward. Finally, the issues and risks associated with such virtual trust are asserted as not believed to be a manifestation of dysfunctional strategic planning because defence organisations can have clarity of purpose, can have clear direction, and yet still send competing messages. Paradoxically, that is the weakness of being strong. The analysis suggests that action has to be taken in order to stimulate interpersonal trust, because it is important to avoid or mitigate negative effects of contextual variables influencing CPGs. To this end, it is crucial to understand the role that interpersonal trust plays in the cross-functional work that is critical for the successful integration of skills and capabilities, and to ensure that people involved in capability planning and other cross-functional activities are assisted in understanding the nature of this challenging and complex context.

This thesis is a study of the men who served as archers in the armies of the English kings between 1367 and 1417. However, the focus is not the archers in their military capacity, but the motivations behind their service and their position in late medieval English society. Increasing usage of indentures, recorded in muster rolls, to recruit soldiers for English armies in this period provide historians with rich resources for the study of the military community. Previously this has focused on those of higher socio-economic backgrounds, serving mostly as men-at-arms, and not on those who served as archers. However by combining this muster roll data with information on residency, wealth, and occupations from the poll tax returns of 1377, 1379, and 1381 in a relational database the backgrounds and service links of the archers could be explored. There is a clearly identifiable group of archers whose service was not significantly motivated by political or social obligations and represents a shift towards military service as a ‘free market’, driven by economic considerations. This was apparent in the connections between archers and captains and in the patterns of service they followed, with the more professional archers ranging more widely in both the location and type of military service they performed. Despite this, it is evident that the archers were embedded within society and did not differ greatly in terms of occupation or wealth from their non-military peers. The difference between the careerist and ‘amateur’ archers was more subtle, with ‘amateur’ archers appearing in a wider range of economic backgrounds.

The safety and defence of the United Kingdom (UK) and its citizens depend on the efficient delivery of a number of national essential services, among them information and communication systems, energy, banking, finance, transport and vital human services such as the provision of food and water. These national essential services, comprising both Public organizations and Private sector companies, are collectively known as the UK Critical National Infrastructure (UKCNI). Protecting the UKCNI and ensuring the continuation of political, social and economic activity is vital to the UK. As a modern 'just-in-time' information-based society it is becoming increasingly dependent on goods and services distributed through critical information infrastructures; the potential consequences of disruption to those infrastructures are becoming more serious. However, the increasing importance of well-protected, resilient infrastructure is threatened by the growing complexities and interdependencies of the UKCNI, which is spread across public and private sectors. Public sector organisations and private sector companies are all key partners in ensuring the secure functioning of the UKCNI. The problem is that they are independent government or commercial organizations, each having their own identity, objectives, culture and information security management processes. This Thesis seeks to answer the fundamental question: how can information security management processes in the UKCNI be better designed, developed and implemented? To do this, the Thesis must range across a number of different organisations drawn from the public and private sectors, and even within these within disparate organisational and cultural norms. The purpose of this work is to develop a process model to aid the development of Processes that may be utilised by information security managers in any of the UKCNI sectors. The model is called PROMISE - Process Modelling for Information Security Engineering.

No description available.

No description available.