• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • No language data
  • Tagged with
  • 31
  • 8
  • 6
  • 5
  • 4
  • 4
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • 2
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

The US Army and American strategic culture : an examination of the US Army's strategic thought since the Vietnam War, and its implications for US foreign policy

Lock-Pullan, Richard James Donovan January 2000 (has links)
This study examines how and why US military intervention strategy changed after the Vietnam War. It argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilisation to coordinate political aims and military means, and changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Employing strategic culture and military innovation literature, it argues that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity and perception of its role and utility as it became a professional all-volunteer force. The Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war1 for the nation, embodied in the AirLand Battle doctrine. The Weinberger doctrine was the formal acceptance by the executive of the Army's formula. The Panama intervention and Gulf War vindicated the lessons the Army drew from the Vietnam War, and brought a revived confidence in the use of force. The failure in Somalia exposed the weaknesses and particular nature of the lessons drawn from the war. The revival of the Weinberger doctrine shows that the Army's understanding of its professional identity and operational doctrine was fundamental to the US's military intervention strategy, and provided its norms and constraints in the new strategic environment.
2

Analysis of superpower nuclear strategy : compellence as a competing paradigm to that of deterrence

Pennie, K. R. January 1991 (has links)
This thesis centers on that aspect of superpower strategic nuclear systems that lies beyond pure deterrence. Much has been offered under the rubric of deterrence, but little analysis of compellence has been attempted. Considering the widespread criticisms of deterrence theory, this is surprising. A comprehensive look at nuclear strategy from the conceptual framework of compellence helps clarify the limits of deterrence and indicates that deterrence and compellence are increasingly interrelated. To demonstrate these assertions, this dissertation provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of intercontinental nuclear systems. The thesis is that nuclear strategy in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1970-1986 may be described at least equally well by compellence rather than deterrence. By looking closely at technological capabilities, the real capability of these nuclear systems can be more accurately determined. This analysis includes an assessment of how these nuclear systems could interact in combat, based on a Soviet correlation of nuclear forces model. This is the first time in the West that this model has been used for this purpose. It provides a unique Soviet perspective on nuclear strategy. This dissertation begins with the theoretical basis of deterrence and compellence, and then establishes two models based on these two concepts which provide the conceptual framework for the dissertation. The second chap ter examines the theoretical basis for arms control based on each paradigm. The next two chapters address alternately the American and the Soviet nuclear strategies, attempting to draw out the deterrent and compellent aspects therein. The fifth chapter narrows the focus to the role of arms control in identifying actual nuclear strategy; to what extent are the superpowers attempting to achieve foreign policy objectives in SALT I, SALT II and START. The sixth chapter considers the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship to determine to what extent the superpowers are using their respective alliance systems in their strategic interrelationship. The next three chapters analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the American and Soviet strategic nuclear force structures to determine a correlation of forces trend and develop some predictions as to the viability of each force structure in supporting its respective strategy. The paradigmatic analysis of superpower nuclear strategy clearly portrays the limitations of deterrence as an explanation for international strategic behaviour. The compellent paradigm is shown as a reasonable alternative that in many ways better explains what has happened in superpower strategic relations from 1970-1986.
3

Reconceptualizing the just war tradition : the morality of asymmetric war

Luther, Damien Eileen January 2014 (has links)
This thesis in political theory explores the salient moral problems of asymmetric war. It begins with the assumption that the just war tradition provides an important language for addressing asymmetric war. I argue, however, that the modern conception of the tradition is statist and it should be reconceptualized from a cosmopolitan perspective. This claim is applied to four problems. The first problem is that asymmetric war involves non-state actors who, under the modern account of the principle of legitimate authority, cannot have the authority to engage in war. After challenging prevailing conceptions of the relationship between sovereignty and authority, I argue that non-state actors can have legitimate authority. The second problem is that non-state actors often look more like civilians than soldiers and use the civilian population as cover and, thus, questions arise about combatant equality and responsibility. Contrary to dominant conceptions of combatants and responsibility, I argue that non-state actors can be considered combatant equals and that certain 'non-state' tactics do not affect their status since such tactics are not necessarily irresponsible. The third problem is whether assassination is a justifiable tactic. Three positions are evaluated: a policy of absolute prohibition; assassination justified as a means of state-sanctioned revenge and punishment of terrorists; and assassination justified as 'named killing.' None, however, are successful. Nevertheless, I argue that assassination is a justifiable tactic of war, within some limitations, since it can be more discriminate and proportionate than other tactics. The fourth problem is whether terrorism is a justifiable tactic, whether as a means of bringing people out of 'bad lives,' equalizing or redistributing rights violations, or necessary in a supreme emergency. I conclude that regardless of how terrorism is justified, the tactic is immoral and its use entails a flagrant disregard for the principle of noncombatant immunity.
4

Quasi-armies : obstacles to, or vehicle for, state-building in Central Africa

Bachmann, Olaf January 2013 (has links)
The object of inquiry of this thesis is the military as a constitutive component of state institutions in the Central African sub region. Its aim is to identify whether and to what extent the military has been and can be instrumental to the process of state-building and state formation in the region, and whether and under which conditions it is an obstacle to that process. This thesis is built upon two assumptions: the key conceptual differentiation between the state formation process and the state-building project, and the relevance of political culture in explaining military development and the military relationship to the state. A shaping parameter of the analysis is whether, and in which conditions, it is possible to “accelerate” state-building in the context of a given political culture. Lessons for Africa are drawn from historical analogy and the limits of classic civil-military theory in interpreting Africa’s experience analysed on the basis of the example of three states, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda. Each national situation and each period is examined from a dual historical and sociological perspective so as to pin down the articulation between political decisions and cultural constraints, and the positioning of the military at key turns in those countries development. Clarity is cast from this analysis on the degree and characteristics of “quasi-ness” of each state, and correspondingly, the level of “quasi-ness” of its armed forces.
5

I spy with my military eye : strategies of military vision and their use in fine art practice

Streffen, Isabella Sarah Espie January 2013 (has links)
This research deals with specific aspects of the relationship between artistic and military practices through military vision and visioning technologies, and explores these both within and through a fine art practice. In particular, it examines their impact on subjectivity and objectivity, and how these can be analyzed and synthesized through fine art practice. The research indicates that art practice may be the most useful method of critiquing militarism, as a result of its acknowledgment and embrace of shifting positions. The thesis comprises two sections running concurrently on recto and verso pages, in a layout that echoes the constant dialogue of theory and practice. The thesis is conceived as a ‘serious game’ in itself, and the methodology of game playing, shifting identities, provocations and interruptions (all of which constitute the foundation of fieldcraft, particularly the skills of camouflage) is visible throughout. The authorial voice slips from the academic to the conversational as the subjectivity of the researcher becomes evident in the text. The verso section consists of three main chapters, all of which examine subjectivity and objectivity through their respective frameworks and through the prism of practice. It surveys weaponry, devices and strategies created for the purpose of looking. It traces the military intention at the heart of apparently unrelated technologies, and defines four interpretive regimes emerging from these correspondences.
6

Virtual wars : a comparative analysis of the 1991 Gulf War and the 'War on Terror'

Mendel, Jonathan Michael January 2007 (has links)
This thesis maps out the development of virtual and networked warfare, from the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency through to the 1991, Gulf War and the ongoing violence of the `war on terror'. I demonstrate that we have seen two parallel developments over the past few decades: the US has become able to dominate the fighting of large-scale, high-tech virtual wars, and opponents of US-led forces are able to deploy techniques of networked warfare that US-led forces cannot effectively combat. It is therefore the case that US-led `successes' in the major combat operations phases of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are being followed by a US-led failure to deal with the networked warfare of Afghan, Iraqi and other insurgent groups. This thesis investigates the policy impact of these developments, and their broader ethical and political implications. I demonstrate that - if we are to ameliorate the ongoing bloodshed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and avoid carrying out additional military interventions that generate networked opposition to which we do not have an effective response- there is a real need for an ethical engagemenwt ith others,a nd for more effective participation in the ideational aspects of conflict.
7

Quantifying the dynamics of conflict : distance, terrian, maps, GIS and their relationship with war

Pickering, Steven January 2010 (has links)
For as long as war has been studied, geographical factors associated with it have also been analysed. Yet there are numerous issues with existing work, from theoretical, methodological and technical perspectives. This thesis addresses these gaps in several ways. It presents a comprehensive new distance dataset and in so doing is able to demonstrate that minimum distance is the most useful measure of distance to conflict research. Novel types of distance measurement are also presented which shed new light on the relationship between distance and conflict. Additionally, a complete new set of digital maps is developed upon which the distance dataset is based. In order to create these maps, it critically engages with the use of maps in IR theory and conflict research, finding the spread of the Westphalian state around the world is intimately related to the spread of the "political," and, most recently, computer-generated map. The thesis finds issues with existing terrain-based analyses depending theoretically on romanticised, deterministic stereotypes of "mountain people," and more technically on state-aggregated mountain binaries. It goes on to develop a new method of determining the ruggedness of both states and conflict zones. It finds that there is a strong relationship between terrain and conflict, contradicting some previous research. The thesis also demonstrates that ruggedness is an important factor in the location of conflicts which, when combined with data on the location of state borders and capital cities, offers valuable new insights into the geography of conflict.
8

Linking the East and West : in search for a general theory of strategy

Yuen, Derek Mi-Chang January 2008 (has links)
Today there is yet no recognized general theory of strategy and this seriously affects the West in dealing with the problem of war as a whole. This thesis aims to establish a general theory of strategy by synthesizing Western and Chinese strategic thought, the two main streams of strategic thought in the world. As a general rule, this thesis investigates the requirements of a general theory of strategy, its functions, and its importance to the study of war. Rather than simply regarding the works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as first-class general theories of war and strategy and using them in a ad-hoc manner, it reexamines the main aspects of Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's thoughts, identifies the essential aspects that link them together, discusses how they can be used together, and proposes the proper "division of labor" between them according to their strengths in respect of developing a general theory of strategy.
9

The Nigerian military contribution to counter-insurgency (COIN) : a study of organizational culture, institution, doctrine and operations

Omeni, Akali Ebube January 2015 (has links)
Why has the Nigerian military struggled within its contribution to counter insurgency, and what are the underpinnings of that contribution? This is the central question addressed by this research PhD, as an original contribution to academic knowledge. The thesis begins by examining the broader discourses, with one overarching set of findings: the military contribution to counter-insurgency is, ab initio, fraught with problems and is a difficult contribution to make effectively and with readily demonstrable results. This for the most part is the case for militaries everywhere, moreover. Part of this difficulty is down to the nature of insurgency as irregular warfare. That the Nigerian military has struggled within its contribution to counter-insurgency therefore is not, in itself, unique. What is unique, and where this project makes an original contribution to academic knowledge, are the processes that underpin the Nigerian military’s own contribution to counter-insurgency, from its formative years as a professional fighting force, to date. Consequently, four premises, supported by evidential data, and with field and theory-driven analysis, underpin the thesis’ research-based argumentative response to the central question. The first premise of the central argument holds that the Nigerian military’s identity crisis, emergent from a hasty institutional transfer process from the British, contributed to institutional isomorphism. This is a process whereby an organization B, modelled after another, A, in order to reduce uncertainty, limits and selectively adapts change. The Nigerian military’s failure to re-interpret its internal function left it as a “coercive institution” of the state and, furthermore, left it even more internally involved than was the case during the colonial administration. With indiscipline already an issue within the institution, this political meddling, a coup culture, and a neglect of professionalization, will further undermine the military’s legitimacy and will damage the civil-military interface. The second premise is that strategic culture of the post-civil war era meant the military saw a regional peace support role for itself between the late 1980s and the turn of the century; and before that, in the 1970s, perceived the main threat to security as external and largely Francophone. Neither posture encouraged the need to diversify the military function to accommodate a counter insurgency culture. Consequently whereas there already was recognition within the Army’s school of infantry, as at 1978, that counter-insurgency required development, this development will be stifled over the decades. Third, doctrinally — both in codified and in uncodified form — the Nigerian military persistently failed to develop theory and practice suitable for counter-insurgency. The military’s doctrine drew too heavily from Western interpretations to accommodate its own experiential learning and the local operational environment. The Nigerian military’s doctrine moreover, has been demonstrably difficult to change, in situ, during a campaign. This is in stark contrast to Boko Haram’s military doctrine, and its adaptability, examined in the thesis. The three previous premises therefore, connive to give the lie to the notion that the Nigerian military, in its operational contribution to COIN, should have been more effective. If anything they lend explanatory power to why it seems too much, in too little time, is now expected of operations by a military that culturally, institutionally, and doctrinally, has failed to purposively prepare for this forme de guerre. Still, at the operational level of war, there has been some progress. JTF ORO had its challenges, and at times struggled; but certain lessons can be taken, in the area of joint and multi-agency operations, from that phase of the Nigerian military’s counter-insurgency. By evaluating these four underpinning premises, by supporting them with evidential data, and by structuring all four areas of thought into a coherent narrative on Nigerian military counter-insurgency, this study therefore constitutes an original contribution to military and academic knowledge.
10

Alternative explanation of North Korea's survival : successful application of smart power

Shin, David W. January 2017 (has links)
The original contribution of this study is to demonstrate how North Korea survives by using smart power. The existing literature has offered partial explanations, but many have lost their explanatory power over time and there seems to be no definitive answer to explain how North Korea survives. This multi-case study was designed to explore how the North uses smart power by examining its provocations from the Korean War to August 2015. The rationale for this study is to increase understanding of Pyongyang’s behavior and offer recommendations to bring long-term stability to the Korean Peninsula. This study purposefully began with the Korean War because it was assumed that, without understanding the origin of North Korean provocations, it would be difficult to provide the proper temporal context for other provocations. This study reveals that Kim Il-sung and his guerrillas consolidated power and established totalitarian rule dominated by his Juche ideology (self-reliance). Subsequently, they waged a long war of reunification from 1948 to the 1980s. Although Kim’s smart power attempts failed to achieve his principal aim of reunification, when Beijing and Moscow abandoned him in the early 1990s he focused on regime survival. He bolstered his weak hand by playing the nuclear card to buy more time to ensure the hereditary succession by his son Kim Jong-il, who defied predictions he would not survive and proclaimed Songun (military-first) to deal with the changing international environment. He demonstrated his own skill by exploiting Seoul’s Sunshine Policy and successfully negotiating three nuclear agreements with the U.S. After his death, Kim Jong-un waged a reign of terror to consolidate power and manufactured crises to bolster his legitimacy and demonstrate his leadership. He also invoked his grandfather’s anti-Japanese legacy and the Byungjin policy (simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy) to legitimize his rule. The evidence shows he is rational and that offers opportunities to resolve the North Korea issue.

Page generated in 0.0205 seconds