This thesis is a study on corruption from an economics perspective. Corruption is defined as the misuse of power in public office for private gain. Unfortunately, its obscure nature makes it difficult to identify and fight it. The thesis’ aim is to increase our understanding of its mechanics and help toward this direction. In particular, it consists of three different studies, which focus on the causes of corruption, its consequences and measurement. The first section investigates whether political leaders are empirically associated with governance, one of its constituent elements being corruption. The results show that leaders do matter for bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, especially in autocratic regimes. Corruption does not seem to be affected by leaders though, which is an outcome probably driven by the data inadequacies and the inherent features of malfeasance. The second part elaborates on corruption as a driving force behind a salient feature of demographic transition. This is the dilemma that parents face whether to improve their children’s education or increase the size of their families. Corruption can affect their decision since it impedes the provision of public services important for the development of human capital. The model shows that higher levels of corruption increase fertility, diminish human capital and lower growth. Additionally, the model offers an explanation for the empirical observation of volatile fertility rates. Finally, the last study explores the measurement of malfeasance. Initially, a new dataset is built including measures of perceived corruption along with survey questions. A sample of 10 measures is chosen taking into consideration their nature and reliability. An advanced statistical model is applied to this sample in order to construct a new index of corruption, whose scores are accompanied by their measurement errors as well. The strength of the new index is its ability to combine the knowledge of numerous scholars and analysts who examine corruption. In addition, the model is equipped with tools that make feasible the comparison of the constituent measures’ different levels and reliability on the same underlying scale.

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Until now, little has been investigated empirically on the impact of bribery and corruption on livelihoods of the income groups, especially in Africa in general an Nigeria in particular. Most available literatures focused on corruption from the receiver's perspective, but this study explored the impact of bribery and corruption from the giver's (payer's) perspective, on the impact of corruption on livelihoods of the low, middle and high income households in education and health care provision in Apata, Ibadan, Nigeria. The researcher used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies which comprised of in-depth structured questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, documentary sources and case studies, to examine and understand the impact of bribery and corruption on the income and expenditure, access to education and health care, and their quality, and how the income groups perceive bribery and corruption in education and health care provision. The major objective findings are that bribery and corruption impacted severely on the low income households' incomes, their access to quality schools and health care, the increase in the use of informal health care by the income groups especially the low income households, the use of social networks by the high income households and their perceptions based on their experiences that bribery and corruption are not only endemic in education and health care provision but are also prevalent in other sectors of the Nigeria economy, due to the governments inability to checkmate corruption. Bribery and corruption had adverse effect on low income households because it prevented them from having access to education and health care and also it impacted the provision and quality of education and health care accessed, through embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, dearth of facilities and infrastructure, and lack of both common and prescription drugs.

Corruption is a structural and a moral problem of modern societies. It undermines social development, democracy and people's wealth. The cost of corruption is about $1 trillion per year, and it is often paid by the poorest groups in society. To study corruption is, therefore, not only a scientific challenge but also a necessity in the search for social justice and in the context of improving quality of life. ( In fighting corruption, policy makers often have to decide whether to shape an in- tervention based on the individual or on the individual's perception of their environ- ment. Moreover, campaigns against corruption need to be tailored to the social context in which they will be implemented. Policies to be designed to counteract corruption can, therefore, benefit of a tool to differ social settings wit3respect to corruption. The current literature on corruption lacks a theoretical framework as well as tools for shedding light on the subject matter outlined above. The following research attempts to fill this. Qualitative and quantitative research evidence is used to identify social regularities brought about by corruption and, based on those observations, a set of social mechanisms are put forward. These are then used to design a model and a tool to gather first hand data. Finally, a new set of analytic techniques to grasp the degree to which groups affect individuals' decisions complete the methodology. Moreover, to show the strong empirical link between the model and the data gathering method, a data collection exercise with 16 participants is illustrated. This study proposes a new methodology for understanding how corruption emerges in small groups. More specifically, the extent to which group features affect individu- als' decisions as to whether or not to uphold corrupt practices is addressed in the context of limited public resources. The main result of this study is the development of the methodology itself, producing a set of values which are then interpreted to provide a measure of corruption. Such a measure quantifies the extent to which individuals' decisions are affected by their group. This contribution is particularly relevant for policy making, especially when it comes to deciding whether to design initiatives tailored to the individual or to the individuals perception of society. Key words: Agent-Based Modelling, Computational Sociology, Corruption, Role-Playing Game, Cultural Dimensions, Emergence, Validation, Calibration

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This thesis addresses two central questions in the field of corruption: the relationship between corruption and some of its main determinants and the effect that these relationships have on economic development. The research presented in this thesis extends the literature on corruption in several directions. The third chapter studies the empirical relationship between press freedom and bureaucratic corruption. As one of the main democratic checks and balances, press freedom is thought to impose a curb on corruption. We investigate two related aspects. The first considers whether there exists a robust empirical relationship between press freedom and corruption. The second investigates the detail, by exploring which types of restrictions to press freedom are robustly related to corruption. Using robust regression techniques on a panel of countries we conclude that restrictions to media freedom are robustly associated to higher corruption. Also we find that both political and economic restrictions to press freedom are strongly related to corruption while legal and administrative restrictions are not. The fourth chapter studies the relationship between decentralisation, corruption and development in a dynamic macroeconomic model. We assess whether corruption is always harmful to development, whether decentralisation is always beneficial for development and the effect that corruption produces on the relationship between decentralisation and development. Our main finding from this model is that if corruption is absent, decentralisation is the best alternative for development but may not be preferable to centralisation if corruption is widespread in the economy. The fifth chapter examines the empirical relationship between decentralisation and corruption. This chapter has two main goals. First, to reconsider the available evidence in light of some newly assembled data. The second goal is to incorporate into the analysis several dimensions of decentralisation simultaneously. We find that the inconsistencies in the empirical literature arise due to the frequent omission of multiple measures of decentralisation. Secondly, that both fiscal decentralisation and constitutional centralisation are simultaneously associated with lower corruption. Finally, we find that certain forms of political decentralisation -local elections- weaken the positive effect of constitutional centralisation -unitarism- on corruption.

The purpose of the thesis is to offer an examination of the economics of crime and corruption. By stressing the importance of Becker's seminal paper, we show how criminal behaviour is no longer considered the result of mental illness, but a decision largely based on a cost-benefit comparison from the possible legal and illegal actions. The puzzle that countries, with seemingly identical characteristics, display different corruption levels can be explained by considering the role of social stigma in the decision-making process. Additionally, we also examine the way that corruption is practised, by assuming that two regimes are possible, namely, collusive corruption and non-collusive corruption regimes. In the second part of the thesis, we examine the interrelationships between crime, fertility and economic growth. We link these variables of interest with the probability of avoiding apprehension, which is considered as one of the most important deterrence factors in crime decisions. In line with current literature, results show that a higher probability of avoiding apprehension increases crime rates, has a non-monotonic effect on fertility rates and an ambiguous impact on growth. The contribution of the model is that the relationship between the probability of avoiding apprehension and crime is not linear, but becomes positive after a threshold value of the parameter. In the subsequent part we provide an econometric analysis that examines these empirical regularities. We find that there exists a positive relationship between the probability of escaping apprehension, the rates of crime and fertility. The relationship is not linear but is subject to threshold effects. The finding of a positive impact of the probability of escaping arrest on both crime and fertility implies that the positive link between fertility and crime is an equilibrium outcome, rather than a causal one running from fertility to crime. In addition, we find that the probability of escaping apprehension has a negative effect on economic growth, an effect that becomes more notable when the probability exceeds a threshold value. Lastly, we consider the interrelationships among the three endogenous variables of crime, fertility and growth. In accordance with the theoretical section, we find that the probability of avoiding detection has a positive effect on both crime and fertility. In addition, these two variables negatively affect economic growth.