This thesis aims to examine the extent and type of progress schools make during the post-Special Measures period in order to achieve ‘sustainability’ which is defined in terms of three factors: viability, performance trends and social capital. The viability and performance trends of an exhaustive sample of all 55 secondary schools that, by the year 2003, had been out of Special Measures for at least there years were investigated using data available in the public domain. Central to this research is the implementation of a measuring instrument to evaluate the stock of organisational social capital at a point in time. 499 teachers in a sample of 10 of these schools were surveyed in order to measure social capital and develop an overview of the patterns of trust and pedagogic interactions across each school. Interviews in 4 case study schools with 40 teachers were focused on identifying organisational norms and the processes, activities and/or behaviours that developed social capital through the post-Special Measures period. Discussion of the findings is inevitably drawn to the barriers that these schools face in achieving sustainable improvement. Although most schools recover from the drop in pupil that generally follows Special Measures, a minority continue to be undescribed with static or declining rolls. This negatively impacts on their viability through diminished resources and continuing threats of closure. The national trend of linear improvement on the ‘headline’ performance indicator was found to be rare with performance characterised more by fluctuation. The social capital measuring instrument revealed significant differences between schools. Importantly, it showed that the social capital developed through a period of adversity was not always sustained over time. This thesis suggests that a social capital perspective can be useful in explaining why schools in challenging circumstances find it difficult to generate improvement as well as offering insights into how they might sustain it.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The powers acquired by governors during the 1880s seem to have indicated expectations that governors would control and direct schools' managers. It is suggested instead, that governors developed covert functions predisposing them towards being supportive and protective of the principals and staffs of their schools. Existing education elites absorbed governors and prevented them from becoming contenders for power. Governors concurred with this. The first of governors' covert functions has been termed consent. This confirmed principals' rights to leadership. Consent legitimated headteachers' centrality in policy determination and confirmed the rightness of policies selected by principals. Secondly, governors protect headteachers by providing a forum through which heads referred, and deferred, decisions. Governors also protected heads through deflecting criticisms away from them and towards government and parents. Governors were particularly protective of curricular policies, accepting the professional leadership of teachers concerning the content of education and thus, performing the function of educational protectionism. The belief that governors should become more powerfully involved in school management arose from a renewed emphasis upon the value of accountability. School governing bodies became more representative to make this accountability a reality, but a fourth covert function of governors was to create the illusion of democracy rather than its reality. The explanations for the development of covert functioning are searched for within a framework of structural, political imperatives. The thesis examines the extent to which governors' covert functioning was related to their legal position, their political resources and their political will. Their legal status gave them a powerful position as government but their modes of action made them more like pressure groups. To extend their influence, governors needed to have interests for which they had the political will to bargain and resources critical to the survival of their schools. In the 1980s, governors had neither.