During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

This thesis examines professional supervision practice under new public management from the perspectives of probation officers and service managers in the Community Probation Service. In particular, the research explores the participants’ philosophy of professional supervision, their recent supervision experiences, and their aspirations and expectations with regard to professional supervision. In order to provide a background for an informed analysis and discussion of the research findings, the thesis discusses the key themes in the social service supervision and new public management literature. It also examines the Community Probation Service’s context and the history of new public management and professional supervision in this organisation. The thesis is a qualitative study that is informed by social work practice theory and utilises the phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches. The research findings show that amongst the participants there was: (a) an unclear philosophy of supervision; (b) minimal recent experience of supervision and little ownership or support for the agency supervision project; (c) a belief that the context increased their need for supervision, but at the same time reduced their ability to receive or participate in it; (d) an expectation that professional supervision would assist them to work more effectively with clients and staff; (e) an expectation of good committed supervisors who would support and help them develop; and (f) an expectation that the agency would support professional supervision through resourcing, guidelines, accredited supervisors and the establishment of a learning culture. The major implications of these findings are that: (1) there is a need for staff to be socialised into professional social service supervision; (2) that the professional supervision programme within the Community Probation Service, as currently implemented, is unlikely to be successful; and (3) that professional social service supervision needs to be focused upon persons and their environments, rather than upon the agency.

From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.