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This thesis examines the adversarial roles of nuclear physicists Hans Bethe and Edward Teller as political advisors during the first three decades of the nuclear era and the part each played in the shaping of US nuclear weapons policy. It focuses on four episodes - post-war arms control, the development of the hydrogen bomb, the banning of nuclear weapons testing and the deployment and subsequent banning of a limited system of missile defence, and in each episode, it contrasts the scientists’ individual motives, political agendas, means of affecting policy and respective degrees of success. Thereafter, it assesses the pair as Cold War political advisors by considering the validity of their advice as regards the Soviet nuclear program. Whereas a number of scholarly works have been devoted to the political career of Teller, these have typically focused on his role in the hydrogen bomb controversy. In contrast, very little has been written about Bethe’s political role, despite its obvious significance. Interestingly, no work to date has focused specifically on the openly confrontational roles of these two scientific advisors, who remained at the forefront of the decision-making process over nuclear weapons policy for many years. This thesis meets this objective by providing an historical voice to Bethe, a largely overlooked historical figure, while offering fresh insight into Teller, a contentious Cold War character. In doing so, it utilizes a range of recently declassified sources to shed further light on previously documented episodes, such as the hydrogen bomb affair, while chronicling largely untold episodes, including the pair’s involvement in the debate over missile defence. At the same time, it challenges a commonly-held conception that Teller, by utilizing his connections to influential Washington conservatives, was able largely to dictate the course of nuclear policy throughout this period. Indeed, a central contention of this study is that Bethe, by effectively employing both his personal and professional reputation, was able to moderate the influence of his well-placed colleague. Finally, through the use of recently published sources on the Soviet nuclear progam, this study assesses the validity of the political advice of the two scientists, concluding that both men were hindered to a certain extent by the rigidity of their respective positions. Specifically, it argues that Bethe’s advice was characterized by an unduly benign view of Soviet intentions, and Teller’s by an exaggeration of Soviet capabilities.

This thesis examines the adversarial roles of nuclear physicists Hans Bethe and Edward Teller as political advisors during the first three decades of the nuclear era and the part each played in the shaping of US nuclear weapons policy. It focuses on four episodes - post-war arms control, the development of the hydrogen bomb, the banning of nuclear weapons testing and the deployment and subsequent banning of a limited system of missile defence, and in each episode, it contrasts the scientists’ individual motives, political agendas, means of affecting policy and respective degrees of success. Thereafter, it assesses the pair as Cold War political advisors by considering the validity of their advice as regards the Soviet nuclear program. Whereas a number of scholarly works have been devoted to the political career of Teller, these have typically focused on his role in the hydrogen bomb controversy. In contrast, very little has been written about Bethe’s political role, despite its obvious significance. Interestingly, no work to date has focused specifically on the openly confrontational roles of these two scientific advisors, who remained at the forefront of the decision-making process over nuclear weapons policy for many years. This thesis meets this objective by providing an historical voice to Bethe, a largely overlooked historical figure, while offering fresh insight into Teller, a contentious Cold War character. In doing so, it utilizes a range of recently declassified sources to shed further light on previously documented episodes, such as the hydrogen bomb affair, while chronicling largely untold episodes, including the pair’s involvement in the debate over missile defence. At the same time, it challenges a commonly-held conception that Teller, by utilizing his connections to influential Washington conservatives, was able largely to dictate the course of nuclear policy throughout this period. Indeed, a central contention of this study is that Bethe, by effectively employing both his personal and professional reputation, was able to moderate the influence of his well-placed colleague. Finally, through the use of recently published sources on the Soviet nuclear progam, this study assesses the validity of the political advice of the two scientists, concluding that both men were hindered to a certain extent by the rigidity of their respective positions. Specifically, it argues that Bethe’s advice was characterized by an unduly benign view of Soviet intentions, and Teller’s by an exaggeration of Soviet capabilities.

No description available.

This thesis examines the adversarial roles of nuclear physicists Hans Bethe and Edward Teller as political advisors during the first three decades of the nuclear era and the part each played in the shaping of US nuclear weapons policy. It focuses on four episodes - post-war arms control, the development of the hydrogen bomb, the banning of nuclear weapons testing and the deployment and subsequent banning of a limited system of missile defence, and in each episode, it contrasts the scientists’ individual motives, political agendas, means of affecting policy and respective degrees of success. Thereafter, it assesses the pair as Cold War political advisors by considering the validity of their advice as regards the Soviet nuclear program. Whereas a number of scholarly works have been devoted to the political career of Teller, these have typically focused on his role in the hydrogen bomb controversy. In contrast, very little has been written about Bethe’s political role, despite its obvious significance. Interestingly, no work to date has focused specifically on the openly confrontational roles of these two scientific advisors, who remained at the forefront of the decision-making process over nuclear weapons policy for many years. This thesis meets this objective by providing an historical voice to Bethe, a largely overlooked historical figure, while offering fresh insight into Teller, a contentious Cold War character. In doing so, it utilizes a range of recently declassified sources to shed further light on previously documented episodes, such as the hydrogen bomb affair, while chronicling largely untold episodes, including the pair’s involvement in the debate over missile defence. At the same time, it challenges a commonly-held conception that Teller, by utilizing his connections to influential Washington conservatives, was able largely to dictate the course of nuclear policy throughout this period. Indeed, a central contention of this study is that Bethe, by effectively employing both his personal and professional reputation, was able to moderate the influence of his well-placed colleague. Finally, through the use of recently published sources on the Soviet nuclear progam, this study assesses the validity of the political advice of the two scientists, concluding that both men were hindered to a certain extent by the rigidity of their respective positions. Specifically, it argues that Bethe’s advice was characterized by an unduly benign view of Soviet intentions, and Teller’s by an exaggeration of Soviet capabilities.

No description available.