This thesis begins with an overview of debates about heredity, politics and evolution in the period after Darwin wrote <I>The Origin of Species</I>, in order that the main body of the work can explore the ways in which early- to mid-nineteenth century reformist debates impacted on later evolutionary ideologies. It responds to recent work on the sociological application of Lamarckism, in particular that of Adrian Desmond, who identifies the influence of transformist ideas in early radicals among the working classes and the medical profession. My work argues that much of what we understand as 'Lamarckian' ideology from this early part of the century owes its definition to terms set out by the neo-Lamarckians in the 1880s. If we are to understand the importance of transformist thinking during this early period we must reposition ourselves to take into account the pre-Darwinian perspective. This in turn allows us a greater appreciation of the ways in which reformist ideology influenced later socio-political thinkers who sought an evolutionary theory to counter the social Darwinists. I argue that reformist literature from the mid-century exhibits the ideological prejudices, arising from changes in the evaluation of specialist knowledge and the criteria for proof, which would emerge more fully in the Lamarckism/Darwinism debates. In Chapter One, I review the prevalence of Lamarckian ideas in the nineteenth century up until publication of <I>The Origin,</I> concentrating in particular on the ways in which evolution was appropriated for socio-political purposes. I also examine how Lamarckian transformist ideas were both repudiated and propagated by Charles Darwin. In Chapter Two, I investigate the ways in which the public imagination responded to changes in its criteria for proof, as the 'natural theological' tradition conceded ground to 'natural law' science. I focus in public responses to Robert Chambers's transformist text <I>Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation </I>(1844) in order to demonstrate how these changes were absorbed into broader ideologies of proof and knowledge.

This thesis is concerned with the role and status of singular experiences in the making and diffusion of natural knowledge at the Royal Society of London between 1695 and 1752. It is primarily focused on reports of extraordinary phenomena concerning the generation of living beings that were presented at the meetings of the Royal Society or published in the <I>Philosophical Transactions. </I>First, I discuss their significance in terms of their place in the natural historical agenda at the Society and of their authorship. Next, the reporting and displaying of singular experiences is considered in the context of the culture of curiosity at the Society. Some of the multiple and interconnected roles of these practices in the promotion of inquiry, instruction, polite discourse and entertainment of the Fellows are discussed. The various strategies used in the authentication of observations of extraordinary phenomena are then considered. Particular attention is paid to the roles assigned to the competence and status of the reporter and witnesses in the assessment of testimony. Next, the Fellows interest in extraordinary phenomena, as portrayed in some literary satires of the period, is discussed as part of a more general assault on the language, activities, and credibility of the members of the Royal Society. Then, I focus on the medical understanding of monstrosity at the Society, examining the use of monsters in anatomical and physiological inquiry as well as the tension involved in their understanding within a system of natural order. I also discuss human hermaphrodites as the subject of the most radical attempts by members of the Society to integrate the monstrous within the natural and social order. Finally, in the Conclusion, the relationship between the various perspectives presented in the different chapters is addressed, as well as the issue of continuity and change in the experience of the singular at the Royal Society in the eighteenth century.

Within the last ten years a large amount of material written by Alfred Marshall has been newly published. This material includes Marshall's earliest academic manuscripts (dealing with philosophical subjects), his early lectures to women students, and all of his correspondence. In terms of Marshall's early years studying political economy, this new material may be seen to complement the early economic writings of Marshall, which had already been published (edited by Pigou in 1925, and then Whitaker in 1975), and to offer scholars the opportunity of considerably expanding and indeed perhaps even revising their image of Marshall's formative years as an academic economist. This doctoral thesis utilizes all of the newly published work, as well as previously published material and archival sources. It is intended as a contribution to the revised picture of Marshall's early life and work, which in the opinion of this author, must emerge before too long. This main argument of this thesis is that previous histories of the generational 'revolution of the Cambridge dons' need to be revised, in that there existed a previously passed over generation between William Whewell and Adam Sedgwick on the one hand, and Henry Sidgwick on the other. Reading the works of this hitherto overlooked generation shows how far they in fact bridged the gap between the conservative reformers of the 1850s and the radical reformers of the 1870s. Two key representatives of this 'missing generation' are Grote and Maxwell, and it is argued that Marshall's thought must be seen as closely connected to both these men. This thesis further argues that Marshall's philosophical outlook did not depart far from that which he imbibed from reading Grote's work in the late 1860s, and it tries to show how Marshall's early equilibrium theory of value adopted the techniques recently developed by Maxwell in his statistical models of gas behaviour. In terms of Marshall's early theory of value it is also argued that Marshall's early demand curve was derived by a process of integrating a 'bell-shaped' error curve.

This work centres upon nineteenth century treatment of the luminiferous ether (æther), the hypothetical medium for the transmission of light and other phenomena. In particular it concerns the philosophical problems raised by the apparently contradictory properties of this substance; the methodological problems of dealing with a substance which was both invisible and insubstantial; and the models which were designed to represent this medium. Although it refers to aspects of ether physics throughout the nineteenth century, the primary focus of the work is the period 1850 till 1890. The thesis examines several of the more significant ether models, asking what exactly was their role, how important they were in the process of theory-formation, how realistically they were viewed, and other questions. It also seeks to identify other factors besides the failure of experiment which were influential in leading physicists towards mechanical modelling. To this end, it discusses cultural factors including Victorian attitudes towards construction and machinery, the academic context in which most of the ether physicists were working, and a series of other influences (including spiritualism and the new Energy physics) which were conducive to a highly realistic view of the ether and to the construction of mechanical representations. It also examines the natural philosophy which was required to license the use of models as tools of research, and demonstrates that there was a high degree of conscious debate among physicists about the philosophical problems of modelling. Finally, the work seeks to explain why the mechanical ether models were eventually discarded at the end of the nineteenth century. In doing so, it suggests that the transition from ether to electromagnetic field should be best considered as a shift from what may be termed entity realism to structural realism, and makes some observations about the role of scientific models in general.

During the middle decades of the twentieth century the American human sciences were marked by a sustained engagement with the theory of knowledge. Discoveries in physics and mathematics had come to emphasize the artificial nature of scientific conceptual schemes. Spurred by this development, philosophers, sociologists, and economists began to conceive of their respective disciplines as forms of constructive "analysis" on the model of the mathematical sciences. This study examines the origins and development of analysis—conceived as a distinct mode of inquiry—in the human sciences, by focussing on the ideas and careers of the philosopher W. V. Quine, the social theorist Talcott Parsons, and the economist Kenneth J. Arrow. It shows how analysis emerged in response to three major social and intellectual trends of the interwar years: the growing esteem among humanistic thinkers for the cognitive principles of the mathematical sciences, the waning of progressive thought in the academy, and the gradual de-Christianization of American intellectual life in the 1920s and 1930s. It then describes how and why analysis became prominent during the post-World War II era. The reasons for the ascendancy of analysis in the postwar period include: an ongoing commitment to the "cognitive modernism" of the mathematical sciences, the continuing accommodation of Jewish and other non-protestant groups in the American university, the increasing importance of disciplinary consensus in the postwar research economy, and the demand from Cold War policymakers and think-tanks for scientific knowledge of human behaviour. In contrast with a number of other studies of the analytical human sciences in postwar America, however, this thesis rejects the claim that the success of analysis can be attributed to Cold War expediency or professional interests alone. Instead, it argues that analysis served a variety of needs for an intellectual culture in the grip of a profound ideological and institutional transition. Finally, it shows that the epistemological concerns of mid-century analysts in philosophy, sociology, and economics belong to a tradition of conjectures regarding the principles of knowledge which has characterized modern Western thought.

This thesis examines the circulation of physics between Australia and Cambridge from 1850 to 1950, arguing that scientific knowledge was produced through this very process of circulation. Four aspects of the circulation of knowledge are investigated; technology, scientific roles, public science and scientific discovery. The thesis begins with a discussion of telegraphy as a technology of settlement in relation to the Overland Telegraph between Adelaide and Darwin, completed under Charles Todd’s leadership in 1872. This offers a new perspective on telegraphy and Empire: the cross-cultural context of the Overland Telegraph suggests how central Australia was colonised through accumulation and exchange of knowledge and how the limit of telegraphic coordination were reached. New attempt at coordination through the development of electrical technology and theory are then discussed in the case of the rural hermitage of Tasmanian mathematical physicist, Alexander McAulay. The concept of technological settlement is extended to the discussion of early twentieth century hydroelectrification that created naturalistic landscapes while transforming land use. This created overlapping spaces for physics that encapsulated competing environmental and industrial values. From this hermetic landscape McAulay challenged Cambridge mathematical physics to adopt his preferred form of vector calculus, quaternions, previously rejected during his undergraduate years in Cambridge in the early 1880s. Imperial circulation created new spaces for the acceptance of new knowledge. The travels of the New South Wales experimental physicist, Richard Threlfall, shaped a new identity for experimental physics in Australia and prepared Cambridge physics for the reception of this persona. Between 1884 and 1897 Cambridge seemed transiently bereft of personnel who were able convincingly to perform the new physics that head of the Cavendish Physical Laboratory, JJ Thomson, tried to make routine. Threlfall combined the requisite performances in chemistry and physics, demonstration and measurement, into a professional framework. He Anglicized German research models for a New South Wales audience and conducted institutional development to this end when Australasia was becoming pivotal to projects in imperial defence and to Cambridge science. The institutionalisation of Australasian career models in Cambridge physics is then discussed through the careers of Ernest Rutherford and Thomas Laby. Adept in the crossing of boundaries, the pair contributed to the reform of Cambridge physics through their definition of heroic and routine career models emulated throughout the Empire. These models were deployed to realise Thomson’s experimental program.

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