At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

This dissertation examines in detail, the organisation, training and operations of the 27th and 30th American Divisions during the period of Summer 1917 to the announcement of an armistice in November 1918. Particular emphasis is placed on the two divisions after they were attached to the II American Corps, especially their experience with the British Expeditionary Force in 1918, and the training received under the supervision of British officers. The II American Corps was unique in that it spent its entire service in France in the British sector. Originally it was composed of 10 divisions, but eight of these were removed by the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, Gen. John. J. Pershing. The divisions were transferred to the First American Army and operated entirely independent of II American Corps. The two American divisions that remained with the British, the 27th and 30th, relied heavily upon their coalition partners for advice in training, supplies, equipment, food and more importantly, tactical leadership. Although General Pershing forbade American divisions from being amalgamated into Allied armies, in reality, the 27th and 30th Divisions became part of the BEF, especially the Fourth Army during the final campaigns of the war. Despite its attachment to arguably the best fighting force on the Western Front in 1918, the II American Corps suffered heavy casualties during its limited operational experience and, in many ways, failed to take advantage of lessons learned by the British Army during its campaigns of 1916-1917. This dissertation concludes that the relationship between the two American divisions and their British ally was in the end result a success. By allowing the 27th and 30th Divisions to remain behind with the BEF, Pershing provided the British with more than 50,000 able American troops to use at the front. Thus the two allies became Brothers-in-Arms.