In the midst of the freezing winter of 1978 and 1979, more than 2,000 strikes erupted across Britain. In what became infamously known as the "Winter of Discontent," workers struck against the Labour Government's attempts to curtail wage increases with an incomes policy. The defeat of this incomes policy, and Labour's subsequent electoral defeat, ushered in an era of unprecedented political, economic, and social change for Britain. Conservative victory under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, not only seemed to signal the disillusion of "traditional" working-class ties to the Labour Party, but it also appeared as if a new era had begun, one where British working class politics was finally on its last leg. Furthermore, a potent social myth has developed around the Winter of Discontent, one where "bloody-minded" workers bring down a sympathetic govemment and "invite" the ravages of Thatcherism to the British labour movement. My thesis, on the other hand, moves beyond the myth and uses the previouslyunexamined experiences of rank and file activists to not only situate their narrative in the foreground, but to examine how the memories of participants compare and/or contrast with that of the negative social myth of the Winter of Discontent. I argue, first of all, that rather than the caricature of "bloody-minded wreckers" that has subsequently served to delegitimize working class politics, my research shows striking workers were inspired by were inspired by a multitude of complex economic and political motivations.

This thesis examines how the government of Edward Heath (Prime Minister 1970-74) managed the two most significant domestic political and economic crises which determined both its fate and its long term reputation; first, the 1972 miners’ strike and secondly, the 1973-4 miners’ dispute and the three-day week. Its defeat by the miners in 1972 was an enormous humiliation from which the Heath government never fully recovered. The violent mass picketing which accompanied the strike shook both the government’s and the public’s confidence in the ability of the state to maintain law and order. Their victory boosted the miners’ confidence to take industrial action again in the autumn of 1973 when their position was strengthened by the oil price rise in the wake of the Yom Kippur war. This led to the imposition of a three-day week on industry which ended in the general election of February 1974 and the fall of the Heath Government. This thesis uses the new material in the National Archives to examine the interplay between these events and the government machinery for handling civil emergencies. It reveals the manner in which Heath’s first attempt to reform the system was defeated by Whitehall resistance. The incompetent handling of the 1972 miners strike then strengthened the case for reform and led to the thorough overhaul of contingency planning which laid the foundations for the system which exists to the present day. It examines the factors which influenced the handling of the crises, including the relationship between the Prime Minister and his colleagues, between ministers and officials, the problems posed by external events and the cumulative exhaustion which placed ministers and officials as well as the machinery of government under increasing strain.