Approximately half of the material used in the present work is from unpublished and hitherto apparently unused sources. By correlating this material with that commonly used by writers on the history of Scottish music, it is possible to trace in some detail the policy formulated by the Reformers with regard to music. The existence of such a policy has been a matter of some doubt, and the question has not been elucidated by even the most recent works on the subject. For example, Dr. Henry Farmer's massive work, like its predecessors, relies on data of the kind used by several generations of writers, of whom the chief were Dauney, Livingston, Rogers and Laing. Farmer excels by using a wider variety of sources, which, unfortunately for the student as opposed to the general reader, he does not name. His book is a weighty contribution to the general literature on the subject, rather than an original thesis. This is not to say that he does not propound a thesis, in the looser sense of the word for he is concerned to show the interplay of national characteristics historical vicissitudes on the one hand and national art on other.

Few reigns are so difficult to understand as that of the sixth James of Scotland; there are so many sudden and revolutionary changes in foreign and domestic policy, that the thread of the story is often lost, and we begin to think that there is no connecting link. In fact the reign appears to be a series of disconnected chapters which might bear as titles the names of the most prominent men of the time, with James a shadowy figure in the background, too irresolute or too indifferent to pursue a settled policy and assume definite control. But there is a connecting link, a keynote to the reign, which, while it does not explain the whole of the tortuous policy of regents and king, does help towards a clearer understanding of the period. This is the financial position of the government. The impecuniosity of the Scottish crown, although not a new thing, was especially acute between the years 1567 and 1603, and it is impossible to study the reign from the financial point of view and not feel pity for James, who seemed eager to do the, right thing for his country, anxious to utilise his talents for statecraft for his country's glory, and yet was terribly conscious of the weakness of his central government, lacking the necessary patriotic advisers, and lacking above all the money to rule well. Always did he find his poverty the main obstacle to his success, his talents limited by his purse. It is futile to blame the regents or the king for their shameless begging, although it is difficult to refrain from a smile at the tricks they employed to obtain money. And when it is known that the government was always hampered by poverty and never able to put a well-considered policy into execution, it is time to revise our verdict: James no longer appears to be 'the wisest fool in Christendom' or 'James the Shifty', but a man deserving at least of our pity if not of our admiration. Again, it is a commonplace of history to praise the ability with which his great contemporary, Elizabeth, faced the great difficulties of her time, and overcame them, but her very success is apt to blind us to the ignoble means she employed, and we are apt to forget how much she oared to her advisers. On the other hand how rarely is it emphasised that James had to face difficulties and dangers equally serious with less support, and yet because he had not her glowing success, we deal out not praise but blame. The difficulties of the reign were enormous; the Scottish baronage, always the obstacle to the establishment of a strong monarchy, were now more than ever dangerous, having profited by the Reformation to make themselves richer than the crown; the Church, too, was a serious rival, and began to claim for itself the status not only of a state within the state, but of the state itself, with the right to control even the monarch. Thus the crown faced with these two difficulties could only buy off the hostility of its rivals by granting concessions, which, in themselves weakened the central power. As if this was not enough, for a long time the country was divided into two factions, and the civil war brought great misery upon the country. Abroad Scotland had difficult problems to deal with; its foreign policy was carefully watched by the powers of Europe, and because of the importance of that foreign policy relations with the continent became very intimate and delicate. With conditions so grave the government had a difficult task to perform, and worst of all it had to do so without sufficient money. It has been attempted here to account for James' poverty, to illustrate it, and to indicate its influence upon his domestic and foreign policy. The object has not been to investigate in every detail any one branch of the subject, but to treat the whole subject generally.

It is well known that the North was slov to accept the religious changes. This is of course, largely proved by the rebellion of 1569. It is interesting however, to try to find signs of this conservative attitude before 1569 , and to to be able to show whether the rebellion seems merely the signal for the display of a long pent-up hostility to the changes among the people generally, or whether i t was simply the results of the schemes of ambitious leaders, or of those with a social grievance, working momentarily upon them. It is also interesting to see whether this conservative attitude was apparent in a clinging to old forms and opposition to the new, or whether the people appeared to submit to the changes. The extent t o which the doctrinal changes were accepted in the North,. can be gathered in part from a scruting of the wills of the periods These at first generally open with a commendatory clause followed by a request f o r the prayers of the Virgin and Saints, Whilst under Henry VIII invocation of the Saints was permitted by the Ten Articles of 1536 ( 1 ) , and by the Bishops' Book of 1537 , both were careful to guard against any implied worship of the Saints, the latter stating that although the Saints might be asked to be intercessors, such addresses to them should not be similarto the adoration rendered to God ( 2 ) . This attitude was also visible in the Royal Injunctions of 1538 (3) o In the Litany in the Prayer Book of 1549, however, the requests to Saints for their prayers were omitted, and in 1549 Parliament condemned such invocation (4)

jxl the basis oi an attempt to define what in the fourth Commandment is permanent and what temporary, the thesis classifies five main theories oi Sunday observance, and deals in some detail with Thomas Aquinas's exposition of the Roman Catholic position and with John Calvin's teaching. Traditional, Catholic teaching and Calvin's teaching were, indirectly, the predominant factors which went to the shaping oi the Scottish 1560-1606 Sunday observance. John Calvin set forth one theory in his earlier teaching, arid another in his later teaching, his former teaching came to Scotland by way of the 1556 catechism; and represented the radical Scottish Sunday observance position during the first post-1560 years. His later teaching became increasingly known in Scotland alter 1572 or thereby; and may be reflected in John Craig's 1581 catechism. It becomes impossible to distinguish between a Sunday observance policy which may have been based on the 1556 catechism's teaching and a policy which may have been based on the 1581 catechism. The present work brackets, after 1572, the teaching 01 the two catechisms; and calls the accompanying Sunday observance position the Catechetical. It was anti-Sabbatarian. Parallel to the radical and Catechetical views on Sunday observance from 1560, there were views which were predominantly traditional and Sabbatarian, from 1560 to 1606, except for the first year of .loray's Regency, that Sabbatarianism, in one modified form or another, was a factor in the Scottish Sunday situation. It increased as the radical and Catechetical views lost their original force and declined. The Catechetical and the traditional views also interacted. The result was a hybrid which was akin to, but not necessarily derivable from, the Elizabethan compromise Sunday observance teaching in England. That resultant Sabbatarianism was not the Sabbatarianism which the Westminster Confession was later to incorporate in its teaching. The thesis offers three distinctive contributions to the subject of Sunday observance in general, in addition to its conclusions concerning Sunday observance in Scotland from 156O to 1606.

No description available.

This thesis examines the political career of Marie de Guise in Scotland during the period 1548-1560. Challenging the conventional interpretation of Guise as the defender of Catholicism whose régime climaxed with the Reformation Rebellion, this study shows that she was, on the contrary, a shrewd and effective politique, whose own dynastic interests and those of her daughter took precedence over her personal and religious convictions. Dynasticism, not Catholicism, was the prime motivational force behind her policy and it is from this perspective that her regime is considered. The eight chapters of the thesis focus on two main themes. Firstly, that Marie de Guise's dynasticism, and political career as a whole, were inextricably associated with those of Mary, Queen of Scots, whose Scottish sovereignty, Catholic claim to the English throne and betrothal to the Dauphin of France carried with it notions of Franco- British Imperialism. And secondly, that Marie de Guise's policy in Scotland was dictated by European dynastic politics and, specifically, by the Franco-Scottish alliance of 1548-1560. Significantly more than a betrothal contract, the treaty of Haddington established a 'protectoral' relationship between the 'auld allies' whereby Henri II was able to assume control over Scottish military affairs, diplomacy and foreign policy as the 'protector' of Scotland. Guise's assumption of the regency in 1554 completed the process of establishing French power in Scotland, which was later consolidated, albeit briefly, by the marriage of Mary Stewart to François Valois in 1558. The overall success of Guise's dynastic and domestic policies, however, was limited. International considerations undermined her policies and weakened her administration. Yet the collapse of her regime came not with the outbreak of the Reformation Rebellion or her alleged defeat at the hands of the Congregation. Only with her death, did Marie de Guise's regime and French power in Scotland truly collapse.

This thesis examines and re-evaluates the political career and reputation of James Stewart, Earl of Moray, who acted as Regent of Scotland for the young King James VI from 1567-1570, after the deposition of Mary, Queen of Scots. Drawing upon a rich and varied body of evidence located in both the English and Scottish archives of state papers, together with contemporary propaganda, memoirs and histories, this work constructs a much needed political narrative of the period, investigating the often highly complex politics which lay behind the outbreak and the initial stages of the Marian Civil War. It questions Maurice Lee's image of Moray as the 'gude regent', an image which was first present in Buchanan's History, and which depicts Moray as a highly successful regent, and an altruistic Protestant reformer. Dispelling Lee's view of Moray as a 'reluctant regent', it shows instead that the Earl was determined to gain, and then maintain, his position of power. It incorporates a discussion of the constitutionality of the actual regency itself, together with the theories of election which were drawn up to justify both it and the deposition of a monarch. In addition, the thesis sheds light upon the dynamics of Scottish political alignment during the period, emphasising the great fluidity which was to be found, and showing how issues of internal government, and attitudes towards England, affected men's allegiances as much as, if not more than, the ostensible issue of monarchy itself. This study also builds upon recent work by Tudor historians such as John Guy and Stephen Alford, and sets Moray's regency within an Anglo-Scottish context, demonstrating the importance of the interconnections between events in England, such as the Norfolk plot, and Scottish politics. It investigates the English attitudes towards Mary, and towards the two rival parties within Scotland, taking into account the sometimes conflicting objectives of Elizabeth I and her leading ministers, such as William Cecil, yet showing how they consistently sought to gain dominance over Scotland. Moray's regency was cut short by his assassination, and this thesis concludes by considering both his murder and its aftermath. It explores how his death impacted upon the political situation, together with the way in which his reputation was shaped in the immediate period after his death. Finally, it investigates the opportunity that both Moray's assassination and the Northern Rising of late 1569 had given England to intervene in Scottish affairs, and further pursue policies to that country's own advantage.

This thesis is the first attempt to provide an assessment of Scottish-Jacobean foreign relations within a European context in the years before 1603. Moreover, it represents the only cohesive study of the events that formed the foundation of the diplomatic policies and practices of the first ruler of the Three Kingdoms. Whilst extensive research has been conducted on the British and English aspects of James VI & I's diplomatic activities, very little work has been done on James's foreign policies prior to his accession to the English throne. James VI ruled Scotland for almost twenty years before he took on the additional role of King of England and Ireland. It was in his homeland that James developed and refined his diplomatic skills, and built the relationships with foreign powers that would continue throughout his life. James's pre-1603 relationships with Denmark-Norway, France, Spain, the Papacy, the German and Italian states, the Spanish Netherlands and the United Provinces all influenced his later ‘British' policies, and it is only through a study such as this that their effects can be fully understood. Through its broad scope and unique perspective, this thesis not only contributes to Scottish historiography, but also strengthens and updates our understanding of Jacobean diplomacy. Furthermore, it adds to European perspectives of international politics by re-integrating Scotland into the narrative of late sixteenth century European diplomatic history.