The Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism produced in the period 1925 to the present day is a strikingly varied body of work in which the nature of Stalin, his regime and his role within his regime have been and continue to be the subject of debate. This characteristic is all the more striking when we consider that from the earliest years of the period under study there has been a general understanding of the nature of the Stalinist regime, and of the policies and leader which have come to define it. This thesis analyses the principal influences on research which have led to this body of work acquiring such a varied nature, and which have led to an at times profoundly divided Western, and more specifically Anglo-American, scholarship. It argues that the combined impact of three key formative influences on research in the West over the period of study, and their interaction with each other, reveal recurring themes across the whole historiography, while also accounting for the variety of interpretations in evidence. The first impact identified is the lack of accessibility to sources during the Soviet period, which posed a constant and real obstacle to those in the West writing on Stalin and Stalinism, and the impact of the removal of this obstacle in the post-Soviet era. The second is the influence of wider historiographical trends on this body of work, such as the emergence of social history. Finally the thesis argues that evolving Western attitudes to Stalin and Stalinism over this period have played a key role in constructions of Stalin and his regime, demonstrating an on-going historical process of the othering of Russia by the West. The extent and nature of this othering in turn provide a central line of enquiry of the thesis. Tightly intertwined with all three impacts has been the changing global political context over the period in question which provides the evolving and influential contextual backdrop to this study, and which has given this body of work a deeply political and personal character.

Destalinisation was the process of enormous change that began in the wake of Stalin’s death. Whilst it has been heavily studied from the Soviet perspective, it has not been examined from the American standpoint. This thesis fills that gap. It took until 1956 for Eisenhower and Dulles to alter their perceptions of the USSR and its ideology despite the years of change that followed Stalin’s death. This thesis explains how the majority of policymakers rejected signals of change in the USSR until 1956. There were numerous reasons for this: domestic politics, relations with allies, and public opinion all played a role. But the key factor in preventing a change in mindset was an engrained perception of the Soviet leaders as Stalinists. While the Soviet leadership after 1953 rejected the hallmarks of Stalinism, the Eisenhower administration understood such signals of change within a mindset that saw the Soviets as unreconstructed communists, expansionist in aims, conspiratorial in methods, and, above all, out to destroy the West. This perception was in effect a mental ‘dam’, which held back any substantial perception change in Washington. By 1956, however, a new perception of destalinisation, and by extension Soviet Communism, came into being. The Eisenhower administration no longer rejected out of hand the changes the Soviet leadership enacted both domestically and in foreign relations. Eisenhower and Dulles found sufficient evidence to question whether the rigid view of Soviet Communism and its aims was accurate or useful. The 20th Party Congress caused serious cracks in the ‘dam'. Two of these ‘cracks’ were in the minds if Eisenhower and Dulles, who by the end of 1956 had changed their view of the Soviet leaders, and no longer regarded them as Stalinist. This change in perception would ultimately allow détente to take hold.

This thesis deals with the Soviet Union’s Peace Campaign during the first decade of the Cold War as it sought to establish the Iron Curtain. The thesis focuses on the primary institutions engaged in the Peace Campaign: the World Peace Council and the Soviet Peace Committee. Chapter 1 outlines the domestic and international context which fostered the peace movement (provisional title) and endeavours to construct a narrative of the political and social situation which the Soviet Union found itself in after World War II (as a superpower and an empire leading the Socialist Bloc) in order to put forward the argument that the motivations for undertaking the project of the 'peace movement', above all, were of an international-political nature, rather than of an internal and domestic nature. Chapter 2 starts off with the Soviet project of establishing an international peace movement, including firstly the World Peace Congress, which simultaneously convened in Paris and Prague, and then proceeds with the institutional, political and social development of the Campaign up to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956. The task of this chapter is not merely to chronicle the history of the Soviet Peace Campaign, but to extract from the narrative underlying themes and organise them accordingly. Finally, Chapter 3 deals with internal Soviet Peace Campaign. The task here is to construct a historical account of the Soviet anti-war movement from 1949 to 1956 through the institutional history of the Soviet Peace Committee. Furthermore, the aim is to demonstrate the relationship between the Soviet Peace Committee and party and state institutions and its dependency on and implications for political decision-making processes within the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Finally, this chapter will also examine the role of the Soviet Peace Committee and its affiliated institutions in the advancement of Cold War propaganda through the media (i.e. press, journalism, etc.), literature (i.e. novels, poems, etc.), film and political art (i.e. posters, caricature, etc.).

This thesis contributes primarily to answering two broad questions within the current scholarship on ‘everyday life’ in the Soviet Union: (1) How did Soviet citizens perceive, understand, and adapt to the 1930s? And (2) What were the principal associational structures of Soviet society in these years? These issues are not easily separated, with the second constituting a vital element of the first. They are therefore explored simultaneously in the first three chapters, which examine, respectively, the nature and possibilities of joke-telling in the 1930s; the principal targets of that humour; and, thirdly, its implicit assumptions, values and thematic proclivities. The fourth chapter concentrates on the structure and nature of sociability in the 1930s, and the final chapter incorporates those conclusions in order to address the larger question of how Soviet citizens came to understand and adapt to life in these years – for they did so together, rather than alone as old totalitarian theories of ‘atomisation’ proposed. The thesis makes two principal arguments. Firstly, all unofficial associational ties in this decade were necessarily underlaid by (and hence reliant upon) trust; therefore, the fundamental social unit in the 1930s was the trust group (small groups of citizens bound together by trust). Secondly, citizens adapted to the 1930s via an intricate blend of acceptance and criticism or, rather, of acceptance through the process of criticism. By criticising that which could not be changed, ‘ordinary’ Soviet citizens could retain some agency of their own and shared these interpretive acts with those whom they trusted. Rather than forming a critical ‘resistance’ or ‘dissent’, these processes created a pathway to adaptation without becoming simply crushed or brainwashed by ideology, and simultaneously shaped a complex, mutually affective interaction between popular values and official ideology.

The thesis examines the Communist Party in Moscow between 1925 and 1932. Its structure, role and membership are studied, together with its relationship with the population of Moscow. A study is also made of politics in the period, with special reference to the oppositions of the 1920's. Four broad problems are discussed. The first is the relationship between the central Party leadership and the Moscow Committee. Second is the role of the grassroots activist in political life. Thirdly, the failure of the oppositions is studied in detail. Finally, popular influence over the Party is examined with a view to discussing how far the revolution had been 'betrayed' in this period. It is found that the Moscow Committee was less autonomous than other regional organs, but that grassroots initiative played an important part in political life. In general, people were reluctant to engage in formal opposition. This largely explains the defeat of the Left and Right oppositions, who failed to attract significant support. The majority of Muscovites remained apathetic or hostile to the Party, but a core of committed activists within it was responsible for many of the period's achievements. To the extent that they supported and even initiated policy, Stalin's 'great turn' included an element of 'revolution from below'.

The main aim of this dissertation has been to examine the creation, organisation and work of the Red Army's Civil War political apparatus and assess its overall contribution to the Bolshevik war effort. To this end the dissertation itself consists of 4 main chapters and a number of appendices, detailing not only the work of the main political organs of the Red Army, but also the main personalities involved. The first chapter is an introductory chapter, examining the organ, which many Soviet historians have for a long time considered to be the Bolsheviks' first attempt at the creation of a centralised political organ for the Red Army, namely the Organisation-agitation department of the All-Russian Collegiate for the Formation and Organisation of the Red Army. The work carried out for the first chapter then leads to a discussion of the work of arguably the first real attempt by the Bolsheviks to create a properly functioning political organ specifically for the Red Army, namely the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars (VBVK). The chapter has been sub-divided into a number of sections, in order to allow a greater detailed examination of the work, personalities and difficulties that the central political apparatus faced in its attempts to exert some sort of control over the various constituent parts of the front political apparatus-the military commissars, the Party cells and the ever-increasing important political departments in the period 1918-1919. That VBVK was not to be a crowning success is revealed by the necessity that the Bolsheviks felt towards the beginning of 1919 to abolish VBVK and create arguably the centralised political organ of the Red Army during the Civil War period-the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic (PUR). Created in May 1919, PUR was to face many of the same problems that had beset VBVK a year or so earlier but, on the whole, coped with them better and political and cultural-educational work in the Red Army proceeded apace. The final, conclusive chapter brings all the threads together and assesses the claims made for the political work carried out in the front-line Red Army units during 1918-1920 and, whilst admitting that the Bolsheviks did spend much time on promoting the apparatus in a number of ways, the assertions made by generations of Soviet historians concerning the overall value of the political and cultural-educational work carried out in the Red Army are still too grandiose and that there is a lack of concrete evidence available, proving the worth of the political work carried out and its positive military consequences.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 was the high point of class struggle in the twentieth-century. For the first time in world history, a social movement predicated on the overcoming of class exploitation succeeded in gaining state power. In the days and weeks following October 1917 insurrection, a self-declared Marxist government set about the task of constructing a socialist society. However the Russian Revolution was more than the mass political mobilisation of class resentments. In addition to proletarians and peasants, the Bolsheviks also mobilised national minorities, for whom October represented the opportunity to put an end to centuries of national oppression. The Bolshevik promise, therefore, entailed not just class solidarity, but national self-determination and internationalism as well. In the very moment of revolution, however, these sentiments were put to the test as mass outbreaks of antisemitic pogroms spread across the vast regions of the former Pale of Settlement. The pogroms posed fundamental questions for the Bolshevik project, since they revealed the nature and extent of working class and peasant attachments to antisemitic and racialised forms of consciousness. This dissertation has two broad aims: first, it sets out to offer the most comprehensive analysis to date of the explosive articulation between antisemitism and the revolutionary process. It reveals, for example, the extent to which class struggle and anti-bourgeois discourse could overlap with antisemitic representations of Jewishness, often with devastating consequences. Second, it offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of the Soviet government attempt to arrest this articulation between antisemitism and revolutionary politics. Contrary to existing understandings, the dissertation argues that the ‘Bolshevik’ campaign against antisemitism was led not the Party leadership, as is often assumed, but by a small grouping of non-Bolshevik Jewish socialists who worked in the Party and Soviet government throughout 1918 and 1919. Having brought into focus an almost entirely overlooked moment in the history of Jewish experiences of, and responses to, antisemitism, the dissertation concludes by reflecting on how this reframing of the Russian Revolution might offer insights for anti-racists and socialists engaged in struggles for social justice today.

This thesis examines the experiences of the overseas Chinese in the Russian Far East during the revolutionary and Civil War period from 1917 to 1920, as well as their responses to the upheaval. Bucking the current trend towards transcultural history, the thesis argues that Chinese identity and nationalist language were of prime importance to this community. By concentrating on Chinese-language sources, the thesis re-privileges the community's internal discourses and highlights the prevalence of nationalist rhetoric across the Sino-Russian border. It also sites the Chinese community's use of nationalist language within the context of the global diaspora, for which questions of national weakness and revival were also pressing. Going further, the thesis postulates the presence of "Chinese nationalism with Russian characteristics", in which the issues surrounding Chinese nationalism as a whole were heightened. It shows that the rhetoric of 'national humiliation' and victimhood were particularly immediate to the community in the Russian Far East, since it was located at one of the epicentres of imperial contestation. In practice, this led to a modus vivendi with the Reds and a decisive turn against the Whites. Furthermore, the chaos of the revolutions and Civil War imbued this nationalism with an opportunistic quality. The collapse of Russian state power became the 'opportunity of a thousand years' for China to redress past wrongs. This allowed the overseas community to work closely with local authorities and the Beijing government to achieve shared goals. New civil society organisations with community-wide aims were formed. Beijing extended its diplomatic reach in the form of new Far Eastern consulates. Finally, common nationalist rhetoric underpinned China's successful attempt to re-establish its civilian and military presence on the Amur River. "Chinese nationalism with Russian characteristics" could be effectively harnessed to secure multi-level and cross-border cooperation.

In both western and Russian historiography the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 enjoys, at best, only a passing reference in any narrative of the period and is poorly integrated into existing scholarly analyses of the Soviet regime under Stalin. It is my contention that this conflict offers an invaluable opportunity to test for continuity and change in the form and function of the Stalinist system. Between the disastrous efforts of its forces and the condemnation of the international community, the Kremlin was confronted with the serious challenge of how to portray the events of the war in the media, while managing domestic and international opinion over the course of the fighting. This thesis examines the extent to which the Soviet regime under Stalin had the institutions and agents in place at the close of the 1930s to cope with the crisis of war in Finland; to be in command of the military campaign, while simultaneously controlling the direction of the official narrative about the fighting; and to censor conflicting interpretations, experiences and information channels, which might expose the Red Army's woeful performance on Finnish territory. This mobilisation of press, propaganda and censorship organs in the face of widespread international condemnation and domestic disquiet constituted a significant challenge for a regime still dealing with the sudden reorientation of the Communist International, required after the Soviet Union's conclusion of a non-aggression treat with Nazi Germany in August 1939. An international perspective is central to this thesis, with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the public face and private practice of Soviet information controls.

This thesis investigates the formation of power structures in a revolutionary setting. It takes as a case study the central Siberian city of Krasnoiarsk, in which a powerful Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies emerged during the period March-October 1917. The Krasnoiarsk Soviet was an elective council established during the overthrow of Tsarist authorities. Throughout 1917, it became a vital component of an emerging local and regional power structure, assuming growing responsibility for a number of core state tasks. As well as providing a new empirical case study to English-language literature on 1917, the thesis employs a nuanced analytical approach which challenges existing conceptualisations of state power in revolution and the role played by local soviets. State power in revolutionary Russia has often been viewed as something to be contested between different political groupings and organisations seeking to assert their own outright control. This view is captured neatly by the formulation of “dual power”, in which soviets and Provisional Government organisations constructed alternative power bases in an attempt to wield outright control. Accordingly, the soviets’ growing political strength indicated an ability to marginalise other groups and organisations seeking to wield power. By contrast, this thesis does not seek to explain how power in revolutionary Krasnoiarsk was “captured” or otherwise controlled by the Soviet alone. Instead, it applies a critical interpretation of state power proposed by Bob Jessop and other theorists, who view the state as a site of interaction and negotiation between multiple autonomous organisations and social actors, all of which have a stake in the way it operates in practice. It focuses on the emergence of a “soviet power” writ small, in which the Krasnoiarsk Soviet became an authoritative organisation within a broader constellation of revolutionary actors. Without denying the Soviet’s centrality within this power structure, the thesis does not explain its role simply as the monopolisation of authority over other would-be contenders. Rather, it sees the Soviet’s importance in its ability to establish itself as a focal point for interactions between multiple actors which, collectively, shaped state power at a local and regional level. It considers how the forms and practices of revolutionary power developed through these interactions and how these interactions in turn transformed the roles of actors and organisations engaging them. In order to unpick the complex and dynamic processes of revolutionary power, the thesis employs three core methodological concepts: institutions, mobilisation, and ideology. It makes several important and original arguments. Firstly, it emphasises the autonomy of social actors which supported the Soviet and engaged in its politics, demonstrating the extent to which they were able to shape its political functions and structures according to their own concerns. Secondly, it reveals the importance of skilled administrative personnel to Soviet work, highlighting the invaluable practical roles they played in the regulation of provisions and their ability to influence Soviet policy measures on this issue. Thirdly, it demonstrates the close cooperation between the Soviet and other local governmental and administrative bodies, including the city Duma and provisions regulatory organisations, which remained vital to fulfilling state functions throughout 1917. Finally, it discusses how the Soviet and socialist activists challenged established power relationships between Krasnoiarsk, as a locality, and all-Russian state authorities, revealing the growing importance they attached to securing greater local autonomy in revolution and the changing ways local actors viewed their role in wider all-Russian politics.