This thesis is to contribute to academic knowledge concerning Russian public opinion and the two wars in Chechnya, focusing on differences in perception of each war within the coinciding Russian political climate. This thesis adds on to relevant academic literature pertaining to this subject in several ways, and represents a necessary approach on a topic in which the state of Russia's democracy can be tested, particularly as to what the status is of the Russian state as a democratic state or alternatively an authoritarian state. Frequently, as will be detailed, the subject of Russian public opinion on the Chechen wars will have been mentioned, and even explored in the context of academic writings. However, the author finds it necessary to put exactly this issue on a pedestal and observe how the very nature and status of Russian public opinion concerning the Chechen war issue reflects on the Russian regime, if indeed at all. There are a great many facets to a study of this topic. Firstly (chapter one), in the context of a detailed literature review, finding and elaborating on an understanding of Russian public opinion is necessary in the earliest instance. Secondly (chapter two), a comparative examination of Russian public opinion and its contending views on each of the two wars must be scrutinized.

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This study looks at the constructions of the past in post-Soviet Simferopol, the capital of Crimea. Revelations about the Soviet period since Perestroika and Ukrainian independence resulted in countless and contrasting interpretations of the past which leaves people to make their own decisions as to where "truth" lies. Literature concerning memory in post-authoritarian states usually focuses on repression and trauma (cf.Hann 1993:11). My study, on the other hand, tries to integrate the substantial amount of positive memories that were being told during my fieldwork.It therefore deals With the question how these memories can be interpreted in the context of former political repression, social trauma and the gaps in the overall picture. Furthermore, the researcher is confronted With a situation of rapid change (cf. Hann 1994) that influences peoples' assessment of the present and the past in major ways. Part of what has been termed "nostalgia" can be seen as a way of resisting social change that has been too radical for many to follow.The positive portrayal of the past can furthermore be connected to the fact that they were directed at me, the 'Western" researcher. This is affected by a past of ideological confrontation and present economic and political decline. This thesis thus also addresses reflexive issues concerning the position of the researcher and how the collection of data and subsequent representation are influenced by various audiences. Crimea is said to have a multiplicity of ethnicities, the three strongest being "Ukrainian", "Russian" and 'Tartar". Looking at genealogies I argue that these cannot simply be designated as "ethnic" identities but that one has to take into account the Soviet past of internationalism and nationalities politics. Contentions over the past centre on issues connected to social accountability. "Ukrainian" nationalists look at the Soviet past as totalitarian and destructive. In connection with this, their appraisal of the present is more positive. 'Tartars" protest at the wholesale deportation of their people by Soviet forces and are trying to claim back their rights as the "original" inhabitants of Crimea. "Russians", on the other hand, fondly remember the security and stability they perceive to have enjoyed under the Soviet regime. My material shows that to interpret this as the repression of former trauma, does not do justice to the ways in which the present (social insecurity, joblessness, crime, poverty)is at the centre of the reconstruction of the past. Nevertheless, public ceremonies commemorating the past as well as monuments and people's narratives show a concentration in remembering certain times more than others closely related to Soviet rhetoric.

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This case study examines the role of the political party United Russia in the rise of ‘dominant-power politics’, also termed ‘electoral authoritarianism’, that characterises the Putin period (2000-2008). Comparative literature identifies parties as important independent or explanatory variables in a range of regime outcomes, including the successful consolidation of democracy, but also in the establishment and consolidation of authoritarian rule. The impressive rise of United Russia in the Russian political system from late 2001 onwards, together with its co-occurrence with the growing strength of the Putin regime, suggests that the party was a factor in the outcome of the latter. This research first develops a theoretical framework to understand the role of parties in modern political systems and then applies this framework to explore the Russian case. Although a component of power in the Putin period, this research argues that the origins of United Russia in the ‘party of power’ phenomenon limit its value as an explanatory variable. Rather than a principal power in the emerging post-Yeltsin political order, United Russia is an agent of a powerful civilian executive, which remains beyond the control of any party. In this sense, the rise of United Russia in the Putin period is misleading. United Russia is an example of ‘virtual’ party hegemony; a reflection of the intentions and ability of non-party power-holders to project their power onto party-agents. This research contributes to existing literature on party politics in the post-Soviet space and Russian politics in the Putin period. In comparative terms, this study contributes to existing notions of party dominance and emerging literature on divergent regime trajectories in the post-Cold War period.