The objective of this PhD is to examine the influence of national identity on the postSoviet foreign policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the period 1991-99. Contrary to the traditional Realist view that external relations and state security are determined solely by power, I argue that foreign-policy choices are not the product of purely rational considerations but are instead shaped by ideational forces, such as historical collective memory and perceptions of self and other. My thesis is based on the hypothesis that the foreign policy of all states is influenced by national identity. The influence of national identity increases when states are new and political institutions are thus weak, when there is little social cohesion between ethnic groups and when inter-state relations are bilateral and not international; national identity provides a psychological framework within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented, whereby core beliefs set foreign-policy decision-makers along particular paths and preclude certain options from being considered; national identity influences foreign policy if the elements of that identity (ethnic group or territory, for instance) are perceived to be under threat and require protection; national identity itself can be used as a foreign-policy tool to enhance security by creating a social reality through discourse whereby states embed themselves in the global political consciousness as members of a broader collectivity beyond the control of actual or potential enemies. To demonstrate this, I examine four foreign-policy issues: the impact of citizenship and minority rights legislation on relations with Russia and Poland; the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Army; the demarcation of the eastern borders of Estonia and Latvia; and attempts by the three Baltic States to enhance their security through membership of European organisations.

This thesis examines how the three Baltic countries constructed their internal and external sovereign statehood in the interwar period and the post Cold War era. Twice in one century, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were confronted with strongly divided multiethnic societies, requiring a bold and wide-ranging ethnics policy. In 1918 all three Baltic countries promised their minorities cultural autonomy. Whereas Estonian and Latvian politicians were deeply influenced by the theories of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the Lithuanians fell back on the historic Jewish self-government in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Many politicians were convinced that the principle of equality of nationalities was one of the cornerstones of the new international order, embodied by the League of Nations. The minority protection system of the League was, however, not established to serve humanitarian aims. It only sought to ensure international peace. This lack of a general minority protection system was one of many discussion points in the negotiations of the Estonian and Latvian minority declarations. Although Lithuania signed a much more detailed minority declaration, its internal political situation rapidly deteriorated. Estonia, on the other hand, established full cultural autonomy with corporations of public law. Although a wide-ranging school autonomy was already established in 1919, Latvia never established cultural self-government. The Second World War and the subsequent Soviet occupation led to the replacement of the small historically rooted minority groups by large groups of Russian-speaking settlers. The restoration in 1991 of the pre 1940 political community meant that these groups were deprived of political rights. In trying to cope with this situation, Estonia and Latvia focused much more on linguistic integration than on collective rights. Early attempts to pursue a decolonisation policy, as proposed by some leading Estonian and Latvian policymakers, were blocked by the ‘official Europe’ which followed a policy analogous to the League of Nations.