The Balkans have always been the arena for war competitors, and diplomatic relations in which Western Europe has always played a crucial part. After the collapse of communism and the dividing wall between Western and Eastern Europe, the Balkans have been for one more time the "powder keg" of Europe. The Yugoslav crisis reveals the always existing nationalistic tensions and minority problems which in combination with the poor economy of the area prevented the ex-communist countries from an easy transition to democracy and a market economy. AlulOugh the EC/u reacted immediately to the crisis, it failed to prevent the conflict. The European institutions performed the initial diplomatic activities but the whole enterprise turned out to be something more than a "simple" conflict management, or the perfect opportunity for the EC/u to define its respective role in the changing international environment. A solution to the conflict was prevented not only because of the complexity of the conflict itself, but also because of the specific perceptions of the international actors who were involved. Therefore, in order to understand the management of the conflict it is important to decode the complex role performed by the ECIU. In order to understand this role (of the EU) we have to analyse the factors that influenced and shaped the interests and perceptions of the three main member states of EU, i.e. Britain, France and Germany. The theory that is used in order to explain this is the "rationalistic research tradition", which adopts three approaches (Neorealism, Institutionalism and liberal Intergovemmentalism) that will be applied to explain the European response to the Yugoslav conflict. Therefore, after a brief chronological account of the conflict, a theoretically-informed interpretation of the position of the European players in it is provided that illuminates in depth the contribution of the ECIU in the management of the conflict. The main core of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of the position of France, Britain and Germany in the debates over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the military intervention that took place throughout the management of the conflict, bearing in mind three sets of influences on state interests and perceptions, i.e. the relative power, the influence of institutional membership within the European Union and the interaction between domestic and international constraints. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the explanatory power of the three approaches used in the analysis.

This thesis comprises an empirical study of the British role in Yugoslavia and its successor states between 1991 and 1995, and demonstrates that the British government led the international 'consensus' during that time, through what may be considered a doctrine of assertive appeasement while, at the same time, misleading parliament on issues crucial to an understanding of the situation. It also demonstrates that British policy was consistent, unlike that of its western allies, in obstructing initiatives aimed at effective international military intervention, which resulted in a prolongation of the war, and advanced the agenda of the Belgrade regime. The motives which may have guided British policy in this instance are discussed briefly in the introductory chapter which offers an outline of the global framework within which British policy was formulated in the wake of the Cold War, with particular reference to Britain's place in the New European order, following the downing of the Berlin Wall, and in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty. A chronological approach has been adopted as the most appropriate in demonstrating some of the intricate manoeuvres which characterised British diplomacy in the region at crucial junctures of the war.