The present study sets out to examine British policy over the area of Western Asia Minor and the Straits, one of the three vital strategic spots that Britain sought to safeguard in the area of the Near and Middle East, alongside Persia and Iraq, after the end of the First World War. The focus is on Britain’s attitude towards the Greek Expedition in Asia Minor and the ensuing Greek-Turkish war from 1919 to1922 with the settlement of 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne. The work centres on examining British policy-making process regarding Western Asia Minor and the Straits. Within the British policy-making elite there was a split between those favouring the establishment of Greece as the new protector of British interests in the area, after Turkey’s defeat, and those wanting to continue supporting Turkey for this role. The War, Colonial and India offices inclined towards the former while David Lloyd George and elements within the Foreign Office opted for the Greek solution. The inability of the Greek forces to establish firmly the Greek occupation of Western Asia Minor by defeating the Turkish Nationalist forces in 1921 made a drastic change in the minds of those British policy-makers who had initially supported the Greek option inevitable. This, along with developments such as the Nationalist movement in turkey and the attempts of Britain’s friends and foes alike to contain its supremacy in the region contributed to the change of policy. The study illuminates themes like the Anglo-French relations over the Near and Middle East and British attitudes towards the role of Soviet Russia in the region. With the Treaty of Lausanne British policy returned to the traditional policy of supporting Turkey as the British proxy in the region. British policy-makers by 1923 had achieved a relative stability in the area of the Near and Middle East which remained unchallenged up until the outbreak of the Second World War.