This thesis attempts to reconcile the ‘two Rwandas’ which dominate contemporary scholarship, and seem on first glance utterly incommensurable: the inspirational developmental donor darling, and the brutal police state ruled by a shadowy ethnic clique. It argues both sides capture something, but fail to give a fair assessment of the mercurial system of political order constructed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) following the Genocide of 1994. This system is a durably strong state with exceptionally high levels of societal penetration capable of delivering order and other public goods, with a ruling party in a hegemonic position with a degree of medium-term stability, despite (and because of) its illiberal repressive character. Such a system is only possible because of the extremely unusual sociology of the RPF itself, forged in the refugee camps of Uganda and the Ugandan Bush War, and the structural constraints on rule within Rwanda. With these resources, the RPF has successfully made the transition from guerilla movement to hegemonic civilian political party, created bureaucratic institutions of government which penetrate to the lowest level, and hugely profitable ‘party-statals’ which co-exist alongside functioning competitive markets. Such successes are not disconnected from the violence, repression, and extra-judicial coercion which remain crucial to the regime. Analyses which think the positive aspects of Rwanda’s current ‘miracle’ can be mimicked without the accompanying domination and autocracy are engaging in wishful thinking. Crucially, given how distinctive the enabling conditions for Rwanda’s current political dispensation are, the extent to which Rwanda can be a policy exemplar or ‘best-practice’ for other African states to follow is in any case seriously overstated.