The dismantling of rebel structures at the end of civil war is often considered to be one of the most important aspects of a successful transition to peace. Combatants are expected to lay down their weapons, but also to abandon their wartime networks. Yet, peace agreements and subsequent Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes do not automatically, or necessarily, destroy rebel networks. In Liberia such structures have lingered since the war came to an end in 2003 and networks of ex-combatants are still active, though maintained and mobilised for new purposes. The security political situation in Liberia, with weak formal security institutions and a history of predatory behaviour, has created an environment where informal initiatives for security and protection are called upon. In such an environment informal security groups have a natural platform. Based on original interview material and findings from fieldwork this thesis examines how post-war rebel networks are organised and operate in the informal security arena, while describing the rationale behind these lingering features of war. By doing so this thesis sheds light on how the adaptive capacity of former rebel soldiers is utilised by various Liberian actors, and the risks, but also possible positive outcomes, of such a development. This dissertation follows individuals, former rebel commanders in particular, in post-war rebel networks from the time of war to 2013. We will see them, and ex-combatants around them, mobilised as ‘recycled’ warriors in times of regional wars and crisis, as vigilantes and informal security providers for economic and political purposes. Yet, we will also meet them when there are no specific event ex-combatants could be mobilised to fully examine the relevance of post-war rebel networks and ex-combatant identity in contemporary Liberia. In the conclusions basic underlying aims and purposes with the processes of demobilisation and reintegration are challenged. And as this thesis finds, one might even argue that these ex-combatants have succeeded in reintegrating themselves due to, not despite, the fact that they have not been demobilised.

This thesis examines the relationship between ethnicity and violent group mobilisation in Liberia’s civil war (1989-2003). It focuses on Gio, Mano and Mandingo mobilisation to investigate how and why internal dynamics about moral norms and expectations motivated leadership calls for violence and ethnic support. Much of the existing literature interprets popular involvement in violent group mobilisation on the Upper Guinea Coast as a youth rebellion against gerontocracy. I argue that such an approach is incomplete in the Liberian case, and does not account for questions of ethnic mobilisation and the participation of groups such as the Gio, Mano and Mandingo. At the onset of hostilities, civilians in Liberia were not primarily mobilised to fight based on their age, but rather as members of ethnic communities whose membership included different age groups. I explore constructivist approaches to ethnicity to analyse mobilisation for war as the collective 'self-defence' of ethnic groups qua moral communities. In the prelude to the outbreak of civil war, inter-ethnic inequalities of access to the state and economic resources became reconfigured. Ethnic groups—as moral communities—experienced external 'victimisation' and a sense of internal dissolution, or threatened dissolution. In particular, the understanding of internal reciprocal relations between patrons and clients within ethnic groups was undermined. Internal arguments about morality, personal responsibility, social accountability/justice, increased the pressure on excluded elites and thus incentivised them to pursue violent political strategies. Mobilisation took on an ethnic form mainly because individuals believed that they were fighting to protect the moral communities that generate esteem and ground understandings of good citizenship. Therefore, ethnic participation in the Liberian countryside differed from the model peasant rebellion that seeks to overthrow the feudal elites. Rather than a revolution of the social order, individuals regarded themselves as protecting an extant ethnic order that provided rights and distributed resources. Even though some individuals fought for political power and resources, and external actors facilitated group organisation through the provision of logistical support, the violence was also an expression of bottom-up moral community crisis and an attempt by politico-military elites to keep their reputation and enforce unity.