In this essay I examine and criticize Jeffrey Kaplans fifth wave theory of terrorism, the theory is an addition and through the elaboration of professor David C. Rapoports classic Fourth wave theory. I have chosen to do that   by comparing al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State using their corresponding magazines Inspire and Dabiq. The goal of this exercise is to prove that what we experience with the Islamic State is not the beginning of a new wave of terrorism as Kaplan call it, but a state in making. Kaplans fifth wave gives us a good method to analyze terror organizations in between the state of organization and state but fails to live up to a new wave of terrorism. I therefore argue that what we are seeing for the movement is not the birth of a fifth wave, but rather a new development of a fourth.

The United States needs a long-term counterterrorism strategy in Yemen. Nearly three years in, the faltering Yemeni transition threatens to fall apart in the face of an economic crisis, ongoing internal conflict, and al Qaeda attacks. Unchecked, a failed Yemeni state will provide al Qaeda with a larger recruiting base and an expanded area for operations. To prevent this nightmare scenario, the United States should integrate military restructuring, political reform, and economic development policies into its greater strategy to counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This report describes the dynamics of the 2011 Yemeni uprising, the subsequent political transition, and the simultaneous evolution of AQAP. The report then analyzes these phenomena in the context of U.S. national security policy to determine a long-term counterterrorism strategy in Yemen. To succeed in defeating AQAP and stabilizing Yemen, the U.S. government must engage with its Yemeni partners and regional actors; invest in Yemen's military restructuring, political transition, and economic reforms; and continue to attack AQAP through direct action operations and in tandem with Yemeni armed forces. / text