A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Management at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Management in Public and Development Management, 2016 / This report sought to determine the nature of participatory democracy practices in Madibeng municipality. In order to achieve the intension of this study, two research questions were formulated (1) what is the nature of participatory democracy in Madibeng municipality? (2) To what extent does the implementation of participatory democracy mechanisms influence municipal policy decisions? A hypothesis was formulated in respect of the second question that: The implementation of participatory democracy mechanisms in Madibeng is limited to compliance with existing laws and regulations. Data was drawn from two strata’s (population samples), [ward councillors and community members] from Madibeng municipality. A probability simple random sampling was used to collect data from a total list of 36 ward councillors, whilst a non-probability convenient sampling was used to collect data from 27 community members. In respect of ward councillors, the study targeted 26 respondents and only achieved 52% response rate, whilst a total of 11 respondent was targeted and 27 responses were attained, indicating 145% response rate in respect of data collected from community members. The general finding in relation to the first question is that participatory democracy practice in Madibeng municipality is characterised by the implementation of five mechanisms; IDP, Ward committee structures, Mayoral imbizos, Policy public hearings and Petitioning system. A revelation was made that communities prefer to participate in IDP and ward committee structures meetings than the other three mechanisms reflected in the report. However, it remained unclear as to how effective and efficient is the exercising of the two preferred mechanisms. The general arguments found in various literature sources, that the practice of participatory democracy in South Africa’s local municipalities seem ineffective and often do not often yield positive results, was also confirmed by this study. This conclusion was based on the revelations made from the contradicting responses given by ward councilors and community members. In general, ward councilors considered the implementation of available participatory democracy practices in Madibeng as effective and strongly believed such practices informs the municipal Executive Council’s policy decisions to a large extent. On the other hand, community members seemed unsure or inadequately informed about the influence, their participation in policy decisions has on the overall service delivery by the municipality. / XL2018

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, September 2017 / The study attempts to examine the relationship between national identity and political sovereignty and their impact on the emergence of nations, with a special focus on debates around the South African nation-state from 1990 to 2004. Located within the postcolonialism approach, the study looks at national identity through the prism of ethnicity, language, religion and race, while sovereignty is considered through its two component parts, the state and citizenry. By examining two postcolonial contexts, the Arab world and India, the study has developed a framework which is applied to the study of the South African state. This framework identifies nationalism as a glue which holds sovereignty and identity together in the nation-state. The two cases reveal that there is always more than one nationalist narrative, often competing against each other. In the case of the Arab world the study looks at the tensions between pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism and Islamism. In the case of India a secular Indian nationalism has had to compete against a Hindu nationalism. The study argues that South Africa’s history has been characterised by contestation between a white, Afrikaner nationalism and an African nationalism. As in the two case studies, these narratives are not just polar ends, but rather a complex spectrum which has seen alliances being struck across the racial divide. The essence of the former has been an attempt at addressing the ‘Native Question’, that is how to manage the continued subjugation of the overwhelming number of Africans in this country. Having its roots as a reaction to its socio-economic conditions in the Cape, it evolved into an ethnically constructed view of itself and through which it mobilised political and economic resources to perpetuate its dominance after it reached its zenith in the 1948 elections. This narrative’s arc saw it being redefined in race terms to encompass English-speaking whites, and then through a combination of anti-communist rhetoric and anti-African scare-mongering, included the coloured and Indian parts of the South African population. Today it manifests itself in a return to an ethnic laager which takes the form of attempts at discriminating against non-Afrikaans speakers on the basis of an appeal to victimhood and the exercise of constitutional rights. The African nationalism narrative begins from the mid-1800s, tracing the impact of those educated at missionary schools on the society they came from. This Christian elite came to play a powerful role in establishing a plethora of organisations so that as the wars of resistance were ending, political mobilisation was taking off. This mobilisation took the form of voter registration and voting for those white candidates considered to be acting in the interests of Africans, church congregations as well as newspapers which served as platforms for airing of grievances. A moderate, urbanbased, accommodating form of politics ran parallel to a more militant, rural-based form of resistance. The former would shape the first few decades of the African National Congress until the 1940s, while the latter was subsumed under the rhetoric of the nationalist elite – similar to the experiences of India and the Arab world. / XL2018

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Studies, 2016 / The emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as a new and ‘radical’ political party significantly altered the shape of the political landscape in South Africa. As one of the starting points in this paper, I show how the EFF comes out of a history in the ANCYL before turning attention to public discussions on the organisation. These contemporary debates about the EFF have taken numerous forms, oftentimes in deeply polarised ways - from those who argue that the EFF is pejoratively populist or fascist to arguments that the party is a crucial left alternative. Within the context of these debates, this research paper grapples with the question of the political character of the EFF, ultimately arguing that the EFF is populist. I use, however, a framework for populism set out by Ernesto Laclau thus marking a break with most discussions on the EFF that are often theoretically limited. This research works with both the empirical and the theoretical – in doing this I utilise Michael Burawoy’s ‘extended case method’ to ground the discussion and to provide a method that encompasses the field research – I used semi-structured interviews and participant observation – with a theoretical inquiry. This research is based on the Marikana Branch of the EFF, in the North West Province. In using data from respondents, a number of conclusions about the EFF in Marikana are drawn out around the membership base of the EFF, organisational structures, the relations with other organisations as well as the class, gender and age substance of the party. These conclusions partly stand on their own in building an understanding of the EFF. They are also used in a central discussion around populism in the EFF and the building of a collective political subjectivity that is premised on the popular. In this way, this research works on two interlinked levels that feed into answering questions around the EFF as a new political formation. In line with Burawoy’s method that is used throughout this research, I also outline some of the key limitations of using Laclau’s theory of populism in understanding the EFF and how we move from these limitations through the work presented around the Marikana Branch. / MT2017

South Africa adopted a local integration settlement policy for refugees which formed the basis for the reception of refugees into the country since the early 1990s. This policy also laid the foundation for Refugee legislation that was subsequently developed to deal with the arrival of refugees including the applications for asylum and the processes related thereto. The fact that South Africa decided on a local integration policy in the early 1990s is an anomaly in that many countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region at the time and even now had encampment policies where refugees are kept in camps and have minimal freedom of movement outside camp settlements. Foreign policy sometimes plays a critical role in shaping domestic policy in various spheres. This research study has determined that South Africa’s Foreign Policy Practice both during the transition years between 1991-1994 and post 1994 played a major role in South Africa adopting a human rights based settlement policy for refugees. This was initially informed by South Africa’s desire to show the international community that the country was indeed adopting democratic principles and thus denying any role in the destabilisation in the region. After 1994 South Africa had acceded to international instruments on the protection of refugees without any reservations on the freedom of movement. The focus of the study is on the decision-making process that led to the signing of both the 1991 Memorandum of Understanding and the 1993 Basic Agreement between South Africa and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and subsequent adoption of the Refugees Act in 1998 to establish the role played by foreign policy and other foreign policy factors in the final decision of adopting local integration. Findings from this research further highlight the role of civic actors for both the pre and post 1994 periods. The study has implications for other countries in the region and beyond which are promoting democratic principles while curtailing the right to freedom of movement for refugees.

Much of the academic - and popular - literature on the South African negotiations process focuses on the two principal players, the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party Government. A significant number of other political groupings were vying for influence at this time and although they would not fare well electorally in 1994, their influence and also their symbolic importance has been overlooked. Four groupings that have found themselves on the margins of the South African transition are the subject of this thesis: The white right wing (Afrikaner Volksunie, the Conservative Party, the Freedom Front); the homelands (in particular Bophuthatswana, KwaZulu and Transkei), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). All four of these political groupings were deeply involved in the transition process and critically, offered very different options and scenarios for the future. These included alternative visions of a federal South African state, a more independent judiciary, stronger provincial powers and greater degrees of cultural and territorial self-determination. For some of the parties - notably the PAC- the compromises reached in the constitution around property rights were unacceptable. In the case of the PAC, Inkatha and some far-right Afrikaner groupings, there was a turn to violence - even if not always sanctioned by leadership - that had an important impact on conditioning the settlement. The differing trajectories and prescriptions of these groupings offer up important lessons regarding the history of the negotiations period, the potential for alternative pathways during this time as well as the deficiencies of the current constitutional order. The histories of these marginal groupings on the sidelines of a historic settlement speak to longstanding fault lines in South Africa's political discourse, including the role and salience of liberalism, socialism and ethno-nationalism in the post-apartheid era.

The aim of the government' s state of emergency in June 1986 was to try and bring the country under control through the use of force. Tens of thousands of people were detained, and many were tilled. At the same time, the government has been building a National Security Management System (NSMS). This is a series of structures throughout South Africa, designed to defend apartheid. The main type of structure is called a Joint Management Centre (JHC). Before we explain what a JMC is and what it does, it is useful to know where the idea for a National Security Management System comes from.

The South African Parliament has set up a programme to inform and educate the public about Parliament and to build democracy. Our country has only recently become a democracy. Previously, people were not allowed to vote nor participate in making decisions that affected their lives. Organisations such as Parliament were not open and did not answer to the public. As a result, the majority of the people do not have the experience and the skills to participate in the new democracy. This places a major challenge on all those who are committed to developing democracy in the country. The growing democratic culture can only be built upon if the public participate in issues that affect them. This requires that people are made aware of what is happening in organisations like Parliament and understand how they can become involved. People need to know how to raise their concerns when decisions affecting them are being taken. Once decisions are made, the public should be informed about their rights and responsibilities and how to hold government accountable. In building a democratic culture, the right of individuals to hold differing political views must be promoted. Parliament, as a national representative body, has a responsibility to contribute to deepening the democracy we have achieved. To do this the public education programme that has been set up will: * inform people about what happens in Parliament and about democracy generally; * educate people about how Parliament and democracy work and about their rights and responsibilities; * motivate people to participate in democratic processes and engage with decision making bodies, especially Parliament; and’ * promote a culture of democracy and human rights. To achieve the above, the Public Education Department (PED) has been established to coordinate the implementation of the programme. The PED will undertake a number of activities including workshops, public meetings, the distribution of publications and audiovisuals. campaigns, outreach to the youth and educational tours of Parliament. In undertaking the programme. Parliament will work closely with Provincial Legislatures, Government Departments, civil society and the media. To consult with these agencies and to build support for the programme, a national conference will be held early next year. Prior to this conference, preparatory conferences will be held in each province. The provincial conferences will also design strategies for outreach to the different sectors within the province and plan for the implementation of joint activities. Parliament calls on all members of the public, organisations and the different sectors of society to become actively involved in the programme and the drive to deepen democracy in our country. Individuals and organisations requiring more information or wanting to make an input into the programme can telephone the PED on (021) 403 2460.

Here the agreement between these two Ministers comes to an abrupt end. For while Dr. Koornhof says categorically that the only honourable way in which to do this, is by developing the resources of the homelands, Mr. Froneman states equally categorically that it is no part of the white man's duty to do so. Dr. Koornhof speaks of the moral and altruistic elements in the policy of separate development. Mr. Froneman speaks in the harshest and most callous terms of millions of "surplus" Africans, who must be sent back to their homelands, no matter what awaits them there. He says that African labourers in "white" areas must not be burdened with "superfluous appendages", such as wives, children, and dependents who could not provide service. These two men are in the same Cabinet. If one has been rebuked, it was done in private. And if it was done, it was no doubt done in a semi-jocular manner — "Fronnie, old boy, we all know what you mean, but you must learn to talk prettily." These two men do not represent two irreconcilable wings of the Nationalist Party, they represent the two essential elements of the policy of separate development. And these two elements are essential to each other. Either by itself would be dangerous. Either by itself would be unacceptable. Neither Mr. Froneman nor Dr. Koornhof has reached the stage when one cannot bear to be in the same Cabinet as the other. Although each of these two elements and each of these prototypes, is essential to the other, they do not co-exist in perfect harmony. The one is a naked baas, the other is a bass clothed in soft raiment. The first thinks the second is a sissy, the second thinks the first is a barbarian. They do not say so publicly, but their newspapers do, and that is not good. In the absence of any official pronouncement we must assume that they have been told that the sissy and the barbarian are essential to one another. The sissy will get the barbarian into nice company, the barbarian will protect the sissy if the nice company turns nasty. Why is it that although the barbarian and the sissy do not co-exist in harmony, they are (in spite of the dreams of rift-seekers) essential, the one to the other? Why do the callousness and the altruism not go to civil war? The answer is that neither of them is a fundamental. They are both imposed on something that is fundamental, and that is the preservation of white supremacy (which can be more gently called self-preservation, a soft word that turns wrath in some circles). Neither the callousness nor the altruism is part of the deep monolithic core. The cracks can show, the paint can peel, the fragments can flake off, but the core remains untouched. In times of ease (such as the present), one sees and hears and reads much of the cracking and the fragmentation. In times of danger (which will come), one is conscious of the monolithic core, which is like an ironwood heart in a softwood tree. If we accept the view that Mr. Froneman and Dr. Koornhof have something deep and fundamental in common, is there therefore nothing to choose between them? Or are Dr. Koornhof and his kind, bearers of hope for the future? For Mr. Froneman and his kind certainly are not. Their dream of the total separation of the races, if one chooses to dignfiy it by the use of such a term, is a dream which must be realised at whatever cost, and the cost will be the bitterness, and inevitably the hatred, of millions of Africans towards the white masters who make such heartless use of their power. It is claimed by our rulers that such bitterness does not exist except in the imaginations of sentimentalists and agitators, and it is true that the patience of Africans appears to be infinite. It takes a train disaster to strip the mask from the smiling face. Are Dr. Koornhof and his kind, bearers of hope for the future? Like Mr. Froneman, Dr. Koornhof believes in the policy of separate development. He does not attempt to conceal that this is to be done in the interests of self- preservation. If the homelands are developed, then more and more Africans will leave "white" South Africa to return to the places from which they were driven by the need for work, money, and food. Although Dr. Koornhof did not say so, it is justifiable to infer that he believes that white South Africa will be more secure if it sheds itself of its Africans, surplus or otherwise. There will be no competition in the labour market, no crime by rootless young black men in the beautiful white suburbs, and most important of all, no night of the long knife. But Dr. Koornhof wants this transformation to be made with justice. There must be work and food and hope in the homelands, and they must be helped to achieve autonomy, political and cultural and economic. It is the economic autonomy that poses the greatest difficulty. Even if it does not mean economic independence, it should mean a healthy economic relationship with "white" South Africa. This is where Mr. Froneman parts company with Dr. Koornhof. And this is where REALITY parts company with Dr. Koornhof too. The recognition that there can he no political and cultural autonomy unless there is at least a healthy relationship with “white” South Africa, is for REALITY a recognition by its political opponents that there are moral considera' tions which transcend those of naed self-preservation. These considerations were blue-printed (inadequately) by Professor Tomlinson in the ninteen- fifties, inexplicably ignored by Dr, Verwoerd (his biographer may one day explain why), and are now, in 1969, alternately honoured and dismissed by a two-tongued Cabinet. In any case REALITY rejects the Tomlinson or any other similar blueprint. The wealth of “white” South Africa was created by all of us jointly, and it belongs to all those who created is. / Journal includes vol. 1 no. 2 to vol. 1 no. 6 ; vol 2 no. 1 to vol. 2 no. 6 and vol. 3 no. 1 to vol. 3 no. 6 / Vol. 2 no. 3 is missing

Our Constitution says that South Africa must have an independent body, called Parliament, to make the laws of the country. Parliament is made up of our political representatives who are called Members of Parliament (MPs). We choose the MPs by voting in elections. Parliament has two main parts, called the Houses of Parliament. They are the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The MPs discuss and debate the new laws and make changes to existing laws. Parliament also has many committees where they discuss the laws in detail. Members of Parliament also make sure that the government departments do their work properly. / Funded by the European Union

This the second Worker-Tenant thus sees the light in a period wherein the ruling class, having shackled the newly independent states on the border can now move swiftly to win over those sections of the black middle class or the upper sections or the black working class prepared to accept the crumbs called the NEW DISPENSATION. At the same time the workers, the creators of the wealth of this country, are being faced with new onslaughts which further erode their already miserable living standards. But it would be false to see only doom and despair. The very necessity (from the ruler’s point of view) for a NEW DEAL, the very array of self-ordained "people’s" leaders which have suddenly emerged and the very fact that many of these have been forced to borrow from the language of the workers’ movement shows that the workers remain undaunted. And it is to the successful struggle of the workers’ movement for the right to run our lives that the WORKER-TENANT would like to add its voice. / No. 2