L'administration du système de santé s'est profondément renouvelée avec l'instauration d'agences sanitaires. La mise en place de l'ARS en 2009 participe à l'unification de l'action sanitaire au niveau régional qui faisait défaut sous l'emprise de l'ARH. L'introduction de l'ARS ne traduit qu'une simplification apparente du dispositif de l'action sanitaire, à la confluence du modèle de l'agence sanitaire et de l'Administration territoriale de l'Etat. Cette nouvelle agence apparait alors comme une agence territoriale inédite qui trouve une expression particulière dans son intervention sur le système de santé. L'appropriation des instruments de la régulation par l'ARS, incarnée par le contrat atteste d'un renouvellement des procédés de l'action sanitaire. L'ARS procède à une régulation territoriale du système de santé qui présente un caractère original. Cette rénovation de l'action sanitaire est pour autant loin d'être achevée. Les rapports entre l'ARS et les établissements publics de santé expriment cette efficacité contrastée des modes d'administration du système de santé. Le cumul de fonctions attribué à l'ARS nuit à la lisibilité et l'efficacité de son intervention sur le système de santé. L'ARS devra disposer d'une autonomie accrue pour s'imposer comme le régulateur privilégié du système de santé / The administration of the health care system was deeply changed with the introduction of health agencies. The implementation of the ARS in 2009 contributes to unify the health action at the local level, what was missing under the influence of the ARH. The introduction of the ARS solely expresses a supposed simplification of the health care system, at the confluence of a classic health agency and of a local administration of the State. This new agency appears then as an unprecedented territorial agency what is proved by its intervention on the health care system. The appropriation of regulating instruments by this agency, which can be embodied in the contract, shows a renewal in health action. The ARS carries out a local regulation of health system which is original. This reform of health action is far away from being completed. Relationships between the ARS and public health institutions reveal this partial efficiency. The addition of functions awarded to the ARS harms the readability and the efficiency of its intervention on the health care system. The ARS has to be self-sufficient to become the main regulator of the health care system

Thesis advisor: Andrea Heberlein / Expressions of empathy are considered a core component of a physician’s treatment of their patients. It is imperative to the establishment of open communication, which aids in facilitating a good interpersonal relationship, exchanging information and making treatment-related decisions. Although empathy is widely viewed as essential, it is also commonly viewed as burdensome. We propose that empathy can be divided based on the characteristics in which we evaluate another’s mind. Previous research indicates that we attribute mental capacities based on two distinct dimensions: experience and agency, described as the capacity to feel and the capacity to act, respectively. By dividing physician empathy into an understanding of a patient’s feelings and an understanding of a patient’s goals, it may be possible to extract what we are assuming to be the emotionally taxing component by focusing just on the patient’s agency. 270 participants were surveyed regarding their opinions of their physician’s communication in an attempt to identify trends within demographic populations for preferences for goal-directed or emotional empathy. Results indicate significant effects of age, gender and combined income. As age and combined income increase, appreciation for agency-related communication decreases. Females also expressed significantly higher appreciation for an experience-related style of communication. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology.

This thesis explores the everyday lives and dreams of young people living in urban poverty in Thailand, focusing on their practices and aspirations within three key spheres of action. In recent years, a number of emerging bodies of literature have taken youth in the developing world as the objects of their analysis; the literature on youth in Thailand, studies of youth and development within the Thai and international spheres, and the new anthropology of youth each focus on the lives of young people – social, cultural and economic – and see youth as active agents in the creation of society, culture and the economy. This thesis, drawing on the analysis of ethnographic data, contends that each of these bodies of literature constructs young people in partial or misleading ways, and in particular that insufficient emphasis is placed on the unintended consequences that can ensue from everyday practice and the pursuit of dreams. It argues that if these emerging literatures on youth in the developing world are to adequately conceptualise and represent young people, then they must attend to these unintended consequences. As the thesis will demonstrate, doing so facilitates analysis of the ways in which different spheres of action affect each other, of the structures that constrain and enable young people, and of the way in which attempting to participate in dominant cultures can have profoundly counter-productive outcomes. The thesis also explores some of the methodological processes involved in immersion in, and withdrawal from, „the field‟. It argues that one of the tasks of social research is to bring out the multiple and shifting nature of interpretation, and to be explicit about the contexts in which such interpretations are produced.

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to explain how the theory of action found in Anscombe's Intention can be modified to deliver a plausible account of non-human animal agency (henceforth, animal agency). More specifically, it is an attempt to develop her account in a way that respects the Aristotelian insight that animals act in ways that differ, in certain fundamental respects, from the processes of growth and self-maintenance found in plants, on the one hand, and the self-conscious actions characteristic of mature human beings, on the other. The negative aim is to show that the theory of action that constitutes the received backdrop in the study of animal minds is ill-suited for the task. This is what I call the Standard Approach to Animal Agency and, despite its widespread acceptance in comparative psychology, cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of animal minds, I argue that it faces serious problems. This thesis divides roughly into two halves corresponding to these respective aims. In the first half I argue against the Standard Approach. Amongst other things, I suggest that the theory suffers from a tendency to take the notion of action for granted. The result is an oversimplified metaphysics that is ill-prepared to account for the fact that the activities characteristic of animal life are instrumentally structured processes. In the constructive half of the thesis I develop an Anscombean alternative that takes the structure of action as its starting point. On this view, expressions of animal agency are understood as a distinctive kind of material process. After explaining Anscombe's account of intentional action, I adapt and develop these ideas into a theory of animal agency.

Recently a number of philosophers have begun to promote what are broadly referred to as attributionist or real self views of moral responsibility. According these views a person is responsible for a thing just in case it is indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or "world-directed" attitudes. These philosophers have focused a great deal of attention on dissolving the apparent tension between our commonsense intuitions concerning the connection between control and responsibility, on the one hand, and our lack of voluntary control over our values, beliefs and attitudes on the other. In attempting to relieve this tension, many of them have introduced various forms of non-voluntary control or agency we are said to exercise with respect to things such as our values, beliefs and attitudes. I argue that these supposed forms of non-voluntary agency are untenable because they typically rest on a failure to adequately distinguish between two ways in which we make up our minds; in short, they rest on a failure to adequately distinguish theoretical from practical reasoning. Once certain fundamental differences between theoretical and practical reasoning are brought back to the fore of the discussion, it becomes much harder to sustain some sort of unique species of agency that can be said to apply to beliefs and certain other world-directed attitudes. Without such forms of non-voluntary agency, however, proponents of attributionists accounts of moral responsibility seem to face a dilemma; they must either: sneak volition in through the backdoor or commit to holding people responsible for things with respect to which they are passive. The thesis falls into four main sections. In the first section, I introduce the problem by describing an ongoing debate between defenders of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility and defenders of what have been termed volitionist accounts of moral responsibility. In the second section, I explicate Pamela Hieronymi's construal of the form of non-voluntary agency she calls "evaluative control." In section three, I critique Hieronymi's account of evaluative control by pointing to two predominant points of divergence between theoretical and practical reasoning. In the fourth section, I examine the upshots of the absence of non-voluntary for attributionist accounts of moral responsibility; I do so by examining each horn of the dilemma mentioned above.

Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of institutional owners in the life of the firm and have sought to explain how and when these owners influence firm-level strategies. In spite of evidence that these owners can and do affect broad strategies, there is little empirical support for the extent to which institutional investors involve themselves at the level of strategic competitive actions that firms undertake. This raises the question: "How do different types of institutional investors affect strategic competitive activity between firms?" Further, owners have a unique bearing on competitive activity insofar as they can simultaneously influence firms that are competing with each other. Therefore another important question is: "How are the relationships between institutional investors and strategic competitive activity affected when those investors hold stakes in both the focal firm and their competitor?" Borrowing from the accounting literature, this dissertation classifies institutional owners into three groups based on their historical trading behavior: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer. Findings from examination of the ownership holdings and strategic competitive activity of thirty-six Fortune 500 rivalries over the years 1997-2006 provide insight into these questions. High levels of dedicated institutional ownership are associated with greater strategic competitive activity whereas high transient institutional ownership is associated with low strategic competitive activity. The relationship between dedicated ownership and strategic competitive activity is moderated by common ownership of a focal firm and its rival. As dedicated ownership of the focal firm and its rival increase together, strategic competitive activity is reduced. The results presented here change the way we apply agency theory to explain firm governance. For competitive dynamics researchers, this study points to a previously unexplored means by which firms are motivated to engage, or not engage, in competitive activity. This study also has broad implications for managers, investors, and policymakers.

Universiẗat, Diss.--Ulm, 1990. / Literaturverz. S. 173 - 180.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität St. Gallen, 1996.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Saarbrücken, 2003.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Mannheim, 1998.