Univ., Diss.--Basel, 2001.

Agency theory, which discusses the conflict between agent and principle, was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. Owing to the separation of ownership and management, shareholders and management authority have agency relationship. The one reason that shareholder hand in company affairs to management authority is that management authority has better management ability. Another reason is that shareholder cannot handle by himself for some reasons and must hand in to other people. Management authority has the advantage of information and they also seek for their own interest. But these behaviors may damage shareholder¡¦s right and agency problems occur in the situation. Agency problems occur not only between shareholder and management authority but also between management authority and lender in a company with debt. Shareholders often supervise management authority more strictly and make more rules to confine management authority in order to reduce agency problem or protect their own interest. But these actions disturb management authority when management authority is full of ambitions and endeavor. If agency problems between shareholder and management authority cannot be solved properly, it will make company operate abnormally and damage the nation¡¦s economic further. On the contrary earning forecast can reduce information asymmetry. If management authority can disclose earning forecast voluntarily, it is helpful to reduce the agency problem and the information asymmetry between shareholder and management authority. The article assumes management authority disclose earning forecast voluntarily in order to get shareholder and debtor¡¦s trust in this point of view and use firm size¡Bfree cash flow¡Bleverage as the proxy of agency cost. In this research we find that the more debt the company have, the higher voluntarily the company discloses earning forecast. It is the same as we expect. But free cast flow is not significant. When firm size is bigger, the management authority is less voluntary to disclose earning forecast. The result is contrary to the view of agency problem.

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Univ., Diss.--Copenhagen, 2005. / Enth. 4 Beitr.

Univ., Diss.--München, 2003.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T11:13:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_7929_Dissertação Isaac Final-PDF.pdf: 1685206 bytes, checksum: cd0df1926926f53e9e7e4d8b252da08a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-24 / O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a relação existente entre remuneração executiva e desempenho em companhias brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. A linha teórica parte do pressuposto que o contrato de incentivos corrobora com o alinhamento de interesses entre acionistas e executivos e atua como um mecanismo de governança corporativa a fim de direcionar os esforços dos executivos para maximização de valor da companhia. A amostra foi composta pelas 100 companhias mais líquidas listadas em quantidade de negociações de ações na BM&FBOVESPA durante o período 2010-2012, totalizando 296 observações. Os dados foram extraídos dos Formulários de Referência disponibilizados pela CVM e a partir dos softwares Economática® e Thomson Reuters ®. Foram estabelecidas oito hipóteses de pesquisa e estimados modelos de regressão linear múltipla com a técnica de dados em painel desbalanceado, empregando como variável dependente a remuneração total e a remuneração média individual e como regressores variáveis concernentes ao desempenho operacional, valor de mercado, tamanho, estrutura de propriedade, governança corporativa, além de variáveis de controle. Para verificar os fatores que explicam a utilização de stock options, programa de bônus e maior percentual de remuneração variável foram estimados modelos de regressão logit. Os resultados demonstram que, na amostra selecionada, existe relação positiva entre remuneração executiva e valor de mercado. Verificou-se também que os setores de mineração, química, petróleo e gás exercem influência positiva na remuneração executiva. Não obstante, exerce relação inversa com a remuneração total à concentração acionária, o controle acionário público e o fato da companhia pertencer ao nível 2 ou novo mercado conforme classificação da BMF&BOVESPA. O maior valor de mercado influencia na utilização de stock options, assim como no emprego de bônus, sendo que este também é impactado pelo maior desempenho contábil. Foram empregados também testes de robustez com estimações por efeitos aleatórios, regressões com erros-padrão robustos clusterizados, modelos dinâmicos e os resultados foram similares. Desse modo, conclui-se que há indícios de que a remuneração executiva e os planos de incentivos estão relacionados com a maximização de valor da companhia, a despeito o desempenho operacional apresentou associação negativa com a remuneração executiva.

M.Com. (International Accounting) / Without me trying to rewrite history or steal the thunder from many historians, it was William Pollard who said: “without change there is no innovation, creativity, or incentive for improvement. Those who initiate change will have a better opportunity to manage the change that is inevitable” (Brainyquote, 2014). In the words of the famous George Bernard Shaw, “progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything” (Brainyquote, 2014). These truths equally apply to accounting practice. Over the past few years, many factors have contributed to changes in accounting practice.

During the last decades we have seen a growing number of new start-ups in the service/knowledge sector. These types of companies often have no fiscal assets to secure loans with. What types of financing alternatives are there in those situations? I will in this thesis show that there are two directions to choose between to get financial support. By gathering of information I have been able to show that there are more than one alternative to consider when needing funding and that using different alternatives will lead to different results. I will not say which one is the right one, but that there are different ways and there will be different outcomes depending on which one you choose. The study also shows that there are a lot of things you need to take into consideration before using a venture capitalist. An empirical study is made between two companies that decided to use different ways to get the financial support they required. The result shown in this study is that the entrepreneurs own financial situation affect what direction the entrepreneur will take.

In the next five-to-ten years, Generation Y (born between 1979 and 1994) will be the largestgroup in Chinese firms. This generation is better educated and has unique characteristics.However, most of Chinese firms still employ a classic control system in management process.We argue that unless companies take MCSs as a package and consider HRM in the wholemanagement process, they cannot reduce the agency conflict with highly-educated Generation Yemployees. In order to reduce the agency conflict, the key thing is to identify the motivationsamong highly-educated Generation Y. This research firstly reviews the extrinsic and intrinsicmotivations based on the relevant studies. Then through the in-depth interviews with HR andmiddle managers, we find the special opinions of HR and middle managers in Chinese firms.After that, we design a questionnaire and conduct a survey. Our study identifies that themotivation scales among the Chinese highly educated Generation Y are different from those inthe theoretical studies, and the most important scale for Generation Y is Reward, Personal fit andSelf-fulfillment. Besides, the 1980s and 1990s groups have significantly different requirementsfrom the work environment. Our research indicates that companies should take the ten scales ofmotivations into consideration in the whole process of management control, and supervisorsshould know the motivations of their employees, thereby avoiding misunderstanding.