Uma das bases do sistema de franquias é a relação entre franqueado e franqueador. O franqueador, proprietário da marca, é responsável pela formatação do negócio e por formar as bases de uma rede padronizada, um dos pilares desse tipo de sistema. O franqueado desempenha o papel de manter a sua unidade segundo os preceitos e modelos impostos pela franqueadora. A rede pode se prejudicar por decisão de franqueados que não se engajam e apresentam comportamento diferente. A pergunta que orientou o trabalho foi: O que leva os franqueados a não se engajarem na rede de franquia? Para responder a pergunta foi elaborado um modelo de fatores que influenciam no engajamento e que serviram de base para o objetivo da tese - buscar os fatores que influenciam os franqueados a não se engajarem. O estudo apresenta a relação entre os agentes envolvidos, aprofundando os conceitos da teoria da agência em franquia, principalmente na escolha de novos parceiros e na manutenção dos atuais. Além disso, verifica-se a importância de fatores comportamentais, tais como pró-atividade e capacidade de adaptação e não apenas dos econômicos, usualmente considerados pelos franqueadores. Para a elaboração da tese utilizou-se a Theory Building from Cases (Teoria Baseada em Casos), estudando franqueados de três redes de franquia estabelecidas com mais de dez anos de atuação que totalizam por volta de 400 franqueados em seus quadros (setenta, noventa e duzentas e trinta unidades respectivamente). Para a elaboração da tese foram realizadas 37 entrevistas (3 franqueados; 8 consultores de campo; 24 franqueados e 2 entrevistas teste) totalizando mais de 60 horas de entrevistas. Qualitativo e exploratório, o estudo comparou franqueados engajados e não engajados por meio de dados primários se utilizando das técnicas de analise de conteúdo por meio do software MAXQDA12. O estudo, que partiu de trinta fatores de influência, apresenta um modelo de não engajamento de franqueados de seis fatores, divididos em duas dimensões, Franqueador: Problemas de Comunicação, Falta de Supervisão e Monitoramento e Influência na Rentabilidade e; Franqueado: Pouca Capacidade de Adaptação, Não Conhecimento do Sistema e Baixa Pró-Atividade. Esses fatores dificultam a construção da confiança no franqueador e problemas de agência. Destaca-se que a falta de comunicação com a equipe pode ser um fator desencadeante desse processo, um gatilho desse não engajamento. Na tese também fica claro que o nível de empreendedorismo pretendido pelas franqueadoras para seus franqueados ainda é algo difícil de mensurar e não muito claro. / One of the franchising foundations is the relationship between franchisee and franchisor. The franchisor, brand owner, is responsible for formatting the business and establishing the bases of a standardized franchised chain, one of the pillars of this type of system. The franchisee plays the role of keeping its unit according to the precepts and models imposed by the franchisor. The franchise chain may be harmed by franchisees who decide not to engage and present different behavior. The question that guided the work was: What leads franchisees not to engage in the franchise chain? In order to answer this question, a model of factors that influence engagement was developed. It served as basis for the purpose of the thesis, which is to look for the factors that influence franchisees not to engage. The study presents the relationship between the agents involved, deepening the concepts of the agency theory in franchising, mainly regarding the choice of new partners and maintenance of the current ones; moreover, the importance of behavioral factors is verified as well, such as, proactivity and adaptability and not only the economic ones which are usually considered by franchisors. In order to elaborate the thesis 37 interviews were conducted (3 franchisees, 8 franchise field consultants, 24 franchisees and 2 test) totaling more than 60 hours of material. Qualitative and exploratory, the study compared engaged and not engaged franchisees through primary data using content analysis techniques by operating MAXQDA12 software. The study, which started off from thirty influence factors, presents a six-factor model of franchisees non-engagement, divided into the following two dimensions: Franchisor (Communication Problems, Lack of Supervision and Monitoring and Influence on Profitability) and Franchisee (Poor Adaptability, No Knowledge of the System and Low Pro-Activity). These factors hinder confidence building in the franchiser resulting in agency issues. It is accentuated that the lack of team communication can be an initiating factor to this process, a trigger of this nonengagement problem. In this thesis it is also clear that the entrepreneurship level intended by franchisors to their franchisees is still something very difficult to measure and it is very unclear.

A política de dividendos é um tema amplamente pesquisado no Brasil e no mundo ao longo de várias décadas. Consequentemente, inúmeras teorias foram desenvolvidas para explicar esse assunto. Contudo, recentemente, o arcabouço da Teoria de Agência tem proporcionado novas descobertas sobre os fatores que influenciam as políticas de dividendos das empresas. Especificamente, foram propostas teorias que sugerem que os dividendos refletem boas práticas de governança corporativa, tornando a distribuição de proventos um complemento à proteção legal do acionista. Em contrapartida, em um ambiente com proteção mais fraca e regras menos rígidas de governança, a distribuição de dividendos atua de maneira substituta à essa carência de proteção. No Brasil, devido às características legais mais frágeis quando comparada com mercados como o Norte Americano e do Reino Unido, seria esperado uma situação na qual os dividendos fossem substitutos à proteção oferecida pelos padrões de governança. Entretanto, pesquisas relacionadas à América Latina, aos mercados emergentes e, mais especificamente, ao mercado brasileiro, têm apontado para situações diferentes do que é apontado pela teoria, mas não de maneira unânime. Além disso, considerando o ambiente institucional brasileiro, de elevada concentração de propriedade, estudos anteriores não conseguiram determinar de que forma esse fenômeno influencia a política de dividendos das companhias. Assim, para contribuir com essa discussão, este trabalho investiga conjuntamente como a governança corporativa e a concentração de propriedade afetam as políticas de dividendos das empresas brasileiras. Esta pesquisa abrangeu 171 empresas no período de 2008 a 2017. De maneira inédita, foi utilizada como variável dependente o valor total dos dividendos dividido pelo patrimônio líquido. Os resultados das estimações por efeitos fixos com erros-padrão robustos por empresas mostraram uma relação positiva entre as proxys para governança corporativa e concentração de propriedade com a distribuição de dividendos. Como contribuições adicionais, foi mostrado que os resultados da estimação com a variável dependente dividendos pelo patrimônio líquido são melhores que os resultados da estimação com a variável dependente payout. Também foi identificado que a propriedade dispersa e altamente concentrada afetam positivamente e de maneira mais intensa a distribuição de dividendos, em comparação com outros níveis de propriedade do maior acionista / The dividend policy is a widely researched topic in Brazil and the world over several decades. Consequently, numerous theories have been developed to explain this subject. However, recently, the Agency Theory framework has provided new insights into the factors that influence corporate dividend policies. Specifically, theories have been proposed that suggest that dividends reflect good corporate governance practices, making the distribution of proceeds a complement to shareholder legal protection. On the other hand, in an environment with weaker protection and less rigid rules of governance, the distribution of dividends acts in a substitute way to this lack of protection. In Brazil, due to the more fragile legal characteristics when compared to markets such as the United States and the United Kingdom, a situation in which dividends would be a substitute for the protection offered by governance standards would be expected. However, research related to Latin America, emerging markets and, more specifically, the Brazilian market, have pointed to different situations than is pointed out by theory, but not unanimously. Moreover, considering the Brazilian institutional environment, with a high concentration of ownership, previous studies have not been able to determine how this phenomenon influences the companies\' dividend policy. Thus, to contribute to this discussion, this work investigates jointly how corporate governance and concentration of ownership affect the dividend policies of Brazilian companies. This survey covered 171 companies in the period from 2008 to 2017. In an unprecedented way, the total amount of dividends divided by shareholders\' equity was used as the dependent variable. The results of fixed-effect estimate with robust standard errors by companies showed a positive relationship between the proxies for corporate governance and concentration of ownership with the distribution of dividends. As additional contributions, it was shown that the results of the estimation with the dependent variable dividends by the equity are better than the results of the estimation with the dependent variable payout. It has also been identified that dispersed and highly concentrated ownership positively and more sharply affect the distribution of dividends as compared to other ownership levels of the largest shareholder

A presente dissertação parte de uma análise dos principais corpos regulatórios nacionais e internacionais da governança corporativa para buscar os traços essenciais que caracterizam tal sistema. Uma vez identificados os traços essenciais a partir dos elementos regulatórios, passa o texto a analisar os elementos caracterizadores da governança corporativa por meio das principais disposições doutrinárias sobre o tema. Após estabelecido um conceito funcional de governança corporativa, busca-se compreender as bases econômicas que originaram e auxiliaram no desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa. A partir deste ponto são levantadas as principais Indagações acerca do funcionamento do mercado em um ambiente de informações assimétricas, ressaltando-se o impacto advindo dos agency costs. Finalmente, após levantados os problemas relacionados à assimetria de informação, essencialmente focados no agency problem, se propõe a dissertação a vincular o desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa à mitigação dos problemas de assimetria de informação. / The present work starts from an analysis of the main national and international regulatory provisions in connection to corporate governance searching for the essential traces that characterize such system. Once the essential traces are identified by means of the regulatory elements, the dissertation moves on to analyze the characterizing elements of corporate governance through the main academic considerations on the subject. After a concept of corporate governance is reached, the intent of the works shifts to comprehending the economic basis that have originated and further developed the corporate governance system. From this point forward, the dissertation addresses the main questions on the working of markets under asymmetric information, mainly taking into consideration the impacts arising from the agency costs. Finally, after the problems related to asymmetric information are addressed, basically related to agency problems, the work deals with the objective of bonding the development of the corporate governance system with the reduction of the problems arising from asymmetric information.

A política de dividendos é um tema amplamente pesquisado no Brasil e no mundo ao longo de várias décadas. Consequentemente, inúmeras teorias foram desenvolvidas para explicar esse assunto. Contudo, recentemente, o arcabouço da Teoria de Agência tem proporcionado novas descobertas sobre os fatores que influenciam as políticas de dividendos das empresas. Especificamente, foram propostas teorias que sugerem que os dividendos refletem boas práticas de governança corporativa, tornando a distribuição de proventos um complemento à proteção legal do acionista. Em contrapartida, em um ambiente com proteção mais fraca e regras menos rígidas de governança, a distribuição de dividendos atua de maneira substituta à essa carência de proteção. No Brasil, devido às características legais mais frágeis quando comparada com mercados como o Norte Americano e do Reino Unido, seria esperado uma situação na qual os dividendos fossem substitutos à proteção oferecida pelos padrões de governança. Entretanto, pesquisas relacionadas à América Latina, aos mercados emergentes e, mais especificamente, ao mercado brasileiro, têm apontado para situações diferentes do que é apontado pela teoria, mas não de maneira unânime. Além disso, considerando o ambiente institucional brasileiro, de elevada concentração de propriedade, estudos anteriores não conseguiram determinar de que forma esse fenômeno influencia a política de dividendos das companhias. Assim, para contribuir com essa discussão, este trabalho investiga conjuntamente como a governança corporativa e a concentração de propriedade afetam as políticas de dividendos das empresas brasileiras. Esta pesquisa abrangeu 171 empresas no período de 2008 a 2017. De maneira inédita, foi utilizada como variável dependente o valor total dos dividendos dividido pelo patrimônio líquido. Os resultados das estimações por efeitos fixos com erros-padrão robustos por empresas mostraram uma relação positiva entre as proxys para governança corporativa e concentração de propriedade com a distribuição de dividendos. Como contribuições adicionais, foi mostrado que os resultados da estimação com a variável dependente dividendos pelo patrimônio líquido são melhores que os resultados da estimação com a variável dependente payout. Também foi identificado que a propriedade dispersa e altamente concentrada afetam positivamente e de maneira mais intensa a distribuição de dividendos, em comparação com outros níveis de propriedade do maior acionista / The dividend policy is a widely researched topic in Brazil and the world over several decades. Consequently, numerous theories have been developed to explain this subject. However, recently, the Agency Theory framework has provided new insights into the factors that influence corporate dividend policies. Specifically, theories have been proposed that suggest that dividends reflect good corporate governance practices, making the distribution of proceeds a complement to shareholder legal protection. On the other hand, in an environment with weaker protection and less rigid rules of governance, the distribution of dividends acts in a substitute way to this lack of protection. In Brazil, due to the more fragile legal characteristics when compared to markets such as the United States and the United Kingdom, a situation in which dividends would be a substitute for the protection offered by governance standards would be expected. However, research related to Latin America, emerging markets and, more specifically, the Brazilian market, have pointed to different situations than is pointed out by theory, but not unanimously. Moreover, considering the Brazilian institutional environment, with a high concentration of ownership, previous studies have not been able to determine how this phenomenon influences the companies\' dividend policy. Thus, to contribute to this discussion, this work investigates jointly how corporate governance and concentration of ownership affect the dividend policies of Brazilian companies. This survey covered 171 companies in the period from 2008 to 2017. In an unprecedented way, the total amount of dividends divided by shareholders\' equity was used as the dependent variable. The results of fixed-effect estimate with robust standard errors by companies showed a positive relationship between the proxies for corporate governance and concentration of ownership with the distribution of dividends. As additional contributions, it was shown that the results of the estimation with the dependent variable dividends by the equity are better than the results of the estimation with the dependent variable payout. It has also been identified that dispersed and highly concentrated ownership positively and more sharply affect the distribution of dividends as compared to other ownership levels of the largest shareholder

Uma das bases do sistema de franquias é a relação entre franqueado e franqueador. O franqueador, proprietário da marca, é responsável pela formatação do negócio e por formar as bases de uma rede padronizada, um dos pilares desse tipo de sistema. O franqueado desempenha o papel de manter a sua unidade segundo os preceitos e modelos impostos pela franqueadora. A rede pode se prejudicar por decisão de franqueados que não se engajam e apresentam comportamento diferente. A pergunta que orientou o trabalho foi: O que leva os franqueados a não se engajarem na rede de franquia? Para responder a pergunta foi elaborado um modelo de fatores que influenciam no engajamento e que serviram de base para o objetivo da tese - buscar os fatores que influenciam os franqueados a não se engajarem. O estudo apresenta a relação entre os agentes envolvidos, aprofundando os conceitos da teoria da agência em franquia, principalmente na escolha de novos parceiros e na manutenção dos atuais. Além disso, verifica-se a importância de fatores comportamentais, tais como pró-atividade e capacidade de adaptação e não apenas dos econômicos, usualmente considerados pelos franqueadores. Para a elaboração da tese utilizou-se a Theory Building from Cases (Teoria Baseada em Casos), estudando franqueados de três redes de franquia estabelecidas com mais de dez anos de atuação que totalizam por volta de 400 franqueados em seus quadros (setenta, noventa e duzentas e trinta unidades respectivamente). Para a elaboração da tese foram realizadas 37 entrevistas (3 franqueados; 8 consultores de campo; 24 franqueados e 2 entrevistas teste) totalizando mais de 60 horas de entrevistas. Qualitativo e exploratório, o estudo comparou franqueados engajados e não engajados por meio de dados primários se utilizando das técnicas de analise de conteúdo por meio do software MAXQDA12. O estudo, que partiu de trinta fatores de influência, apresenta um modelo de não engajamento de franqueados de seis fatores, divididos em duas dimensões, Franqueador: Problemas de Comunicação, Falta de Supervisão e Monitoramento e Influência na Rentabilidade e; Franqueado: Pouca Capacidade de Adaptação, Não Conhecimento do Sistema e Baixa Pró-Atividade. Esses fatores dificultam a construção da confiança no franqueador e problemas de agência. Destaca-se que a falta de comunicação com a equipe pode ser um fator desencadeante desse processo, um gatilho desse não engajamento. Na tese também fica claro que o nível de empreendedorismo pretendido pelas franqueadoras para seus franqueados ainda é algo difícil de mensurar e não muito claro. / One of the franchising foundations is the relationship between franchisee and franchisor. The franchisor, brand owner, is responsible for formatting the business and establishing the bases of a standardized franchised chain, one of the pillars of this type of system. The franchisee plays the role of keeping its unit according to the precepts and models imposed by the franchisor. The franchise chain may be harmed by franchisees who decide not to engage and present different behavior. The question that guided the work was: What leads franchisees not to engage in the franchise chain? In order to answer this question, a model of factors that influence engagement was developed. It served as basis for the purpose of the thesis, which is to look for the factors that influence franchisees not to engage. The study presents the relationship between the agents involved, deepening the concepts of the agency theory in franchising, mainly regarding the choice of new partners and maintenance of the current ones; moreover, the importance of behavioral factors is verified as well, such as, proactivity and adaptability and not only the economic ones which are usually considered by franchisors. In order to elaborate the thesis 37 interviews were conducted (3 franchisees, 8 franchise field consultants, 24 franchisees and 2 test) totaling more than 60 hours of material. Qualitative and exploratory, the study compared engaged and not engaged franchisees through primary data using content analysis techniques by operating MAXQDA12 software. The study, which started off from thirty influence factors, presents a six-factor model of franchisees non-engagement, divided into the following two dimensions: Franchisor (Communication Problems, Lack of Supervision and Monitoring and Influence on Profitability) and Franchisee (Poor Adaptability, No Knowledge of the System and Low Pro-Activity). These factors hinder confidence building in the franchiser resulting in agency issues. It is accentuated that the lack of team communication can be an initiating factor to this process, a trigger of this nonengagement problem. In this thesis it is also clear that the entrepreneurship level intended by franchisors to their franchisees is still something very difficult to measure and it is very unclear.

This thesis is an empirical investigation into the control mechanisms of headquarters (HQ) exercised over their subsidiaries and is conducted with the help of primary data collected from 147 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Following on from the literature review, this study proposed that the headquarters-subsidiary mechanisms could be linked to agency theory (with the 'classical' principal-agent relationship as its core) and to resource dependency theory (implying relations between the subsidiary and other partners based on interdependence). Our results show that the agency and resource dependency mechanisms are indeed used side by side and complementary to each other to exercise control. The Headquarters-subsidiary model used in this study has four components of control in it: personal centralised control (PCC), bureaucratic formalised control (BFC), output control (OUT) and informal control (INFO). These controls (as an agency mechanism) provide a solid platform on which other mechanisms can be built. The complementarities of these control mechanisms may be linked to earlier studies that show that successful organisations combine tight control with more open, informal and flexible information and communication exchanges. A focus that bends too much towards formal control or too much towards informal control may threaten a company's existence. Our research provides an empirical explanation on this premise. The study found that Anglo-Saxon countries heavily use impersonal types of control mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. Compared to the US, the level of control in Oriental subsidiaries is less; or, put differently, the latter enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than US subsidiaries. Once a unit is operational, Oriental parent companies grant many more degrees of freedom than US parent companies. When we deconstructed the results for Europe, comparing German and British MNEs as a group to Oriental MNEs, we found that the latter exercised greater overall control. With regard to output and bureaucratic control, we found that both US MNEs and those from the Middle East exercised greater control than Oriental MNEs. The study drew the aspect of international transfers into the picture and investigated the role of expatriates in controlling subsidiaries. It has been recognised that expatriates can form both direct and indirect means of control. In executing direct types of control, expatriates directly supervised decisions taken at subsidiaries. The study found that this role is particularly strong in MNEs from Asia-Pacific countries and German MNEs, and is much less important in subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon MNEs. We found that subsidiaries of German MNEs experienced a very high level of control; indeed, the only control mechanism that German MNEs did not implement among subsidiaries was control by socialisation and networks. German and Japanese MNEs are perhaps more rooted in business systems concerned with the management of issues internationally than American or British companies. The second group reflected that Anglo-Saxon countries heavily used impersonal types of control mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. When we deconstructed the results for Europe, comparing German and British as a group to Oriental MNEs, reveals the latter as possessing greater overall control. With regard to output and bureaucratic control, we found that both US MNEs and those from the Middle East exercised greater control than Oriental MNEs. Headquarters can strategize to implement control by the informal and social means method by positioning a sizeable number of managers from the home country within the subsidiary. Indeed, our results revealed this as true. It seems that their presence has positive and significant effects on most levels of control: personal, output, bureaucratic and informal. Contrary to this, however, we found that the presence of a sizeable number of expatriates (as opposed to headquarters managers) leaded to greater autonomy in subsidiaries. In terms of strategy and structure, we indicated that the three distinct organisational models identified for MNEs could be recognised in our study. Control INFO was significantly, positively related to global strategy, multi-domestic and transnational strategy compared with PCC, BFC, and OUT control mechanism. Conversely, BFC had a significant, negative and weak relationship with global strategy and transnational strategy, and no relationship with multi-domestic strategy. In general however, we can deduce the existence of a tendency for global, transnational and multi-domestic MNEs to use indirect control mechanisms and informal control suited to their integrated organisational models to a larger extent. Our results confirmed previous studies in the field of organisation theory, in the sense that size is an important explanatory factor for differences in control mechanisms. In contrast to these studies, however, a dominant effect was found only for the indirect control mechanisms. Few detailed studies that have investigated the effect of size on the two indirect control mechanisms; in actuality, most previous studies have focused on the direct control mechanisms (personal centralised control and bureaucratic formalised control) only. As such, our study reconfirmed the importance of the variable size, but concluded that it is mainly associated with higher levels of indirect control. The age of the subsidiary does not seem to have a significant influence on the type of control mechanism that is exercised by headquarters towards a particular subsidiary. Our study investigated the importance of various MNE characteristics in an attempt to explain performance differences between MNEs. The advantage of this study is that many of the characteristics that have been identified in previous literature as being important factors influencing performance were included in our research design, in order for us to be able to answer the other research questions. This therefore allowed us to assess the relative importance levels of different variables in explaining performance differences between companies, such as: country of origin, industry, size, interdependence, local responsiveness, knowledge flows, and the strategy and structure of the MNEs.

This study uses agency theory to test whether the demand for quality audits by listed Chinese companies is associated with changes in ownership structure, which is characterized by the dominance of the state, institutional and individual shareholders. The empirical test results obtained in a concentrated ownership setting are supportive of agency theory. Specifically, I find that the decrease of state shares and the corresponding increase of institutional shares result in a demand for higher-quality audits in China’s stock market. The results provide empirical support for the government’s recent initiative in reducing state ownership in listed companies to improve firm performance and the supply of quality accounting information through independent auditing.

Agency theory is one of the principal frameworks utilized in explaining the family business phenomena. The objectives of this dissertation are to (1) identify the unique agent-principal dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firms, (2) determine the effects of these unique agency dynamics on family firm performance, and (3) evaluate these unique agency dynamics within family businesses, as moderated by differing forms of governance and management practices.This dissertation proposes that family firms are defined by two unique and opposing agency dynamics. On one hand, it is posited that family firms are defined by their ability to deploy concomitant forms of relational governance that reduce information asymmetry and associated agency costs. On the other hand, it is posited that family firms are distinctly encumbered with agency costs from non-economic family oriented goals. These distinct agency cost-savings, termed as family gains, and agency costs, termed as family costs, contribute to the study on how and why family firms perform differently than non-family firms.In addition, the study proposes that the ensuing trade-off between family gains and family costs may lead to competitive advantages for family firms in highly competitive environments. This agency trade-off provides a link between agency theory and the resource-based perspective of the family firm.Finally, this dissertation seeks to investigate these agency dynamics among family firms that employ differing governance and management practices. In particular, this study looks at how the agency dynamics of family firms that employ the most concentrated forms of management and governance, manifested as owner-manager led family firms, compare against other forms of family firms. This study posits that manager led family firms, on one hand, have greater family gains and, on the other hand, have greater family costs when compared against other forms of family firms. Moreover, it is proposed that under highly competitive environments, the trade-off between family gains and family costs lead to greater competitive advantages for owner-manager led family firms over other family firms.This dissertation employs cross-sectional linear regression as the primary tool for empirical analysis on Australian business data. In addition, non-parametric testing is utilized to support the above analysis. These analyses are complemented by proper robustness checks to support the study’s validity.The results from empirical analysis corroborate this study’s propositions. First, the research suggests that family firms have family gains driven by lower information asymmetries, but have family costs driven by greater divergence in firm objectives. Second, the results indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms, which is consistent with extant family business literature. Likewise, the results suggest that family firms under managerial ownership have greater family gains and greater family costs than other

The purpose of this study was to advance the discussion of collaboration between Canadian sport organizations beyond current levels of critical rhetoric and to (a) recommend improvements to the collaborative sport management processes specifically related to this particular case and (b) provide an analytical framework that will facilitate the application of this knowledge to others in similar interorganizational relationships. The purpose was achieved by collecting empirical evidence on the collaborative process through a theoretically guided case study of the relationship between Sport Canada and Canadian Interuniversity Sport (CIS), which were selected for the study due to their prominence in the Canadian sport system. Agency theory was chosen to provide the primary guiding framework for development of the research questions, and data collection and analysis. Data collection included three sources: my personal narrative, a selection of relevant documents, and personal interviews with thirteen key informants familiar with the two sport organizations. Data analysis was guided by the key concepts of agency theory to provide structure for the process. Consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, my findings indicated that the primary goals of Sport Canada and CIS are incongruent and that a managed contract is in place that includes financial incentives for CIS to collaborate with Sport Canada, but the incentives do not appear to work. Reporting and monitoring occur on an annual basis, but the relationship is essentially one of funding and accountability and not collaboration. The results of this research suggest that the current paradigmatic approach to understanding the Canadian sport system, based on the assumption that the federal government controls funding and national policy and thereby controls the sport system, is inappropriate and works directly against the espoused need for interorganizational collaboration. The opportunity for enhanced collaboration does exist, but intentional efforts to collaborate must be increased. The control paradigm should be rejected in favor of shared goal setting and decision-making and a negotiated contract between the organizations that identifies a measurable collaborative advantage. This research confirmed and explained the contribution that can be made by agency theory to the study and management of collaboration in sport organizations.

The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others? The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports. For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions. The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.