With the arrival of the Economic Analysis of Law, some scholars began to consider Law as a set of “official prices” given by the legislature or the courts. Such change of perspective created some ius-economic inconsistencies because  a  large segment of the doctrine didn’t realize the impossibility of efficiently regulating the economy by recurring only toorders and mandates.In this article, the author argues that it is necessary to establish the ius-economic differences between sanctions and prices, i.e. between those hypotheses in which Lawsets a price on a behavior and those cases which Law looks forward to impose a sanction. Such ideas should be applied to Tort Law, specifically in the definition and understanding of allocation criteria. / Con la llegada del Análisis Económico del Derecho se pasó a considerar el Derecho comoun conjunto de “precios oficiales” dados por ellegislador o por los jueces. El cambio de perspectiva creó algunas incoherencias ius-econó-micas, ya que un amplio sector de la doctrinano cayó en la cuenta de la imposibilidad deregular eficientemente la economía usando sólo órdenes y mandatosEn el presente artículo, el autor sostiene que resulta necesario establecer las diferencias ius-económicas entre las sanciones y los pre- cios; es decir, entre aquellas hipótesis en que el Derecho atribuye un precio sobre un com- portamiento y aquellos supuestos en que el Derecho se ocupa de imponer una sanción, ideas que deberán ser aplicadas a la responsabilidad extracontractual, específicamente a la delimitación y comprensión de los criterios de imputación.

Since 1994, the Public Procurement Act has undergone changes aimed to improve the procurement process and promoting innovation. In order to promote innovation there are a number of government agencies that offer financial assistance, especially to small business with innovative ideas. Despite these efforts, newly established small businesses have difficulties entering the market. The study investigates whether changes have been made in the public procurement of medical devices with regard to price and quality prioritization. The priority criteria is presented by the contracting authority as percentage in the allocation criteria. The study is limited to in vitro diagnostic products contracting in Swedish healthcare between the years 2009 and 2015. All tenders, companies that apply for participation in procurement, were analyzed based on sales, number of employees and year of establishment with the purpose of evaluating differences between winning tenders and other tenders. The result shows that prioritization has been increasingly on price rather than the quality. Regarding the winning tenders the study shows that larger, more established companies dominates the market. Noteworthy is that this dominance has increased over theses last years. The increase may be due to a spiral effect that is created when winning tenders get an increased economic power.