Zhang, Chuqi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [141-151]). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1. --- The Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1. --- Definition of Jurisdiction --- p.1 / Definition of Jurisdiction --- p.1 / Limits on Jurisdiction in International Law --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.2. --- The Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction --- p.3 / Basis for Jurisdiction in International Law --- p.3 / Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problem --- p.4 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Extraterritorial Jurisdiction based on Effect Principle --- p.5 / The Alcoa Case --- p.5 / After Alcoa Case --- p.6 / Key Question of This study --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2. --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.1. --- The Perspective of Jurisdictional Doctrine in International Law --- p.8 / Sovereignty Concern --- p.8 / Concurrent Jurisdiction & Conflicting Jurisdiction --- p.9 / In the Context of Globalization --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2. --- Evaluating Effect Principle and Its Development --- p.12 / "Development of Effect Principle´ؤ´ؤ""Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect""" --- p.12 / Restriction on Effect Principle´ؤInternational Comity --- p.14 / Restriction on Effect principle´ؤ´ؤReasonableness --- p.16 / Chapter 1.2.3. --- From the Perspective of International Competition Law --- p.18 / International Competition Law --- p.18 / Appraisal of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Competition Law --- p.19 / Chapter 1.3. --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.20 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Inadequacies of the Research on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.20 / Chapter 1.3.1. --- Approach of This Study --- p.21 / Chapter 1.3.2. --- Structure of the Study --- p.21 / Chapter Chapter II. --- Theoretical Framework --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1 --- Strict Territoriality --- p.24 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- Theoretical Foundation --- p.24 / Definition of State --- p.24 / Territoriality of Sovereignty --- p.25 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- Jurisdiction Rules in Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.26 / Exclusive Territory Principle --- p.26 / National Principle´ؤthe Only Exception --- p.28 / Effect Principle in Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.29 / Chapter 2.1.3. --- Reflections on Strict Territoriality --- p.31 / Appraisal of Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.31 / Challenge of Globalization to Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.32 / The Appraisal under International Law´ؤS.S. Lotus case --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2. --- Close connection theory --- p.34 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Theoretical Foundation --- p.34 / Concept of State --- p.34 / Sovereignty and Allocation of Power --- p.35 / International Comity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2.2. --- Jurisdictional Rules --- p.37 / Contact/connection/link --- p.37 / The Requirement of Reasonableness --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.3. --- Appraisal of Close connection theory --- p.40 / Approval for Close connection theory --- p.40 / Criticisms on Close connection theory --- p.40 / Chapter Chapter III. --- Effect Principle in Practice --- p.42 / Chapter 3.1. --- Anticompetitive Effect in Competition Law --- p.43 / Chapter 3.1.1. --- Brief Introduction of Competition Law --- p.43 / Chapter 3.1.2. --- Anticompetitive Effect --- p.46 / Anticompetitive Activities --- p.46 / Anticompetitive effect --- p.46 / Chapter 3.2. --- National Connection in Competition Law --- p.47 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- Transnational Corporation and Its Nationality --- p.48 / Nationality of Corporations --- p.48 / Transnational Actors --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Home State Lacks Incentives to Regulate Transnational Anticompetitive Activities --- p.52 / State's Incentive to Regulate --- p.52 / Example: Export Cartel Exemption in the United States --- p.54 / Chapter 3.3. --- Territorial Connection in Extraterritorial Cases in Competition Law --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- Establish A Territorial Connection Through Subsidiary --- p.56 / Parent & Subsidiary --- p.56 / Dyestuff Case --- p.59 / Chapter 3.3.2. --- Implementation Principle in the European Union --- p.59 / Woodpulp case --- p.59 / Relationship between Implementation Principle & Effect principle --- p.61 / Chapter 3.4. --- Development of Effect Principle --- p.61 / Chapter 3.4.1. --- Effect on Domestic Commerce --- p.63 / Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act --- p.63 / Chapter 3.4.2. --- Effect on Export --- p.64 / Footnote 159 --- p.64 / Effect on Export --- p.65 / Chapter 3.4.3. --- "Direct, Substantial & Reasonably Foreseeable Effect" --- p.67 / "The Application of The Direct, Substantial and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect" --- p.67 / Direct Effect --- p.68 / Substantial Effect --- p.70 / Reasonably Foreseeable Effect --- p.70 / Chapter 3.5. --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter Chapter IV. --- Aftermaths of Extraterritorial jurisdiction --- p.73 / Chapter 4.1 --- Inefficient Enforcement --- p.73 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Extraterritorial Enforcement Practice --- p.73 / The Grey Area --- p.75 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Conflicts caused by Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Uranium Litigation --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Response to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Blocking Statutes --- p.77 / Discovery-blocking statutes --- p.77 / Judgment blocking statutes --- p.79 / Clawback provision --- p.79 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- Application of Blocking Statutes: Laker Airway Litigation --- p.80 / Chapter 4.2 --- Concurrent jurisdiction --- p.81 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Multinational Merger Control --- p.83 / The Characteristics of Merger Control --- p.83 / Example I: Boeing case --- p.84 / Example II: GE/Honeywell Merger case --- p.85 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Problems with Concurrent Jurisdiction --- p.85 / Transaction Cost --- p.85 / Conflict and Bias --- p.87 / Chapter 4.3 --- Global welfare --- p.87 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Different Competition Laws in Different States --- p.87 / Reexamining GE/Honeywell case --- p.87 / Are differences between substantive competition laws avoidable? --- p.88 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Discrepancy between National Optimum and Global Optimum --- p.89 / Strict law wins --- p.39 / Definition of Efficiency in Economics --- p.90 / Chapter 4.4 --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Chapter Chapter V. --- Transnational Regulatory Modes --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1.1. --- Auxiliary mode based on Comity: EU-US Cooperation --- p.96 / US' Experience in Bilateral Cooperation --- p.96 / Positive Comity --- p.97 / Development of Positive Comity --- p.98 / Chapter 5.1.2. --- Auxiliary mode Based on Harmonization: Cooperation between Australia and New Zealand --- p.100 / Harmonization in Substantive Rules --- p.100 / Bilateral Jurisdiction --- p.101 / Chapter 5.1.3. --- The Role played by International Organizations --- p.102 / Characteristics of OECD --- p.102 / Promoting Convergence of Substantive Rules --- p.102 / Promoting Cooperation Between States --- p.103 / Chapter 5.1.4. --- Appraisal and Limits --- p.104 / Chapter 5.2 --- Supplementary mode --- p.105 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Relationship between Trade Law and Competition Law --- p.106 / Compatibility --- p.106 / Differences --- p.107 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- "WTO,s role in promoting the adoption of Competition law" --- p.108 / Characteristics of Competition Rules in WTO --- p.109 / Promote the Adoption of Competition Law --- p.109 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- WTO's Role in Mitigating Distorting Effect Resulting from State Interest --- p.110 / Obliging States to Implement Competition Law in A Just Way --- p.110 / Remedy for Improper Implementation of Competition Law --- p.111 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- WTO's role in Regulating States' Behavior That May Have An Anticompetitive Effect --- p.111 / Safeguard Agreement --- p.112 / The Kodak-Fuji Film case --- p.112 / Chapter 5.3 --- Alternative mode --- p.113 / Chapter 5.3.1. --- Two Aspects of Common Market --- p.115 / The Internal Aspect of Common Market --- p.115 / The External Aspect of Common Market --- p.116 / Chapter 5.3.2. --- Harmonization in Substantive Competition Law --- p.116 / The Status of the Agreement --- p.116 / Competition law of Member States --- p.117 / Chapter 5.3.3. --- Supranational Institution --- p.117 / The Function of a Supranational Institution --- p.117 / The Jurisdiction of Supranational Institution --- p.118 / Chapter 5.3.4. --- Alternative mode at the Global Level --- p.119 / Past Efforts to Create an Alternative mode --- p.119 / Criticism on international competition law --- p.120 / Chapter Chapter VI. --- Conclusion --- p.122 / Chapter 6.1. --- Legitimacy of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.122 / Chapter 6.1.1. --- A Refined Doctrine of Jurisdiction --- p.122 / Demise of Territoriality --- p.122 / The Close Connection Theory --- p.123 / Chapter 6.1.2. --- Extraterritorial Jurisdiction on Competition Law --- p.125 / Effect as a Close Connection --- p.125 / Reasonableness of Effect Principle --- p.127 / Territoriality and Democracy Concern --- p.128 / Chapter 6.2. --- Sufficiency of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.130 / Chapter 6.2.1. --- Inadequacies of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.130 / State as a Regulator in Globalization --- p.132 / Inadequacies of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.133 / Chapter 6.2.2. --- Three Regulatory Modes in International Competition Law --- p.134 / Types of Transnational Regulatory Modes --- p.134 / Implication of the Three Modes --- p.136 / Conclusion --- p.138 / Bibliography --- p.141

Thesis (J.S.D.)--University of Chicago Law School, 2003. / "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (J.S.D.)--University of Chicago Law School, 2003. / "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis aims to underline the paradox surrounding cartels in general and international cartels in particular. While they are almost unanimously recognised as the most egregious form of antitrust violations, real political willingness fails to fight efficiently against cartels. Notwithstanding, this paper shows why international cooperation is essential but still unsatisfactory in eliminating international cartels through concrete examples in domestic laws, such as the Fine Arts Auctions Case and export cartel configurations. Existing national and international instruments present advantages and disadvantages. International competition law, including international cartel issues, is still subject to virulent debates within the international community, particularly with respect to the future of a WTO Multilateral Agreement. It raises the question as to what can be suggested in order to solve aspects of these debates in a satisfactory manner and thereby contribute---modestly---to ameliorate the fight against international cartels.

Liberalising trade is not limited to diminishing trade barriers or decreasing tariffs rates, but also ensuring that these efforts are maintained: this is the role of competition rules. / It is common knowledge that for decades Countries have been trying to agree on international harmonised competition rules. Aware of this interaction between trade and competition policies, they knew efforts had to be undertaken to make them co-exist. Unfortunately the dream never came true. And parties only inherited rules of competition hardly recognised, or implicitly applied within the International Trade Law Framework. Even if some implicit rules of competition have been 'injected' in some of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provisions in the early 1950's, it is only the new 1994 World Trade Organisation Agreements that have consecrated this orientation, drafted so to discipline the Parties as for competition-related behaviour; even if by definition WTO Agreements were not competition agreements. / Far from the debate of their potential harmonisation, the thesis identifies these rules, analyses their evolution within time and their very application through the study of WTO cases. It will establish that the emergence of a competition jurisprudence is an undeniable reality.

No description available.

No description available.

When the European Commission ultimately blocked the merger between American giant General Electrics and Honeywell in July 2001, this decision triggered a firestorm of criticism. Not only had the Commission just stopped a purely American transaction for the first time since the enactment of European Merger Regulation, but it also contradicted its American Counterpart, the US Department of Justice: The Americans had cleared the deal several months earlier. / In spite of constant cooperative efforts during the investigation, the two antitrust agencies could not reach a common position. When scholars and officials tried to find reasons for the divergence between the American and European decisions, they often criticized the Commission's general approach of focusing on competitors rather than on consumers. They further claimed that the Commission had used dubious economic models to block the merger. / This thesis tries to reinstate the reputation of the European Commission as a professional antitrust institution. The criticisms often left the impression that the Task Force of the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission constituted a politically-orientated, rather than economic and legally-orientated, organ. It will be shown that this is actually not the case. / After having analyzed the Commission's decision in detail, and revealing both the strengths and weaknesses of its findings, the thesis will demonstrate that most of the criticisms have to be rejected, and that the Commission had a legal and economic basis in blocking the GE-Honeywell merger.

No description available.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law