Leung Siu Kuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-68). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- A Story --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Overview --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Introduction of SQL Injection --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- The importance of SQL Injection --- p.6 / Chapter 1.4 --- Thesis organization --- p.8 / Chapter 2 --- Background --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1 --- Flow of web applications using DBMS --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2 --- Structure of DBMS --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Tables --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Columns --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Rows --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- SQL Syntax --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- SELECT --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- AND/OR --- p.14 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- INSERT --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- UPDATE --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- DELETE --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- UNION --- p.18 / Chapter 3 --- Details of SQL Injection --- p.20 / Chapter 3.1 --- Basic SELECT Injection --- p.20 / Chapter 3.2 --- Advanced SELECT Injection --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Single Line Comment (--) --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Guessing the number of columns in a table --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Guessing the column name of a table (Easy one) --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Guessing the column name of a table (Difficult one) . --- p.27 / Chapter 3.3 --- UPDATE Injection --- p.29 / Chapter 3.4 --- Other Attacks --- p.30 / Chapter 4 --- Current Defenses --- p.32 / Chapter 4.1 --- Causes of SQL Injection attacks --- p.32 / Chapter 4.2 --- Defense Methods --- p.33 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Defensive Programming --- p.34 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- hiding the error messages --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Filtering out the dangerous characters --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Using pre-complied SQL statements --- p.36 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Checking for tautologies in SQL statements --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2.6 --- Instruction set randomization --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2.7 --- Building the query model --- p.40 / Chapter 5 --- Proposed Solution --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2 --- Natures of SQL Injection --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3 --- Our proposed system --- p.44 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Features of the system --- p.44 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Stage 1 - Checking with current signatures --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Stage 2 - SQL Server Query --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3.4 --- Stage 3 - Error Triggering --- p.46 / Chapter 5.3.5 --- Stage 4 - Alarm --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3.6 --- Stage 5 - Learning --- p.50 / Chapter 5.4 --- Examples --- p.51 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Defensing BASIC SELECT Injection --- p.52 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Defensing Advanced SELECT Injection --- p.52 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Defensing UPDATE Injection --- p.57 / Chapter 5.5 --- Comparison --- p.59 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.62 / Chapter A --- Commonly used table and column names --- p.64 / Chapter A.1 --- Commonly used table names for system management --- p.64 / Chapter A.2 --- Commonly used column names for password storage --- p.65 / Chapter A.3 --- Commonly used column names for username storage --- p.66 / Bibliography --- p.67

This work presents the implementation of the the IEEE 1609.2 WAVE Security Services Standard. This implementation provides the ability to generate a message signature, along with the capability to verify that signature for wave short messages transmitted over an unsecured medium. Only the original sender of the message can sign it, allowing for the authentication of a message to be checked. As hashing is used during the generation and verification of signatures, message integrity can be verified because a failed signature verification is a result of a compromised message. Also provided is the ability to encrypt and decrypt messages using AES-CCM to ensure that sensitive information remains safe and secure from unwanted recipients. Additionally this implementation provides a way for the 1609.2 specific data types to be encoded and decoded for ease of message transmittance. This implementation was built to support the Smart Drive initiative’s VANET testbed, supported by the National Science Foundation and is intended to run on the Vehicular Multi-technology Communication Device (VMCD) that is being developed. The VMCD runs on the embedded Linux operating system and this implementation will reside inside of the Linux kernel. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2016. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection