Submitted by PPG Filosofia (filosofia-pg@pucrs.br) on 2017-11-24T12:51:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_IURI COELHO OLIVEIRA_COMPLETO.pdf: 1662744 bytes, checksum: 675c0cc2e152bbef478b5b960d034479 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-12-01T13:12:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_IURI COELHO OLIVEIRA_COMPLETO.pdf: 1662744 bytes, checksum: 675c0cc2e152bbef478b5b960d034479 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-01T13:17:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_IURI COELHO OLIVEIRA_COMPLETO.pdf: 1662744 bytes, checksum: 675c0cc2e152bbef478b5b960d034479 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-31 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico - CNPq / This study aims to develop two key concepts for the theistic argument of John Duns Scotus, namely that of essentially ordered causes (ceo) and that of accidentally ordered causes (cao). These concepts appear in both the different versions of his argument (Lect., Ord., Rep. I-A e TPP) as well as in a passage from his commentary on Aristotle?s Metaphysics. Thus, first of all, it is necessary to treat in a general sense the characteristics of these texts and to say where, in themselves, those concepts are found, besides indicating how the frame of the theistic argument of Scotus leads him to causality. Secondly, it is important to devote a little attention to the doctrinal sources on which Scotus based himself to formulate his own concepts, namely on Aristotle and Avicenna. In this chapter it is also shown in which the Scotistic notions approach and depart from those of his sources. In addition, the differences indicated by Scotus between the ceo and cao, on the one hand, and per se and per accidens causes, on the other, are clarified. Finally, it deals exclusively with ceo and cao, initially, presenting the characteristics of the members of each causal series in their respective processes of action; then, it is studied how these causes are structured as series, where the treatment of the bond of both with the First Cause is initiated through three propositions in which the fineness of the ceo is proved, the possible infinity of the cao and how the First Cause acts in relation to these two causal series. This chapter is finished discussing the exclusive characteristics of the Causa Prima in its relation to the others (ceo and cao), and saying how these two series contribute to a causal theory in theistic argument of Duns Scotus. / Este estudo tem em vista desenvolver dois conceitos-chave para o argumento te?sta de Jo?o Duns Scotus, a saber, o de causas essencialmente ordenadas (ceo) e o de causas acidentalmente ordenadas (cao). Estes conceitos aparecem tanto nas diferentes vers?es de seu argumento (Lect., Ord., Rep. I-A e TPP) quanto em uma passagem de seu coment?rio ? Metaf?sica de Arist?teles. Assim, em primeiro lugar, ? preciso tratar em sentido geral das carater?sticas destes textos e onde, nos mesmos, aqueles conceitos aparecem, al?m de indicar como a estrutura do argumento te?sta de Scotus leva-o ? causalidade. Em segundo, ? importante dedicar um pouco de aten??o ?s fontes doutrinais em que Scotus se baseou para formul?-los, a saber, Arist?teles e Avicena, mostrando em que as no??es scotistas se aproximam e em que se afastam das de suas fontes, al?m de esclarecer as diferen?as indicadas por Scotus entre as ceo e as cao, de um lado, e as causas per se e per accidens, de outro. Por fim, trata-se exclusivamente das ceo e das cao, inicialmente, apresentando as caracter?sticas dos membros de cada s?rie causal em seus respectivos processos de atua??o; a seguir, estuda - se como estas causas se estruturam enquanto s?ries, onde se inicia o tratamento do v?nculo de ambas com a Causa Primeira atrav?s de tr?s proposi??es em que se prova a finidade das ceo, a poss?vel infinidade das cao e como a Causa Primeira atua em rela??o a estas duas s?ries causais. Conclui-se ent?o o cap?tulo tratando das caracter?sticas exclusivas da Causa Prima em sua rela??o com as outras (ceo e cao), e de como estas duas s?ries contribuem para uma teoria causal no argumento te?sta de Duns Scotus.