Revised thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität, Berlin, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [540]-584) and index.

Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--Rhodes University, 2005. / "A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the department of Philosophy" -T.p.

I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1960. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 509-517).

British aristocratic women exerted political influence and power during the century beginning with the accession of George III. They expressed their political power through the four roles of social patron, patronage distributor, political advisor, and political patron/electioneer. British aristocratic women were able, trained, and expected to play these roles. Politics could not have existed without these women. The source of their political influence was the close interconnection of politics and society. In this small, inter-connected society, women could and did influence politics. Political decisions, especially for the Whigs, were not made in the halls of government with which we are so familiar, but in the halls of the homes of the social/political elite. However, this close interconnection can make women's political influence difficult to assess and understand for our twentieth century experience. Sources for this thesis are readily available. Contemporary, primary sources are abundant. This was the age of letter and diary writing. There is, however, a dearth of modern works concerning the political activities of aristocratic women. Most modern works rarely mention women. Other problems with sources include the inappropriate feminization of the time period and the filtering of this period through modern, not contemporary, points of view. Separate spheres is the most common and most inappropriate feminist issue raised by historians. This doctrine is not valid for aristocratic women of this time. The material I present in this thesis is not new. The sources, both contemporary and modern, have been available to historians for some time. By changing our rigid definition of politics by enlarging it to include the broader areas of political activities such as social patron, patronage distributor, political advisor, and political/electioneer, we can see British aristocratic women in a new light, revealing political power and influence.

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis aims to consider the competing visions of Sasanian Iran advanced by Arthur Christensen in ‘L'Iran sous les Sassanides' (1944) and Parvaneh Pourshariati in ‘Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire' (2008), discuss the relevant evidence in relation to their arguments, and to suggest our own theory of how the Sasanian Empire operated. Christensen argued for the strength of the Sasanian monarchy and the subservience of the aristocracy to the kings, whilst Pourshariati's thesis stressed Sasanian royal weakness and the relative power of the aristocracy. These theses are incompatible, offering fundamentally different conceptions of the natures of the Sasanian monarchy and aristocracy, and how they interacted with each other. Firstly, this thesis critiques the models established by Christensen and Pourshariati, especially their failure to acknowledge evidence at variance with their thesis, and their lack of discussion concerning how the aristocracy perceived their relationship with the monarchy. We then turn to our own discussion of the evidence relating to the Sasanian monarchy and royal power, and the cultural outlook of the aristocracy, with reference to the above theories, so as to understand how strong the Sasanian monarchy was, the nature of royal power, and how the aristocracy perceived their relationship with the crown. We argue for a conception of Sasanian Iran somewhere between the theories of Christensen and Pourshariati. There is very little evidence that the Sasanian kings ruled through a state enjoying significant institutional power; indeed Sasanian power seems very limited in the periphery of the Empire. However, the inherent respect for the monarchy held by the aristocracy, and the ties of mutual dependence which existed between kings and aristocrats, allowed for Sasanian rule to in general be highly effective.